Charles C. Bernstein

This case involves an appeal from a conviction for grand theft against an attorney who served as president of a fraternal benefit society, where he was charged with embezzling funds; the indictment came from a Pima County grand jury later found to have been improperly impaneled. The petitioner moved to quash the indictment and sought to inspect grand jury minutes regarding juror qualifications and impanelment, but the trial court limited inspection to other matters and later denied the motion after no amended filing occurred. The Arizona Supreme Court, referencing its prior decision in State v. Superior Court that invalidated actions by this same grand jury and noting the state's confession of error, held that the trial court's restrictions prevented the petitioner from obtaining evidence to support his challenge. The court concluded that defendants must have the opportunity to investigate grand jury proceedings to ensure proper qualifications under Arizona law, that the petitioner had timely preserved his objections, and that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring unsupported evidence. It vacated the decision below and remanded with instructions to quash the indictment without prejudice to refiling.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the 1966 robbery conviction of Abedon Saiz for a 1961 theft from the Arizona State Treasurer’s office, after an initial complaint was dismissed and refiled near the end of the statute of limitations. Saiz challenged the admission of numerous hearsay statements regarding the planning and execution of the crime, argued that the pre-prosecution delay violated his constitutional speedy trial rights, and contended there was insufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statements were admissible under established exceptions to the hearsay rule, including declarations of intent and admissions by the defendant, that pre-prosecution delays do not trigger Sixth Amendment protections, and that independent witness testimony provided adequate corroboration under state law. The court rejected all assignments of error and upheld the jury verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Jones, the defendant appealed his convictions for attempted robbery, robbery, and robbery with a prior conviction after being apprehended following two incidents at Phoenix stores. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the trial court did not err in omitting a jury instruction on the defendant's failure to testify because defense counsel expressly requested its omission as part of trial strategy. The court further held that evidence of the prior California robbery conviction was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt, based on authenticated documents containing matching names and photographs that could be compared to the defendant.

criminal lawprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Seferino Valdon, a 65-year-old equipment operator for the Maricopa County Highway Department, sustained a hip injury in July 1963 when he tripped over a paint can while performing physically demanding duties. The Industrial Commission awarded him temporary disability benefits but found his condition stationary by February 1965 with no permanent disability or loss of function caused by the accident, attributing ongoing issues to age-related deterioration. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the uncontradicted testimony of seven doctors established no causal link between the injury and any permanent disability. The court also ruled that a referee's recommendations are advisory only and that the Commission bears sole responsibility for final findings of fact. The evidence supported the Commission's conclusions, and the claimant failed to present any medical evidence to the contrary.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case was a wrongful death action brought against the Colorado River Indian Tribe after a swimmer was struck and killed by a boat in the Colorado River near the tribe's Blue Water Marina Park business. The trial court dismissed the suit on the tribe's motion, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that state courts lacked jurisdiction because the tribe is a dependent domestic sovereign immune from suit absent its consent or congressional authorization. The court reasoned that the 1876 executive order creating the reservation lacked the clear intent needed to convey title to submerged lands and navigable waters, which therefore remained under state ownership, and that the tribe's operation of a commercial enterprise did not waive its immunity.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Rodgers, the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon after shooting a man who approached his car and engaged in an altercation with a female passenger; the defendant claimed the shooting was to prevent harm to the passenger. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction on flight because the evidence showed only that the defendant left the scene and returned to his quarters out of fear, without any attempt to conceal himself or evade arrest. The decision relied on prior precedent requiring evidence of concealment or consciousness of guilt for a flight instruction to be proper.

