Robert O. Lesher

The case involved a former employee's claims for unpaid wages under alleged employment contracts with the defendant association. The plaintiff asserted three causes of action: for wages from 1953-1956 under written or oral contracts, and for underpayments from 1947-1951 under an earlier written contract. The court granted judgment for the defendants, finding no valid contract existed after 1953 for the first two claims and that the plaintiff failed to prove an express contract for the third claim, as the original contract had not renewed and no new express agreement was made. The reasoning emphasized that recovery could not be had on an implied contract theory when only an express contract was pleaded.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case is an appeal from a judgment quieting title to real property in favor of the appellee, whose title came from a deed issued after foreclosure of a lien for a special street improvement assessment. The original owners and prior mortgagees challenged the deed on grounds that the purchaser failed to comply with the notice and affidavit requirements of A.R.S. § 11-743 when using posted notice instead of personal service. The court reversed the judgment, ruling the deed void because the affidavit filed with the superintendent was legally insufficient on its face—it stated only that the owner lived in another state without detailing any efforts to locate the owner, failing to demonstrate the due diligence required by the statute. The court reasoned that statutes governing foreclosure of assessment liens must be strictly construed, making a proper affidavit showing due diligence a condition precedent to issuing a valid deed.

propertyprocedure

The case involved an appeal by defendant Jimmy Crose from convictions for kidnapping, grand theft, and aggravated battery after a jury trial in which he raised an insanity defense. The trial court had denied his pretrial request for appointment of two psychiatrists to assist with his defense and had instructed the jury using the M'Naghten right-from-wrong test rather than the broader Durham product-of-mental-disease standard proposed by the defendant. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the constitutional right to counsel does not require the state to provide expert assistance at public expense and that the M'Naghten Rule remains the appropriate test for criminal responsibility despite advances in psychiatry. The court reasoned that medical classifications of mental conditions such as sociopathy do not yet justify equating them with legal non-responsibility and that the existing standard continues to best balance societal safety with individual accountability.

criminal lawprocedure

In Kemble v. Porter, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed an appeal from a superior court order denying a motion to vacate an execution sale of the Arizona Hotel, which arose amid long-running litigation between Gladys E. Porter and Arnold Porter over a separate maintenance judgment and related liens on the property. Intervenor Kemble, who held a separate judgment against Arnold Porter, had sought to establish his lien as prior and to set aside the sale to the wife. The court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the denial order was not appealable. The decision rested on A.R.S. § 12-2101, which permits appeals only from final orders affecting substantial rights; here the order was interlocutory because Kemble's primary claims in intervention had not yet been adjudicated and remained pending for trial.

procedurepropertyfamily law

This case concerned whether service charges added to hotel bills for banquets and club services, which were then distributed to waiters and other employees by the maitre d'hotel in addition to their hourly wages, qualified as "wages" under Arizona's unemployment compensation law, requiring contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Fund. The Employment Security Commission sought to collect such contributions from the Westward Ho Hotel Company, but the trial court ruled in favor of the hotel. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payments were wages because the statute defines wages as all remuneration for services from whatever source, and these amounts constituted remuneration for employment despite their similarity to tips. The court reasoned that the broad statutory language, even after the 1947 amendment removing explicit reference to gratuities, encompassed these payments, consistent with the fund's purpose of compensating the unemployed.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge to a superior court order removing Ashland Corporation as trustee of an inter vivos trust created by Virginia Greene Sturdivant Miller, on the grounds that Ashland was a foreign corporation ineligible to serve under Arizona statute. The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to review the removal, arguing the superior court lacked jurisdiction because an appeal of the trustee's appointment was already pending. The court held that certiorari was unavailable because the removal order was appealable under A.R.S. § 12-2101 as a final order affecting substantial rights or an interlocutory judgment determining rights and directing further proceedings. It therefore quashed the writ and denied the petition, without addressing the jurisdictional question.

procedureproperty

This case was a breach of contract action in which farm owners who leased their land and waived their crop lien to allow financing sued the financing company, alleging that advances to the lessee exceeded the terms of an unsigned crop budget. The court reversed the judgment for the owners and directed entry of judgment for the defendants. The core reasoning was that the record contained no evidence of an oral contract between the owners and defendants limiting advances, the budget was never signed and was at most an estimate, and even if it formed a contract between the defendants and the lessee the owners were only incidental beneficiaries with no right to sue for its breach.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Mountain States Construction Company v. Riley, the plaintiff sued the defendant construction company to recover compensation under an alleged oral employment contract for supervising cableway construction at a dam site, claiming a prior written contract had been mutually rescinded. The trial court, sitting without a jury and making no findings of fact, entered judgment for Riley on the express oral contract claim while rejecting the defendant's counterclaim for breach of the written agreement. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the record contained sufficient evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude a mutual rescission had occurred and an oral employment agreement had been formed, allowing the judgment to stand on the express contract theory.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case was a will contest challenging the admission to probate of Julie H. Pitt's will, under which Guy Anderson was the principal beneficiary. The trial court denied probate based on a jury's finding of undue influence by Anderson. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that any presumption of undue influence vanished once Anderson denied exerting it and other evidence was introduced, shifting the burden to the contestant to prove undue influence by clear and convincing evidence, which the record lacked beyond speculation. The court therefore ordered the will admitted to probate.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a petition for an original writ of prohibition filed in the Arizona Supreme Court by the owner of an existing liquor license in Maricopa County, seeking to prevent the State Superintendent of Liquor Licenses and Controls from filing, processing, or granting applications for additional licenses. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested writ. The core reasoning was that Article VI, Section 4 of the Arizona Constitution limits the Supreme Court's original writ jurisdiction over state officers to mandamus, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, while allowing other writs like prohibition only in the exercise of its appellate or revisory jurisdiction, which does not extend to the administrative acts of an executive officer such as the Superintendent. The court overruled prior precedent that had assumed such jurisdiction without addressing the constitutional question and directed that the petition be denied.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved residents of areas near Tucson who petitioned to incorporate as separate towns but had their petitions denied by the Pima County Board of Supervisors on March 26, 1959; on the same day, the City of Tucson enacted an emergency ordinance annexing those areas under A.R.S. § 9-471. The residents filed actions seeking to enjoin the annexation and review the board's denial, but the trial court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the residents lacked standing to challenge a completed annexation ordinance that was valid on its face, as the incorporation proceedings had ended with the board's final denial and the annexation was complete upon filing without needing publication for an emergency measure. The court further reasoned that the legislature has plenary power over incorporation procedures and no constitutional right to judicial review exists for such denials.

procedure

This case involved Pacific Motor Trucking Company's petition to reopen a workers' compensation claim for employee Dale Rosene, who had received an award based on a 20% disability and 61.76% loss of earning capacity from a 1955 work injury, with the Industrial Commission retaining jurisdiction for changes in condition. The company sought reopening after a new examination by Dr. Taber suggested improvement to no more than 10% disability, but a subsequent medical board and hearing testimony from other doctors found no measurable change in Rosene's physical condition or disability rating. The Industrial Commission denied the petition to reopen, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on certiorari review, holding that the denial was supported by competent conflicting medical evidence and that the court would not reweigh testimony or disturb findings where reasonable support exists in the record.

labor & employmentprocedure