This case concerned the re-sentencing of defendant Lashawn Wilson following her conviction for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, based on using stolen money orders to purchase computers shipped to various addresses. The Sixth Circuit had previously vacated the original 2008 sentence as procedurally unreasonable and remanded the matter. At the August 2011 re-sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of time served (45 months) with no restitution, fine, or supervised release. The court discussed broader issues including delays between conviction and sentencing and the practice of pre-prepared sentencing opinions but explicitly stated these considerations had no bearing on the sentence. The outcome was reached in accordance with federal statutes, binding precedent, and the remand instructions.
In Bell v. Prefix, Inc., the plaintiff sued his former employer alleging termination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and prevailed at a jury trial, receiving $14,563 in damages plus liquidated damages and interest. The plaintiff then moved for over $488,000 in attorney's fees and costs, along with sanctions against the defendant under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The court granted the motion in part, awarding $101,600 in reasonable fees after calculating the lodestar amount, adjusting for hours reasonably expended based on the Johnson factors, and reducing for duplicative billing and other inefficiencies, while denying sanctions because the defendant's defenses were not shown to be frivolous. The court ordered the plaintiff to submit documentation of reasonable costs.
The case involves the U.S. government's motion to withdraw the reference of bankruptcy proceedings to the bankruptcy court in light of a related criminal indictment against Dante DeMiro for operating a Ponzi scheme through MuniVest, seeking forfeiture of various assets. The district court granted the motion for mandatory withdrawal under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), finding that the proceedings require consideration of both bankruptcy law under title 11 and federal criminal forfeiture statutes that regulate activities affecting interstate commerce. The court reasoned that the government, trustee, and creditors have competing interests in the forfeited assets, and that criminal forfeiture procedures provide for adjudication of third-party claims without depriving due process. It also addressed timeliness and procedural issues, concluding that withdrawal is appropriate for matters pertaining to seizure, forfeiture, and distribution of the assets, while retaining bankruptcy jurisdiction for other purposes.
The case involved a defendant charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin, stemming from a search of an apartment pursuant to a warrant. The government filed a last-minute one-sentence motion to dismiss the indictment the day before a scheduled suppression hearing, without specifying whether the dismissal would be with or without prejudice or providing any supporting brief or grounds. The court granted the motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice and ordered the defendant's immediate release, reasoning that it would not compel the government to prosecute or the defendant to defend a case the government would not zealously pursue.
Homeowners sued their township after officials entered their backyard without a warrant on multiple occasions to investigate reports of alleged wetlands ordinance violations and to post stop-work notices following the clearing of vegetation near a lake to expand a lawn. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment warrantless search claim. It held that the entries were unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, which requires a warrant absent narrow exceptions such as consent or exigent circumstances, none of which were present. The court noted that observations from public vantage points did not authorize physical entry onto the curtilage, and the officials' actions went beyond mere posting of notices to include further investigation on the property.
The case concerned a challenge by plaintiff Kevin J. Murray to the federal government's bailout of AIG under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) and Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), alleging that AIG's subsequent use of some funds for Sharia-compliant insurance products violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denied the motion to strike. The court reasoned that the bailout funds served the secular purpose of stabilizing the financial system, that any connection between the funds and religious activities was minimal and attenuated, and that a reasonable observer would not perceive the government's actions as an endorsement of Islam or any religion.
religious libertyfederal powerbusiness & regulatory