Alfred C. Lockwood

The case involved the State of Arizona suing Phoenix Savings Bank & Trust Co. to recover unclaimed bank deposits under sections 51-517 et seq. of the Arizona Code 1939 (as amended), which provided that deposits inactive for over 20 years would escheat to the state. The bank defended on grounds that the statute was unconstitutional for violating due process and contract clauses. The court affirmed judgment for the bank, holding the statute invalid because it did not require any judicial determination of the owner's death and intestacy without heirs, with notice to interested parties, before requiring payment to the state. Instead, the statute allowed the superintendent to demand payment from the bank and authorized suit solely on the bank's refusal, bypassing the core jurisdictional facts required for escheat.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over taxes assessed on land that plaintiff Nelssen had entered as a federal homestead but which was included in Electrical District No. 4 before he received a patent; after the land was sold for unpaid state, county, school, and district taxes, Nelssen sued to declare the district inclusion and all taxes void, obtain an exemption as a veteran, and quiet title. The trial court dismissed most claims under the tax contest statute requiring payment before challenging validity but allowed litigation over whether the land was properly added to the district. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the district lacked jurisdiction to include the land at organization because it remained federal property and no later statutory procedure was followed to add it, rendering district taxes invalid, while affirming that other tax challenges were barred by nonpayment. The court therefore affirmed the judgment except to the extent it refused injunctive relief against future district levies and remanded for entry of that injunction.

taxespropertyfederal powerprocedure

In Brooks v. Brooks, the plaintiff wife sued her husband for separate maintenance under an Arizona statute allowing such actions when a husband deserts the wife or other grounds for absolute divorce exist. After the plaintiff presented her evidence at trial, the court discharged the jury and entered judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the claim and lacked required corroboration. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that this was an equitable action in which the trial court could properly decide the case without a jury when no material factual disputes existed, and that the evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, did not establish a legal right to separate maintenance.

family lawprocedure

The case involved L. L. Hull, who was convicted by a jury in Maricopa County of receiving stolen goods, specifically a cooler stolen from another individual, and sentenced to prison. Hull appealed, claiming the evidence was insufficient to prove he knew the goods were stolen, that certain exhibits were improperly admitted, and that the county attorney's misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence—including the unusual manner of acquisition, concealment of the property, false statements about its source, and possession of other stolen items—sufficiently supported the jury's finding of guilty knowledge. The court also ruled that the exhibits of other stolen property were admissible to show knowledge, and that the trial conduct did not warrant reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hughes v. Union Oil Co. of Arizona, plaintiffs sued the defendant oil company and others for the value of trade fixtures removed from real property they claimed to own since 1935, plus resulting damage, alleging the removal violated their rights after a prior lease without a removal reservation. The defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on a prior judgment in a separate action (Ray v. Mosher) that purported to establish the plaintiffs held no ownership interest in the property as of 1939. The trial court granted the motion, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prior judgment could not conclusively establish title against the plaintiffs because ownership was not directly litigated between them and the other party in that collateral proceeding by a third party seeking a lien; thus a genuine issue of material fact remained on ownership, precluding summary judgment under the applicable rules.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the burglary convictions of Donald Peters and Herb Bechtel in Maricopa County after a joint trial with Clarence Hammons, who pleaded guilty and testified for the state. Defendants appealed, claiming error in the denial of their motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence (including unsworn statements and affidavits about witness credibility and fingerprints) and in the trial court's refusal to allow broader cross-examination of Hammons about other crimes. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the new evidence lacked proper supporting affidavits or was insufficient to make a different verdict probable, that the superior court lost jurisdiction over a supplemental motion filed after the appeal was perfected, and that the offer of proof on cross-examination was not explicit enough to show error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Elisandro Macias, who was charged in Arizona with first-degree murder after stabbing a store owner to death. Macias admitted the killing but raised an insanity defense, claiming he was mentally unable to assist in his defense or understand his actions; the trial court rejected the pretrial competency claim, and the jury found him sane, convicted him of first-degree murder committed during a robbery, and imposed the death penalty. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court's jury instructions correctly applied the M'Naghten test for legal insanity (requiring proof that the defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong), that sufficient evidence supported the jury's sanity finding despite testimony about the defendant's mental condition and introversion, and that the prosecutor's comments on the possibility of parole for a life sentence were proper for the jury to consider in fixing punishment. The court also noted that other alleged prosecutorial errors were not preserved for review.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an original petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a death sentence and warrant issued after a guilty plea to first-degree murder, because the warrant specified a week for execution rather than a single day. The court held that the warrant was irregular under an initiated measure adopted in 1918, which required the warrant to appoint a specific day for execution between 60 and 90 days after judgment, and that a later statute permitting a week was invalid as it conflicted with this measure. The core reasoning was that the people’s initiated measure constitutes legislative authority over criminal procedure that courts must follow unless it unreasonably hampers judicial duties, which this requirement did not; the underlying judgment and sentence were valid, and the proper remedy was to return the defendant for issuance of a corrected warrant. The court therefore quashed the alternative writ of mandamus.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant A1 Green, who was convicted under Arizona Code 1939 section 43-4404 for knowingly receiving money from the earnings of a prostitute, a statute that criminalized such receipt without exceptions for legitimate purposes like food or shelter. Green challenged the law's constitutionality, arguing it violated state and federal constitutions by criminalizing innocent transactions. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the statute, reasoning that the legislature may prohibit otherwise lawful acts if they have a reasonable relation to suppressing prostitution as a public evil, drawing on U.S. Supreme Court precedent allowing broad measures to address admitted harms. The court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence from the prosecuting witness and applying the state constitution's harmless error provision despite some evidentiary issues at trial.

