Remington Products, Inc. v. North American Philips, Corp.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1991-05-07 · cited 13×
This antitrust case involved plaintiff Remington Products challenging the acquisition of Schick Incorporated's electric shaver assets by defendants North American Philips Corporation and its parent N.V. Philips, asserting claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and related Connecticut statutes. The court had previously granted summary judgment to defendants on January 7, 1991, ruling that Remington failed to demonstrate antitrust injury. In this memorandum and final judgment, the court resolved outstanding issues by awarding Remington $178,162.37 in discovery sanctions plus interest from the judgment date, dismissed all claims on the merits for lack of antitrust injury, and ordered each party to bear its own costs. The core reasoning was that the absence of antitrust injury was dispositive of all legal theories, while prejudgment interest on sanctions was deemed appropriate under the circumstances despite Rule 37 not explicitly authorizing it.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Remington Products, Inc. v. North American Philips, Corp.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1991-01-07 · cited 11×
In Remington Products, Inc. v. North American Philips, Corp., the plaintiff brought antitrust claims against the defendants alleging injury from their business conduct. The district court initially granted summary judgment to the defendants on the antitrust injury issue, then denied it upon reconsideration in light of intervening circuit precedent. After the Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., the defendants sought further relief, prompting the court to reexamine its prior order under principles allowing modification of interlocutory rulings when there is a change in controlling law. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact on antitrust injury under the ARCO standards and therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Remington Products, Inc. v. North American Philips Corp.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1989-07-10 · cited 7×
This case is a private antitrust suit by Remington Products, Inc. against North American Philips Corp., N.V. Philips, and Schick, Inc., alleging that NAPC's 1982 acquisition of Schick's electric shaver assets violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by threatening competition in the U.S. electric shaver market. The court ruled on cross-motions for partial summary judgment, granting judgment to the defendants. The core reasoning was that Remington failed to demonstrate antitrust injury, as its claimed harm consisted only of lost profits from increased competition rather than any reduction in competition or threat to its viability, consistent with Supreme Court precedent such as Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.
business & regulatory
Tillquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1989-06-15 · cited 20×
In this case, plaintiff Ralph Tillquist sued Ford Motor Credit Company for alleged wrongful repossession of his automobile and unfair debt collection practices under Connecticut law. After a bench trial, the court ruled that the repossession was not wrongful because the contract's anti-waiver clause permitted FMCC to repossess despite prior acceptance of late payments, and there was no requirement for prior notice of default under the circumstances. However, the court found that FMCC violated unfair collection practices rules and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act through repeated harassing calls to the plaintiff's family and workplace. As a result, the court awarded the plaintiff $500 in punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees, even though no actual damages were proven.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability
Stefano v. Smith
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1989-01-18 · cited 5×
This federal diversity case involved a wrongful death and loss of consortium claim arising from a 1982 two-car collision that killed Anthony Stefano; his widow sued the other driver, a Texaco service station, and Chrysler (manufacturer of both vehicles) under negligence and product liability theories. After the plaintiff settled with the driver and Texaco, Chrysler sought to implead Texaco for contribution via a third-party complaint and moved to certify novel state-law questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court denied certification, reasoning that it had already fully briefed and researched the issues and that certification would delay rather than expedite resolution. It granted Texaco's motion to dismiss the contribution claim, holding that Connecticut's Product Liability Act permits impleader against non-sellers but that settled defendants are protected from contribution claims by settling defendants to encourage settlements and consistent with comparative fault principles.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Yuzari v. Southern Auto Sales
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1988-06-29 · cited 2×
This case was a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident in which plaintiffs Haim Yuzari, Nahemi Yuzari, and Naftaly Hirshman obtained jury verdicts against defendant Southern Auto Sales totaling over $1.1 million before reductions for 35 percent contributory negligence and prior settlements with other defendants. Southern Auto moved for remittitur to offset the settlement amounts against the verdicts and to reduce the loss-of-consortium award by the contributory negligence percentage, while the plaintiffs sought additur on grounds that the verdicts were inadequate. The court analyzed these motions under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-216a, which requires a finding that a verdict is excessive or inadequate as a matter of law before ordering remittitur or additur, and applied precedents such as Peck v. Jacquemin and Alfano v. Insurance Center of Torrington to determine that settlement offsets were appropriate where the combined amounts would render the verdicts excessive as a matter of law. The court further held that the consortium award should not be reduced by the contributory negligence percentage and dismissed one plaintiff's claim for lack of prosecution.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Dighello v. Busconi
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-11-10 · cited 27×
This case involves a long-running business dispute between former associates Ronald DiGhello and Lewis Busconi over the development of a $66 million project on land in Milford, Connecticut, which led to multiple lawsuits and ultimately arbitration under their 1981 contract. After extensive hearings, the arbitration panel issued a detailed award finding DiGhello had breached agreements through obstruction and interference, awarding Busconi over $5.6 million in damages plus interest, and ordering DiGhello to execute various deeds and documents for partial specific performance to allow project completion. DiGhello moved to vacate the award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) on grounds that the panel exceeded its authority by deciding unsubmitted issues, binding non-party corporate entities, and issuing an incomplete or ambiguous award, while Busconi moved to confirm it. The court denied the motion to vacate and granted confirmation, ruling that the panel acted within the scope of the submitted issues, that DiGhello's entities were properly bound as he controlled them, and that the award was sufficiently clear and enforceable; it further appointed the arbitrators as special masters under Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 to oversee implementation given the parties' history of discord. The core reasoning emphasized federal policy favoring arbitration enforcement and the panel's comprehensive, reasoned findings after full opportunity for the parties to be heard.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Napoleon v. Xerox Corp.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-10-06 · cited 2×
