The case concerned intervening plaintiffs Ralph L. Barnes and Sebert Barnes who attempted to join an existing malicious prosecution lawsuit against defendants Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Globe Union, Inc. after the underlying Florida federal case was dismissed in November 1974. Defendants moved to dismiss the intervenors' claims as time-barred under Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations. The court ruled that a motion to intervene filed and served before the limitations period expired, containing the proposed complaint, tolled the statute under principles similar to federal precedent, and therefore denied the motion to dismiss.
This case was a §1983 damages action brought by a state prisoner who self-injected tetracycline, developed gangrene, and lost his arm; he alleged that prison officials knowingly disregarded medical recommendations for outside treatment, causing preventable injury. After a jury returned a $30,000 verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. The court granted judgment n.o.v., holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove a knowing refusal of urgently needed care or that any delay caused preventable harm. The court emphasized that prison officials enjoy wide discretion in medical matters and that negligence alone cannot support a constitutional claim under §1983.
The case involved a habeas corpus petition by William James West alleging that pending state criminal charges against him violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted the petition and dismissed the two indictments. It applied the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo, finding that delays of five to six years were unreasonable and unjustified by the prosecution, that the petitioner had adequately asserted his rights despite being a non-lawyer, and that he suffered prejudice through prolonged anxiety, detainer effects on parole, and the death of a key defense witness.
This case involved hourly employees at General Electric's Appliance Park facility who sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover overtime pay for a scheduled 18-minute meal period that replaced a prior 30-minute period, along with liquidated damages and fees. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the 18-minute period qualified as a bona fide, non-compensable meal break. The court reasoned that the employees, who were skilled and minimally supervised, had sufficient time to eat (aided by a preceding paid wash-up period), had been consulted through their union and expressed a preference for the shorter period to improve shift overlaps, and had declined repeated offers to revert to 30 minutes without filing any grievances. The decision emphasized that the facts showed the period was used for meals and did not constitute hours worked under the Act.
In Bennett v. Macy, a Kentucky resident plaintiff sued an Indiana resident defendant for personal injuries from a car accident that occurred in Indiana on the return leg of a trip that had started in Kentucky. The defendant asserted the Indiana Guest Statute, which limits a guest passenger's recovery to cases of wanton or willful misconduct, but the plaintiff moved to strike that defense on the ground that Kentucky law should apply. The court granted the motion and held that Kentucky substantive law governs, applying Kentucky's conflict-of-laws test from Wessling v. Paris, which looks to the state with the most significant relationship to the parties and the issue rather than automatically using the place of the injury. The facts showed predominant Kentucky contacts, including the parties' employment and social ties, the start and intended end of the trip in Kentucky, and the filing of suit there, together with Kentucky's public policy against guest statutes.