criminal law

This case involved a workers' compensation claim following the work-related injury and subsequent death of Joe Naglich, an employee of Magma Copper Company. After an initial award for temporary disability from a mining accident, the Industrial Commission later determined the injury caused ongoing total disability and directed further compensation plus spinal surgery; Naglich died from complications during recovery. His widow and a child conceived after the injury sought death benefits under the award. The Arizona Supreme Court set aside the award in full, holding that under the relevant statutes dependency status is fixed as of the date of injury rather than death, so a child not yet conceived could not qualify as a dependent.

labor & employmentfamily law

The case involved a dispute over ownership of a portion of a cotton crop grown on leased state land in Arizona. Plaintiff Thompson claimed a one-fifth interest in the crop as rent assigned to him by the lessee Edwards, but the defendant gin company applied the proceeds to a loan secured by a crop mortgage from the sublessee Wellman after Edwards waived his interest. The court affirmed judgment for Thompson, holding that under the lease terms, Edwards and Wellman were tenants in common in the crop, so Edwards's assigned share belonged to Thompson, and the defendant had actual notice of this interest when taking the mortgage, making it liable for conversion.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved the State of Arizona suing the guardian of an incompetent person's estate to recover costs for his maintenance at the Arizona State Hospital from 1930 to 1941. The superior court had initially committed the individual without setting maintenance charges due to uncertainty about funds, but later, after a 1942 hearing, fixed a reasonable monthly rate of $30 and the state presented a creditor's claim for over $3,700 (after credits for partial payments). The trial court ruled for the defendant guardian, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that under 1941 statutes the court had authority to retroactively set charges based on the estate's ability to pay, the claim was not barred by statutes of limitations or presentment rules because it arose by operation of law upon the fixing order, and the estate was fully able to pay without any time restriction in the law.

healthcarefamily lawprocedure

The case involved the Arizona Corporation Commission petitioning the superior court to take possession of the property, records, and business of Alianza Hispano-Americana, a fraternal benefit association organized in 1902, based on findings of impaired reserves, improper fund diversions, inadequate record-keeping, unauthorized loans and real estate holdings, and unqualified officers. The trial court denied the petition after finding the association solvent under the standards applicable to fraternal benefit societies and that its current management could correct past deficiencies. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the association was governed by specific fraternal benefit statutes permitting member assessments to address impairments rather than requiring 100% solvency like ordinary insurers, and that the evidence supported allowing the new management an opportunity to restore financial condition without imposing a receivership.