criminal law

This case concerned whether a trial judge in a marijuana sale prosecution could grant a motion for acquittal after the jury returned guilty verdicts, where the judge had reserved ruling on the motion at the close of evidence. The state argued the judge lacked authority to dismiss after the verdicts and could only sentence, grant a new trial, or arrest judgment. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's discharge of the defendant, holding that a court has inherent power to acquit where the evidence is legally insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even after a reserved ruling and guilty verdict. The court reasoned that determining legal sufficiency of evidence is always a judicial function and that failing to exercise this power would permit injustice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned an appeal by the state from a trial court order granting habeas corpus relief to Richard C. Brown, who had been convicted under A.R.S. § 36-1062 for being under the influence of a narcotic drug. The trial court had ruled the statute unconstitutional based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California, which invalidated a California law punishing the status of narcotic addiction as cruel and unusual punishment. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was valid because it punished the distinct voluntary act of being under the influence rather than a passive status or condition. The court reasoned that such conduct constitutes antisocial behavior that the state may regulate through its police power, distinguishing it from the addiction provision struck down in Robinson. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by the Arizona Highway Commission after a trial court issued a protective order under Rule 30(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The order required the state to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees and travel expenses in advance so that counsel could attend out-of-state depositions of the state's witnesses, which were to be used as trial testimony. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion to require prepayment of travel expenses as a condition of taking the oral depositions because fairness supported shifting that cost to the party benefiting from the remote testimony. However, the court ruled that requiring prepayment of attorney's fees exceeded the trial court's authority because such fees are not recoverable absent a contract or statute. The court therefore made the writ of prohibition permanent as to the attorney's fees portion of the order.

procedure

The case involved the defendant's convictions in Maricopa County Superior Court for first-degree burglary and first-degree rape, based on evidence that he entered a woman's home through a window at night and forced her to submit to intercourse by threatening to kill her and her child. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by stating in closing argument his personal opinion on the overwhelming strength of the evidence presented. The Arizona Supreme Court held that while attorneys must not express personal beliefs about the evidence or guilt in closing arguments, the trial court's specific cautionary instruction to the jury adequately addressed any potential harm from the statement. The court therefore affirmed the convictions and sentences, which were to run concurrently.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the convictions of Clifford Lee McGonigle and Freddy D. Allen for first-degree burglary with prior felony convictions after they were found inside a closed gas station in Phoenix. Allen argued on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because the trial court did not appoint the public defender for all purposes and required him to obtain private counsel, while McGonigle claimed this also prejudiced his own trial; both defendants also challenged the denial of a mistrial over the display of unadmitted evidence and the sufficiency of proof for their prior convictions. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that Allen was not indigent based on the trial court's findings and his failure to declare under oath that he lacked means to hire counsel, so no full appointment of counsel was required under state rules or Gideon v. Wainwright. The court further reasoned that McGonigle showed no prejudice from Allen's representation issues, that the unadmitted gloves created no reversible error, and that fingerprint records, photographs, and prior judgments sufficiently proved the prior convictions without need for additional jury instructions. The court rejected all other claims of error regarding evidence and procedure.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Crowder, the appellant had pleaded guilty to robbery and received probation with a condition to obey all laws; he was later found to have violated a Phoenix city ordinance prohibiting drunk or disorderly conduct in public. The trial court revoked his probation and imposed a prison sentence of five to six years. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under A.R.S. § 13-1657(B), probation may be revoked in the court's discretion if the probationer engages in criminal practices, regardless of whether the specific violation matches an express probation condition. The court further ruled that the absence of a court reporter at the revocation hearing did not violate due process, as the appellant was represented by counsel, raised no objection, and showed no prejudice from the lack of a transcript.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal by Lane Title and Trust Company from jury verdicts finding it liable for breach of trust in its role as trustee under two subdivision trusts for Phoenix land. Brannan sold land to Blakeway via a trust, Blakeway then sold his interest to Res Com via a second trust, and Lane became trustee after Brannan borrowed from it; Lane later extended payment deadlines without disclosing Res Com's debts to Lane and financial distress, leading to nonpayment, Res Com's bankruptcy, and loss of the property. The Arizona Supreme Court held that a subdivision trustee owes fiduciary duties equivalent to those of a common law trustee, including disclosure of material conflicts and information, and that Lane breached those duties by prioritizing its own interests. The court affirmed the verdicts but modified the judgment for Brannan to correct a calculation error from $73,800 to $66,536.72.

propertybusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a negligence lawsuit by Joel Wells against Tanner Brothers Contracting Company for personal injuries from an automobile accident during highway construction work, where Wells struck a gravel pile. After a first trial resulted in a $30,000 verdict for Wells, the court granted Tanner a new trial; Wells did not appeal that order. The second trial ended in a verdict for Tanner, and Wells appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial or to reinstate the first verdict. The court held that the order granting a new trial became final and unreviewable because it was not timely appealed under Arizona appellate statutes, and it affirmed the judgment for Tanner after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and finding no error in the jury instructions on speed limits or other issues.

proceduretorts & liability

In State v. Green, defendant Lonnie Maurice Green was convicted of robbery based on circumstantial evidence after being arrested near the scene with a co-defendant, with a partially burned $20 bill found in the police vehicle where he had been held. The trial court denied Green's request to inspect the victim's police report to check for prior inconsistent statements that could impeach the victim's testimony. The Arizona Supreme Court held that this denial constituted reversible error, reasoning that a defendant has the right to examine such reports for impeachment purposes after the witness testifies, extending prior precedents that applied the same rule to police officers' statements. Although the court found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict and rejected claims for a directed verdict or separate trial, it reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial due to the procedural error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a declaratory judgment action by an injured minor against two insurers after he obtained a negligence judgment against an additional insured whose late notice of the accident led the insurers to deny coverage and refuse to defend. Procedurally, the Arizona Supreme Court recalled its own mandate after initially denying review, holding that it had authority to do so when justice required overriding finality interests, especially where the parties had notice of further proceedings. On the merits, the court reversed the trial court's ruling for the insurers, reasoning that delayed notice alone does not establish prejudice and that the insurers failed to prove actual prejudice or that the additional insured knew of the policy and its conditions.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a 1940 divorce property settlement agreement between Glen Perry and Margaret Perry Minderman, under which each agreed to execute wills leaving specified assets to their son Ted, with mutual releases of inheritance and marital property claims. After Ted's death in 1958 without descendants, Glen revoked his will and left his estate to his second wife Irma; Margaret then sued as Ted's administratrix and individually to impose a constructive trust on the estate for breach of the agreement to make and maintain a will. The trial court ruled against Margaret, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judgment was correct as a matter of law even though the anti-lapse statute did not apply to this contract claim, because the separation agreement extinguished the relevant inheritance rights and the contract terms did not support enforcement after Ted's death.

family lawproperty

In Davis v. Waters, Mrs. Davis sued Mr. and Mrs. Waters for personal injuries she sustained as a passenger in their car after it rolled over on a bumpy road, claiming Mrs. Waters drove negligently following an evening of drinking at bars. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that a jury instruction stating contributory negligence or assumption of risk must bar recovery violated Article 18, §5 of the Arizona Constitution, which requires those defenses to be treated as questions of fact left entirely to the jury. The court further reasoned that evidence of the driver's consumption of alcohol, combined with testimony about her condition and the road, created a factual issue for the jury on assumption of risk, even though the plaintiff denied knowing the driver was impaired.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved parents suing the City of Phoenix for tort claims including false imprisonment, trespass, malicious prosecution, and defamation after a police officer investigated reports of child endangerment, took two minor children into temporary custody under A.R.S. § 8-221, and filed but later dismissed misdemeanor charges under A.R.S. § 13-842 based on the children's accounts of alleged abuse and immoral acts by the parents. The trial court granted summary judgment for the city, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the officer acted within the scope of employment following the abolition of governmental immunity in Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, had sufficient grounds for custody and charges based on the children's statements and prior reports, and made the allegedly defamatory statement under a conditional privilege without bad faith. The court also upheld the procedural order requiring separate counts for the claims as within the trial court's discretion.

torts & liabilitycriminal lawfamily lawprocedure

The case involved Richard Clark's appeal from his conviction for second-degree murder of his wife and a prison sentence of 12 to 20 years. Clark argued that the trial court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction on how voluntary intoxication could negate the specific intent or malice required for murder, and that statements he made to police while intoxicated—without full warnings that they could be used against him—should have been excluded as involuntary. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the given instruction adequately covered the effect of intoxication on intent and malice under state law, and that the statements were admissible because Clark remained mentally aware enough to understand them despite his intoxication, the questioning occurred before Miranda applied and before police suspected murder, and no coercion was involved.

criminal lawprocedure