The case was a survival and wrongful death action brought by a mother against the District of Columbia (after the other defendants settled) for the death of her five-year-old son, who left an inadequately supervised school playground through a broken fence, entered a street, and was struck by a truck. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding damages in both actions, and the court denied the District's post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court reasoned that the District has a duty to maintain safe playgrounds through ministerial acts such as fence repair and supervision, which are not protected by sovereign immunity, and that the evidence supported the jury's findings on negligence, proximate cause, and lack of contributory negligence by the child.
This case was a wrongful death and survival action brought by the mother of a motorcyclist killed in a collision with a fuel truck at an intersection in Washington, D.C. The plaintiff alleged negligence by the truck driver but presented no eyewitness testimony, skid marks, or other direct evidence of fault, relying instead on an accident reconstruction expert. After conducting a voir dire, the court excluded the expert's opinion testimony for lacking a sufficient factual foundation. With no remaining evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the court directed a verdict for the defendants without reaching the issue of contributory negligence. The ruling emphasized that a stop sign does not confer an absolute right of way and that liability requires proof of failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
In Hartwell v. United States, a federal prisoner convicted of drug offenses and sentenced under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act (NARA) to an indeterminate term filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate or modify his sentence after becoming ineligible for parole due to his refusal to participate in the Daytop drug therapy program following a parole violation. The court held that the § 2255 motion was not the proper vehicle for relief. The core reasoning was that § 2255 is available only to attack the imposition of a sentence itself, whereas challenges to the execution of a sentence—including participation in treatment programs and resulting parole eligibility—must be brought via habeas corpus in the district of confinement.
The case involves a petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or modify his sentence under 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) for narcotics possession, arguing that the statute either did not apply or was unconstitutional as applied to a non-trafficking addict. The court reviewed precedents including Watson v. United States and related cases on collateral attacks and Eighth Amendment claims, distinguishing them from Brady v. United States, and concluded that the petitioner could raise the issue despite a prior guilty plea. It determined that the sentencing court had erroneously believed it lacked authority to grant probation due to statutory restrictions and that relief was available under § 2255 to consider alternative sentencing. The court ordered the petitioner to appear for a hearing to evaluate suspending the sentence and imposing probation with conditions for participation in a narcotics treatment program.
This case concerned a subrogation claim by Federal Insurance Company against Plaza Drugs, Inc. for approximately $13,000 in fire damages to a building owned by Wade Apartments, Inc., which had leased space to Plaza Drugs. Federal paid Wade's claim and sued Plaza as subrogee, alleging negligence in causing the 1969 fire. The court granted Plaza's motion for summary judgment, holding that a prior release agreement between Wade and Plaza—executed before the insurance payment and subrogation rights arose—barred the claim, even though Plaza may have known of the insurance policy. The release explicitly covered all claims related to the fire in exchange for early lease termination, and Federal had not alleged fraud or collusion.
This case involved charges of robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon against three defendants stemming from an armed holdup of a jewelry store in the District of Columbia. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment or, alternatively, to suppress all identification evidence on due process grounds. The court declined to dismiss the indictment but ordered suppression of all identification evidence, including any in-court identifications. The ruling was based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the photo displays, lineups, and show-ups, which the court found were unduly suggestive and created an irreconcilable violation of due process under Stovall v. Denno.