In Napoleon v. Xerox Corp., the plaintiff sued Xerox under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state tort law alleging unlawful discrimination in the employment relationship. After the court previously denied dismissal of the § 1981 claim and applied Connecticut's three-year tort statute of limitations, the defendant moved for reconsideration based on the Second Circuit's intervening decision in Okure v. Owens, which it argued required the state's two-year personal-injury limitations period. The court denied reconsideration, concluding that Okure's criteria for selecting among multiple state personal-injury statutes were satisfied by the three-year provision because it was expansive enough to cover diverse claims and provided sufficient time for plaintiffs to investigate federal civil rights actions. The ruling left the § 1981 claim intact under the longer limitations period.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Napoleon v. Xerox Corp.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-03-26 · cited 10×
The case involved a black male employee who sued Xerox Corporation alleging racial discrimination in the denial of training, promotions, and his termination, seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state tort law for wrongful discharge. The defendant moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Title VII was the exclusive remedy precluding the § 1981 claim, that any § 1981 claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, and that the state-law claim was preempted by the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The court analyzed these arguments by reviewing the split in authority on Title VII exclusivity, citing Supreme Court decisions such as Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny and Brown v. General Services Administration that stress the comprehensive procedural framework of Title VII, and by examining borrowed state limitations periods for federal civil rights claims as well as the administrative scheme under state fair employment law.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Teleco Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Skandia Insurance
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1987-01-20 · cited 22×
In this diversity case, Teleco, a Connecticut-based company, sued several Scandinavian insurance companies for breach of contract and bad faith arising from their refusal to pay a $3.6 million claim under a policy covering lost down-hole assemblies used on offshore rigs. The insurers moved to dismiss, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The court denied the motion, holding that Connecticut's long-arm statute authorized jurisdiction because the insurance contract was to be performed in the state through premium payments from Connecticut, claim payments to Connecticut, quarterly reporting prepared in Connecticut, and the insurers' inspections of Teleco's books there. The court further concluded that exercising jurisdiction comported with due process due to the defendants' contacts with the forum and that Connecticut was the appropriate venue under forum non conveniens analysis.
procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability
Belfiore v. New York Times Co.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1986-12-23 · cited 15×
In Belfiore v. New York Times Co., independent newspaper delivery dealers in Fairfield County, Connecticut, sued the New York Times under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging that the Times' expansion of its direct T-Route home delivery system constituted price fixing, restraint of trade, monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize. The plaintiffs claimed the Times' actions, including referring new subscribers only to its own routes and offering lower prices through T-Routes, made it impossible for them to compete. The court granted the Times' motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that newspaper publishers have the right to assume control over all or part of the retail distribution of their products. The decision rested on findings that the plaintiffs failed to define a legally cognizable market for monopoly claims, that no coercion supported price-fixing allegations, and that the Times' conduct did not amount to an improper use of monopoly power.
business & regulatory
Walker v. Luther
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1986-07-16 · cited 11×
The case Walker v. Luther involved two petitioners convicted under District of Columbia law but serving sentences in federal prisons, who filed pro se habeas petitions claiming that the U.S. Parole Commission violated D.C. Code § 24-209 and equal protection by applying federal parole standards instead of D.C. standards at their reviews, unlike the treatment given to female D.C. offenders or those in local D.C. facilities. A pending class action, Cosgrove v. Meese, addressed identical issues regarding whether federal officials have authority to use federal criteria and whether any disparities violate equal protection. The court evaluated the motion to dismiss based on the overlapping class action, the petitioners' request to withdraw due to delay and inadequate representation concerns, and the merits of the statutory and constitutional claims.
criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power
Greene v. Sha-Na-Na
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1986-05-23 · cited 44×
The case concerned a lawsuit by Frederick Dennis Greene, a former member of the rock band Sha-Na-Na, against four ex-partners and two new partnerships they formed after expelling him and dissolving the original partnerships in 1984. Greene, a Connecticut resident, alleged breach of partnership agreements, wrongful dissolution, and related claims involving the band's service mark, seeking injunctive and monetary relief. The defendants, mostly California citizens with partnerships formed there, moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (3) for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The court granted the motion, holding that Connecticut's long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction because the defendants had insufficient minimum contacts with the state, the alleged tortious acts and contract breaches did not arise from Connecticut events, and a substantial part of the claims occurred elsewhere such as in California and Nevada.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
DiPersia v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Board
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1986-04-01 · cited 3×
In DiPersia v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Board, an attorney filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking the names and addresses of Connecticut residents contributing to the Railroad Retirement Fund so he could mail them pamphlets about rights under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The Railroad Retirement Board denied the request, relying on FOIA Exemption 3 (via the confidentiality provisions of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act), Exemption 6 (personal privacy), and the Privacy Act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled for the Board, determining that the requested list qualified for withholding under both Exemptions 3 and 6 because the governing statute permitted discretionary nondisclosure and because the employees' privacy interests in avoiding unsolicited mailings outweighed any public interest in disclosure when alternative means of communication were available.
