The case involved two white male applicants for positions with the City of Pittsburgh police department who sued after being passed over and removed from the hiring list, alleging race and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on all counts and denied the plaintiffs' partial motion. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court found that the plaintiffs had not produced direct or circumstantial evidence showing that the city's stated reasons for not hiring them, such as background concerns including traffic violations or credit history, were pretextual or that discrimination was more likely than not the motivating factor.
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, a high school student and his parent sued the school district under Section 1983 after the student received a ten-day suspension for creating and emailing a satirical 'Top Ten' list about the athletic director from his home computer; an unknown person later printed and distributed copies on school grounds. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion. It held that the suspension violated the student's First Amendment rights because the speech was created off-campus, the student did not bring the list to school, and there was no evidence of substantial disruption to school operations. The court further ruled that the school's retaliatory policy was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it lacked any definition of prohibited 'abuse' and allowed arbitrary enforcement.
This case is a CERCLA contribution action in which settling parties sought to recover a share of response costs for investigating and cleaning up hazardous substances, including metals and radioactive materials, at the Metcoa Radiation Site in Pennsylvania. The court held third-party defendant Bay Metal, Inc. liable and entered judgment against it for $1,495,267 plus interest. The decision rested on findings that the wastes at the site were commingled into an indivisible mass, that response costs could not be apportioned by party or metal type, and that Bay Metal failed to carry its burden of proving divisibility under Section 113 of CERCLA. Allocation was based on the volume and toxicity of materials Bay Metal supplied to the site operator, consistent with the Gore factors.
In Aronson v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., plaintiffs sued Sprint in Pennsylvania state court for invasion of privacy, alleging that the company's account access system permitted third parties to obtain confidential customer information using only a telephone number and billing zip code, without a required PIN. Sprint removed the case to federal court, contending that the state claims were preempted by section 222 of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the well-pleaded complaint rule and finding that the complaint presented only state-law issues with no complete preemption under the Act due to its savings clause preserving state remedies; defendants' motion to dismiss was denied as moot.
The case involved a U.S. Marine Corps private first class petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus after denial of his hardship discharge request, while also challenging Executive Order No. 13139 and the anthrax vaccination program as violating the Nuremberg Code. The court confirmed jurisdiction over the petitioner and his commanding officer, found that administrative remedies had been exhausted, and proceeded to the merits of the preliminary injunction request. It denied the injunction and vacated the temporary restraining order, reasoning that review of military discretionary decisions is limited, the anthrax vaccine has been FDA-licensed since 1970 and is not experimental, and the program does not implicate constitutional or international law prohibitions.
The case concerns plaintiffs challenging interest rates of 18-19.5% and related charges imposed by National Tax Funding and affiliated entities on installment payment plans for delinquent Pittsburgh real estate taxes, water rates, and sewer charges that the defendants had purchased from the city and related authorities. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law (LIPL), the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, alleging that the rates exceeded statutory caps and that the payment plans constituted undisclosed extensions of credit. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court examined whether the Home Rule Charter Law superseded LIPL rate limits, whether the arrangements involved a "use of money" or consumer credit transaction subject to TILA disclosure rules, and whether CARC qualified as a creditor under TILA. The court reasoned that charges assessed under forbearance payment plans could constitute finance charges under Regulation Z if the creditor routinely permits delayed payment without demanding full settlement, while granting summary judgment for CARC on the TILA claims because it acted only as an agent rather than the entity to which debts were owed.