business & regulatory

In this case, A.W. Snyder and his wife sued J.P. Betsch and his wife for damages arising from a 1938 contract to purchase real property, after the Betsches had previously won a possessory action to recover the property due to the Snyders' default. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the damages claims were compulsory counterclaims that should have been raised in the prior action under the 1940 Rules of Civil Procedure (specifically section 21-437). The court reasoned that these rules superseded conflicting older procedural statutes governing possessory actions, that the prior opinion had indicated the claims belonged as counterclaims, and that principles of res judicata therefore barred the new suit; it also rejected any relief based on excusable neglect due to the timing of the rules' adoption and distribution. The decision turned on the application of compulsory counterclaim requirements and the finality of the earlier judgment between the same parties.

procedureproperty

This case involved an appeal by defendant William E. Wells from a money judgment entered against him in favor of plaintiff N. A. Lytle. The appellant raised three assignments of error concerning the sufficiency of the complaint, whether the judgment was contrary to law, and whether the evidence justified the judgment. The court held that the first two assignments failed to comply with the specificity requirements of Supreme Court Rule XII and were therefore waived. The third assignment was liberally construed as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, which the court reviewed and found adequate to support the trial court's factual findings and resulting judgment despite conflicting testimony.

procedure

This case involves a worker's compensation claim filed by David J. Stephens with the Industrial Commission of Arizona after a 1936 workplace injury at Miami Copper Company. Stephens received and accepted awards in 1937 for temporary and permanent partial disability but later sought to reopen the case in 1941, claiming new complications from the injury. The commission denied further compensation after reviewing multiple medical reports and examinations, finding insufficient evidence that any new disability resulted from the original injury. The court affirmed the denial, ruling that the 1937 awards were final as to facts existing at that time and that conflicting medical opinions provided substantial evidence supporting the commission's conclusion on the lack of new compensable disability.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a mandamus action by C. Earl Rogers against Arizona's state auditor to compel approval of his salary claims as a purported member of the industrial commission. Rogers claimed appointment by the governor to a term beginning in January 1942, following a prior commissioner's resignation and failed senate confirmations of other nominees. The court held that Rogers was not legally entitled to the office or salary because his appointment for the full term had not been confirmed by the senate and did not qualify him as a statutory hold-over successor to the prior commissioner. The decision rested on Arizona statutes governing vacancies, hold-over duties until a successor qualifies, the governor's limited power to appoint without confirmation for unexpired terms only, and the ineffectiveness of unconfirmed full-term appointments.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved multiple wrongful death suits arising from a collision at an intersection between a Ford automobile and an ore truck driven by defendant Eddie Pyeatt, where the plaintiffs alleged that Pyeatt's negligence caused the accident. The court held that the trial court should have directed verdicts in favor of the defendants, as there was insufficient evidence of Pyeatt's negligence. The reasoning centered on Arizona's right-of-way statute, which requires the driver on the left to yield when two vehicles approach an intersection at approximately the same time; the evidence showed that Pyeatt stopped and entered the intersection well before the Ford approached, and the Ford driver had a clear view and ample opportunity to avoid the collision, making the Ford's excessive speed the sole cause.

torts & liability

In Paar v. City of Prescott, the plaintiff sued the municipal defendant for the reasonable value of the city's ongoing use of his private water system, which the city had connected to its mains in 1927 to supply water to residents in a new addition and then used to meter and collect fees from consumers without any express agreement on compensation or purchase of the system. The trial court entered judgment for the city, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a municipality acting in its proprietary capacity is liable in quantum meruit for unjust enrichment when it uses another's property without a gratuitous-use agreement. The court further held that the three-year statute of limitations for actions on unwritten contracts applied to the continuing claim, limiting recovery to the reasonable annual rental value for only the three years preceding the 1938 filing.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In Doty v. Southern Pacific Co., plaintiffs sued the railroad for negligence after their car collided with a long freight train stopped across a highway crossing at night, injuring Mary Doty. The complaint described unusual physical conditions at the crossing—including a curved road that directed headlights away from the tracks, a steep incline, a gully, and warning signs only on one side of the road—that allegedly made the train difficult to see despite the plaintiffs driving slowly and being unfamiliar with the area. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failing to state a cause of action, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that it was not negligence for the railroad to stop the train or to rely on statutory warnings, and that the same conditions impairing visibility also required drivers to reduce speed and proceed with caution, so the railroad had no common-law duty to provide additional warnings under these facts.

torts & liability