Roy S. Moore

The case involved the Flannigans' petition to dismiss an appeal by Lynn Jordan to the Montgomery Circuit Court from a probate court order removing her as administratrix of Jeffrey Flannigan's estate. Jordan had filed a motion for reconsideration after the seven-day appeal deadline under § 12-22-21(3), Ala. Code 1975, had passed, and then appealed after that motion was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the appeal was untimely. The court reasoned that a post-judgment motion cannot toll a limitations period that has already expired, and the statute requires appeals from such probate orders to be taken within seven days.

procedurefamily law

This case involves a workers' compensation claim filed by Emma Riddle against Southern Energy Homes, Inc., alleging that she suffered permanent total disability from back injuries sustained in two workplace incidents in 1996 and 1997. The trial court awarded her benefits based on a finding of 100% permanent and total disability, which the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded, concluding that Riddle had not presented substantial evidence of permanent total disability under the Workers' Compensation Act because medical records showed only degenerative conditions without objective impairment findings or physician-imposed work restrictions, and Riddle had not sought further employment.

labor & employment

The case involved the State's challenge to the Court of Criminal Appeals' reversal of Antywan Wilson's convictions for first-degree robbery and attempted murder, stemming from the prosecution's delayed disclosure of police notes on witness interviews that identified different suspects. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted certiorari to review whether the nondisclosure of this potentially exculpatory evidence amounted to reversible error under discovery rules. The Court reversed the appellate decision and remanded the case, concluding that the witness names had been provided to the defense well before trial, the trial court had properly allowed cross-examination of the detective and a witness to mitigate any prejudice, and the evidence did not meet the threshold for requiring a mistrial or new trial. The reasoning emphasized that the information was not suppressed in a manner that undermined the fairness of the proceedings, distinguishing it from Brady violations that would necessitate reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

Janice Folmar sued Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company for slander of title, alleging that a mortgage lien filed on her home in 1996 without her signature became actionable when Empire refused her 2000 and 2001 requests to remove it. The trial court granted summary judgment to Empire, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that slander of title under Alabama law requires a false statement to be published both falsely and maliciously at the time of publication, that Folmar conceded the original filing lacked malice, and that a later refusal to remove the lien does not satisfy the elements of a new publication.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

In 2000, Alabama State University fired its head football coach, Ronald Dickerson, who then sued the university, its president, and board members over the termination, raising various claims including a due-process violation seeking equitable relief. The trial court dismissed most claims on sovereign and state-agent immunity grounds but left the due-process claim intact and did not certify the partial dismissal as final under Rule 54(b). Dickerson appealed the denial of his post-judgment motion, but the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the order was not a final judgment because it did not resolve all claims as to all parties and lacked the required express determination of no just reason for delay.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

The case involved Conseco Finance Corporation appealing the trial court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration of Nora Slay's counterclaim, in which she alleged that her signature on a mobile home purchase contract was a forgery. The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal as not ripe for review. The court reasoned that the trial court's oral and written rulings could be read as either a conditional or absolute denial of arbitration, but no jury had yet resolved the forgery issue and the trial court had not applied any such construction, so Conseco had not yet suffered any harm from a final denial. The court noted that appeals must involve an existing controversy rather than speculative future events and that it must dismiss the matter on its own for lack of jurisdiction.

procedure

This case arose from a dispute between Twin City Fire Insurance and Colonial Life over Twin City's defense of Colonial in a former employee's wrongful-termination lawsuit, which Twin City handled under a reservation of rights while seeking a declaratory judgment on coverage. After the underlying suit settled without Twin City's contribution, Colonial counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of an enhanced duty of good faith. The federal district court certified questions to the Alabama Supreme Court asking whether such a breach claim sounds in contract or tort and whether punitive damages are available. The court held that the enhanced duty of good faith arises from the insurance contract itself and that a breach claim therefore sounds in contract rather than tort, making it unnecessary to address choice-of-law issues or the availability of punitive damages.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a long-running dispute over the validity of a certificate of need (CON) issued by the State Health Planning and Development Agency (SHPDA) to Auburn Medical Center, Inc. in 1984 (later modified in 1992) to build a hospital in Auburn, which East Alabama Medical Center challenged via declaratory judgment after SHPDA denied its own application. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the CON had expired by operation of law and was therefore void. The court reasoned that under SHPDA Rules §§ 410-1-11-.01, -.02, and -.04, the CON's initial 12-month period was extended by AMC's 1993 construction contract but terminated no later than June 1995 due to unmet construction deadlines, and neither later SHPDA proceedings on EAMC's application nor any tolling provision revived it.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

