The case concerned a petition by Agnes M. Hollis, guardian of minor Myra Louise James (the sole heir and next of kin to the estate of William B. James), to remove appellee Willard Crittenden as administrator and to appoint Hollis in his place. Crittenden, a stranger to the family, had been appointed by the probate court shortly after the statutory waiting period based on waivers from the decedent's siblings. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the probate court erred in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition. It reasoned that Alabama follows the common law rule (not repudiated by statute) under which the guardian of a minor entitled to a preferential right of administration may exercise that right on the minor's behalf, and that the siblings' waivers were ineffective against the minor's superior claim.
This case involved a petition by Will Thomas Samuels to the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Appeals' judgment in his case, reported as Samuels v. State, 36 So.2d 561. The petition asked the Supreme Court to examine and potentially revise the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court denied the writ, leaving the Court of Appeals' ruling in place. The denial was issued without additional analysis or dissent from the participating justices.
This advisory opinion addresses questions from the Alabama Governor regarding the validity of a 1948 constitutional amendment authorizing a special school tax in Calhoun County and related school bond issuance. The court examined whether the amendment election complied with constitutional notice and timing rules under Section 284, whether publication schedules in various counties satisfied the four-week requirement, and the mechanics of levying the tax and issuing separate bonds per school district. The majority concluded that the amendment was validly adopted despite some publication variations, that the tax would take effect with payments beginning October 1, 1948, and that separate bond issues were required for each district, while emphasizing that the amendment's text controlled the tax duration and use. A dissent disagreed on the sufficiency of notice for the subsequent tax election, arguing it rendered that vote ineffective.
This case involved Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company appealing awards of unemployment compensation to employee-claimants whose benefits had been granted by the Board of Appeals and affirmed by lower courts after a labor dispute or strike. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment in favor of the claimants. The core reasoning was that Alabama's Unemployment Compensation Act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed to benefit workers, while statutory exceptions disqualifying benefits for unemployment directly due to a labor dispute in the same establishment must be narrowly interpreted; the court found the disqualification did not apply under the facts and the statutory definition of labor dispute.
The case concerned the validity of a municipal ordinance in Decatur authorizing the installation of parking meters on downtown public streets to regulate vehicle parking and traffic flow. The court held that the ordinance was a lawful exercise of the city's police power and did not violate sections 235 or 89 of the Alabama Constitution. The core reasoning was that parking on public streets is a privilege rather than an absolute right, that meters function as mechanical aids to enforcement similar to traffic signals, and that any incidental revenue must be used only for regulatory costs rather than general revenue. The decision reversed the lower court's ruling and upheld the ordinance.
The case concerned the validity of a municipal ordinance in Decatur authorizing the installation of parking meters on downtown public streets to regulate vehicle parking and traffic flow. The court held that the ordinance was a lawful exercise of the city's police power and did not violate sections 235 or 89 of the Alabama Constitution. The core reasoning was that parking on public streets is a privilege rather than an absolute right, that meters function as mechanical aids to enforcement similar to traffic signals, and that any incidental revenue must be used only for regulatory costs rather than general revenue. The decision reversed the lower court's ruling and upheld the ordinance.