procedurefederal powerlabor & employment
McDonnell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1985-07-08 · cited 11×
The case concerned a plaintiff's claims against a brokerage firm and its employee for alleged mismanagement of a securities account opened in 1980, including unauthorized sales of inherited securities and purchases of high-risk investments that reduced the account's value, with causes of action under federal securities laws, state securities and trade practices statutes, exchange rules, and common law. After nearly three years of litigation, extensive discovery, and multiple continuances near the trial date, the defendants moved to compel arbitration under the customer agreement's arbitration clause, to stay proceedings, and to amend their answer to add an arbitration defense. The court examined whether the defendants' delay in raising arbitration constituted waiver or caused substantial prejudice to the plaintiff through wasted discovery costs, while also addressing leave to amend under precedents like Strauss and the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Carpentino v. Transport Insurance
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1985-03-13 · cited 24×
The case involved a Connecticut worker injured on the job who received benefits under a voluntary agreement with his employer's insurer, an out-of-state company; after the insurer unilaterally stopped payments without required state agency approval under the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act, the plaintiff sued the insurer in federal court for bad-faith breach of contract and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), arguing the action was a direct action against the insurer that required deeming the insurer a citizen of the insured employer's state, and also contended the claims were barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions. The court denied the motion in full, holding that the suit was not a direct action because the insurer's liability stemmed from its own alleged wrongful conduct rather than the employer's, thereby preserving diversity jurisdiction, and allowing the independent tort and statutory claims to proceed outside the administrative process.
procedurelabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory
Clemco Corp. v. Frantz Manufacturing Co.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1985-01-14 · cited 3×
In this diversity action, Clemco Corporation, a Connecticut company, sued Frantz Manufacturing Company, an Illinois company, for breach of an oral sales representative agreement, claiming unpaid commissions on certain pre-termination sales with post-termination installment deliveries. The court denied Frantz's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction after a hearing. It held that the Connecticut long-arm statute applied because the contract was to be performed in the state, rejecting a narrow reading that would require only the defendant's performance there, and that Frantz's contacts with Connecticut, including substantial sales and other activities, satisfied due process requirements under International Shoe.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
United States v. Roy
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1984-11-19 · cited 5×
The case concerned federal firearms charges against defendant Michael Roland Roy, who moved to dismiss the indictment for alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD). Specifically, Roy argued that prosecutors failed to bring him to trial within the 120-day period required by Article IV(c) after his transfer from state custody and violated Article IV(e) by returning him to state custody without a trial. The court reviewed extensive facts involving multiple detainers from various states, writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, transfers between facilities including an overnight stay at Bridgeport CCC, and periods of tolling due to motions and other proceedings. The court analyzed whether the overnight stay constituted placement in another facility under the IAD and calculated the running of the 120-day clock, applying a liberal construction to the statute's purposes.
criminal lawprocedureguns
Schirm v. Auclair
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1984-10-26 · cited 7×
This case involves a dispute in which plaintiff John C. Schirm III, the former president of Youngstown Container Corp., sued the co-executors of the estate of the company's principal shareholder after Schirm settled a judgment on promissory notes and sought reimbursement or damages from the estate. The notes had been secured by company assets that the decedent allegedly removed to Connecticut, and the FDIC had pursued recovery against both the estate and Schirm. Schirm asserted three counts seeking declaratory relief based on an alleged indemnity agreement, detrimental reliance on an agreement that he would not be personally bound, and conversion of collateral. The defendants moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the Connecticut nonclaim statute barred the first two counts and that the statute of limitations barred the third. In this diversity action, the court applied Connecticut choice-of-law rules to determine that Ohio law governs the contract claims and the conversion claim, and analyzed whether the indemnity claim was contingent or barred by the nonclaim statute and whether the conversion action was timely.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Guthrie v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 1984-05-10 · cited 3×
The case involved plaintiff Donald Guthrie suing his former employer Ciba-Geigy Corporation and its Swiss parent company Ciba-Geigy, Ltd. for alleged unlawful termination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Both defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing they were not subject to suit in Connecticut under the state's long-arm statute or federal venue rules. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Corporation because the discrimination and termination claims did not arise from any business transacted by the company in Connecticut, and the federal venue statute does not confer personal jurisdiction. It reached the same conclusion as to the parent company, which had no direct involvement in the employment decisions, and therefore transferred the claims against the Corporation to the Southern District of New York while dismissing the claims against Limited.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure