The case concerned whether Alabama circuit judge Inge Johnson, who had met the statutory service requirements for judicial retirement benefits under Ala. Code § 12-18-6(b)(5), remained eligible for those benefits after she resigned her state position and began serving as a United States district judge. The Board of Control of the Employees' Retirement System initially processed her retirement but later suspended payments, relying on Alabama Constitution § 280's prohibition on holding two offices simultaneously and on precedents such as Hogan v. Bronner interpreting a retired judge's status as an "office." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the constitutional bar applied because Johnson continued to hold the office of retired state judge while occupying a federal judgeship, and that prior legal fictions developed under § 60 did not extend to override § 280's restriction on dual office-holding.
This case involves a dispute over life insurance proceeds after Tullie Culverhouse was murdered by his son Hunter, a beneficiary under the policy issued by Alfa Life Insurance. Alfa paid the proceeds to Hunter pursuant to the policy terms, but after Hunter confessed, Robin, another son and heir, sued Alfa claiming the proceeds under Alabama's slayer statute. The trial court denied Alfa's summary judgment motion, ruling that oral notice to a local agent created actual notice that substantially complied with statutory requirements. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for Alfa, holding that the plain language of § 43-8-253(f) requires written notice of an adverse claim delivered to the insurer's home office or principal address before payment, and that oral notice to an agent does not satisfy this prerequisite.
The case involved Alabama owners of Ford Bronco II vehicles who brought a putative class action claiming that Ford fraudulently suppressed information about a design defect causing rollover propensity, inducing them to purchase vehicles worth less than represented. The plaintiffs sought damages for the alleged defect without any actual rollover or tangible economic loss occurring. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to Ford, holding that no legally cognizable injury existed to support the fraudulent suppression claims because the defect had not manifested in observable adverse consequences. The court reasoned that fraud requires actual damage, following its prior decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian.
This case arose from a breach-of-contract action filed in Alabama circuit court by an Alabama sign manufacturer against a Virginia construction company over unpaid work performed for a project in Virginia under an oral contract. The Virginia defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, supported by an affidavit showing it was not qualified to do business in Alabama and had no other ties there, but the trial court denied the motion. The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed a petition for a writ of mandamus and determined that the Virginia company had sufficient minimum contacts with Alabama because it initiated the business relationship by contacting and soliciting the Alabama company to manufacture the signage. The court concluded that these contacts satisfied due process requirements under Rule 4.2, Ala.R.Civ.P., and applicable precedent, allowing the Alabama court to exercise jurisdiction.
Mickey Allen sued Dunlop Tire Corporation for retaliatory discharge under Ala. Code § 25-5-11.1, claiming he was fired solely for filing a workers' compensation claim. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages, and Dunlop appealed the denial of its motions for JNOV, new trial, and remittitur, arguing that three jurors failed to disclose prior litigation during voir dire and that Allen presented insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no probable prejudice from the jurors' nondisclosure, which stemmed from confusion rather than willfulness. It further reviewed the claim under the Twilley prima facie test for retaliatory discharge, requiring substantial evidence that the termination was pretextual after the employer offered a legitimate reason.
The case concerned whether a court-approved workers' compensation settlement agreement between Wal-Mart and its employee Joseph Hines, containing broad release language covering all claims for injuries or damages from employment, barred Hines's separate pending action alleging retaliatory discharge. The trial court granted Hines's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to set aside the settlement judgment to allow the retaliatory-discharge claim to proceed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed that decision. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the settlement judgment should not be vacated. The court's reasoning centered on the explicit terms of the release, which encompassed the retaliatory-discharge claim, the absence of grounds under Rule 60(b)(6) for relief based on Hines's misunderstanding of those terms, and the fact that the trial court was unaware of the pending action at the time it approved the settlement.