Terrell Telfare sued the City of Huntsville and police officer D. McCarver after being struck with a baton and arrested during an altercation outside a lounge, claiming the officer used excessive force and lacked probable cause for the arrest on charges including disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. Telfare asserted state-law negligence tort claims such as false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery against both the officer and the City. The trial court dismissed the claims against the City on grounds of discretionary-function immunity under Alabama Code § 6-5-338, but the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, concluding that the City was not entitled to immunity because no evidence supported the lawfulness of the investigatory detention or the use of force. On rehearing, the court overruled the City's application, noting that neither the officer nor the City provided facts justifying the stop or safety measures under Terry v. Ohio standards.

criminal lawcivil rightstorts & liability

This case concerns Charles E. Conners's petition to the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari following the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's judgment against him. The Court of Criminal Appeals had held in a per curiam opinion that the precedent from Ex parte Berry did not apply to Conners's matter. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. In doing so, the Court explicitly stated it was not endorsing all language, reasoning, or statements of law contained in the lower appellate court's opinion, citing Horsley v. Horsley as support for that approach.

criminal lawprocedure

Roland Rivard sued the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Jorge Alonso for medical malpractice, claiming that Dr. Alonso breached the standard of care by penetrating the spinal canal during a bone-harvesting procedure performed after Rivard's 1995 car accident, which allegedly caused permanent impotence, numbness, and related injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding insufficient evidence that any negligence probably caused the injuries. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that expert testimony from Rivard (an orthopedic surgeon), a urologist, and another orthopedic surgeon created a genuine issue of material fact on probable causation, meeting Alabama's requirements for surviving summary judgment in a malpractice action.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

In Carter v. State, the defendant was convicted of intentional murder for killing an unintended victim and provocation manslaughter for killing the intended victim after firing a gun during an altercation, with the State relying on transferred intent to establish the mens rea for the unintended death. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the verdicts were inconsistent because transferred intent requires the same degree of offense and available defenses for both victims. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed that decision, reasoning that consistency between verdicts on separate counts is not required under Alabama law, as each count is treated independently and the doctrine of transferred intent does not mandate matching degrees of culpability when the jury finds different mental states or mitigating factors. The Court emphasized precedents allowing potentially inconsistent verdicts unless the offenses are mutually exclusive.

criminal law

The case involved Lola Walker seeking uninsured-motorist benefits under her automobile policy with GuideOne after a November 1999 accident in which an unidentified phantom vehicle allegedly caused her to swerve off the road, killing her husband and injuring her; the policy contained a clause requiring competent corroborative evidence other than the claimant's own testimony in accidents without physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle. GuideOne sought a declaratory judgment that it owed no coverage, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, relying on precedents that upheld such provisions. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the corroboration requirement was unenforceable because Alabama's uninsured-motorist statute, § 32-7-23, entitles an insured to recover if legally entitled to damages from an uninsured motorist and does not permit insurers to impose this additional evidentiary limit. The court distinguished the policy language from statutes in other states that expressly authorize corroboration rules and noted that the requirement functioned as an improper restriction rather than a mere standard of proof.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Alabama state finance officials who denied reimbursement claims by court-appointed attorneys for office overhead expenses incurred while representing indigent criminal defendants, prompting the attorneys to seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus to enforce prior precedent from May v. State under § 15-12-21. The trial court granted the writ, directing approval of fee declarations that included such expenses, but denied class certification for affected attorneys; it later dismissed one related case. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment granting mandamus relief, dismissed one appeal as arising from a nonfinal order, and affirmed the denial of class certification. The core reasoning centered on the statute's requirements for advance trial-court approval of expenses and the comptroller's approval authority, combined with 1999 legislative amendments that narrowed reimbursable expenses to those specifically incurred "in the defense of his or her client" and eliminated general office-overhead calculations.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether personal-injury claims could be filed on behalf of Deborah Bassie after she was declared brain dead under the pre-2000 version of Alabama Code § 22-31-1 following complications during childbirth. Timothy Bassie, as her representative, sued the doctors and medical practice for negligence and wantonness in April 2000, before life support was withdrawn, and later added a wrongful-death claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the personal-injury claims, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that under the statute's plain language Deborah was legally dead when the suit was filed, and Alabama law provides that unfiled tort claims do not survive a plaintiff's death.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by Kimberly Linne Myers against the City of Haleyville in Marion Circuit Court after she fell at the Downtown Mall located in Winston County; the City, which straddles both Marion and Winston Counties, sought to transfer the case to Winston County on venue grounds. The City petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus after the trial court denied its transfer motion. The Court denied the petition, holding that under the plain language of Ala. Code § 6-3-11, venue for actions against a municipality is proper in any county where the municipality is located or where the underlying act or omission occurred. The opinion reasoned that the statute is unambiguous and does not limit venue solely to the county containing the municipal seat of government when the city spans multiple counties.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved ToForest Onesha Johnson's petition for a writ of certiorari following his conviction for capital murder of a deputy sheriff. Johnson challenged the trial court's denial of for-cause challenges to two prospective jurors who expressed strong leanings toward the death penalty, the sufficiency of evidence that the deputy was on duty when killed while moonlighting as a security guard, and the denial of his Batson objections to the state's peremptory strikes. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition. The dissent contended that the lower court opinion contained reversible errors on the juror challenges and evidence of the deputy's duty status, as well as erroneous holdings that would preclude review of Batson claims due to incomplete records of voir dire.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Andalusia Distributing Co. suing Singer Hardware Co., a Georgia corporation, and its president Sam Singer, Jr., in Alabama court to recover $108,013.48 owed on an open account for goods sold and delivered from Alabama to Singer's Georgia stores between 1997 and 2000. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding insufficient contacts by the nonresident defendants with Alabama under the state's long-arm statute. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the defendants' ongoing business relationship with an Alabama supplier, including the president's telephone contacts to establish the account, made it foreseeable they could be sued in Alabama if payment was not made, satisfying due process requirements for in personam jurisdiction under Rule 4.2(a)(2), Ala.R.Civ.P., and precedents like Keelean v. Central Bank of the South.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a dispute over the interpretation of two 1904 deeds conveying a 100-foot strip of land in Washington County, Alabama, originally to a railroad company. The plaintiffs claimed the deeds granted only an easement or right of way, while the defendants argued for a fee-simple interest. The trial courts ruled in favor of an easement based on jury verdicts, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the deeds conveyed fee simple title. The court reasoned that the deed language, including references to conveying a "strip of land" and quitclaiming the property, indicated a full conveyance of land rather than a mere right, with "right of way" phrases describing boundaries rather than limiting the estate conveyed. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

property

This case centers on a dispute over a Baldwin County parcel where Donald Peak financed condominium construction under an oral agreement with Paul Whitehurst and Charles Chaney (later transferred to PIM) for shared profits on sales, followed by a separate oral rental arrangement for unsold units. Peak sued Whitehurst and PIM seeking an injunction against their continued leasing and a declaration of rights, claiming sole ownership, while the defendants asserted a partnership interest in the property that limited Peak's control. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in case 1991484 because the challenged trial orders were interlocutory and not properly certified as final under Rule 54(b). In the consolidated case 1001423, the court vacated the trial court's ownership ruling and remanded for further proceedings, reasoning that the issues were interrelated and required a comprehensive final adjudication rather than piecemeal resolution.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory