Lorna E. Lockwood

In State v. Helmick, the defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon and first-degree burglary after an incident at a bar where he held a knife to a patron's throat and later lunged at an officer. On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of criminal discovery rules, the reinstatement of dismissed counts, the denial of an insanity defense, double punishment under A.R.S. § 13-1641, and the length of his consecutive sentences. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the discovery rules provided adequate reciprocity, the motion to dismiss was untimely, the offenses had distinct elements so double punishment did not apply, and the sentences were within statutory limits without an abuse of discretion. The court rejected all assignments of error and upheld the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Stolze, the defendant was convicted of three counts of furnishing marijuana to minors and sentenced to prison. On appeal, he argued that due process was violated by an incomplete trial transcript, that a child witness's testimony should have been stricken due to alleged coaching, that the jury was biased because of acquaintanceship with a prosecution witness, that a variance in proof denied him a fair trial, and that the evidence was insufficient. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court had provided an adequate record, found no evidence of coaching or prejudice, determined there was no showing of juror bias, noted the absence of any continuance motion, and concluded that the state's evidence was substantial enough to support the jury's verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Rios, three indigent Mexican nationals were convicted by a trial court of importing and transporting marijuana after being apprehended near the U.S.-Mexico border based on footprints linking them to hidden marijuana stashes. The sole issue on appeal was whether the defendants were denied due process when the trial court effectively refused their request for a continuous interpreter during proceedings, despite their limited English proficiency and the fact that all prior interactions with authorities had occurred in Spanish. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that an indigent defendant unable to understand English must be provided with translation services to meaningfully participate in their defense, including during witness testimony and cross-examination. The court reasoned that relying on defense counsel to translate simultaneously was impractical and impaired effective assistance of counsel, and that the appointment of an interpreter is a county expense not deductible from appointed counsel's fees.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Jackson, the defendant appealed his convictions on multiple counts of burglary and armed robbery, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and vehicle, in allowing certain in-court identifications, in admitting evidence of other uncharged acts, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on descriptions of a suspect vehicle and items taken in nearby burglaries, making the searches incident to arrest and of the vehicle lawful under exigent circumstances; that the identifications had independent origins; that evidence of other burglaries was admissible to provide the complete story of events on the night in question; and that the jury was properly instructed regarding one directed verdict count. The court found no reversible error in the trial proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved William C. Farni, who was convicted of robbery under Arizona statutes and sentenced to a prison term of forty years to life. On appeal, Farni argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reviewed the record and determined that the claimed errors were either meritless or amounted to reasonable tactical decisions by counsel, such as choices about voir dire, opening statements, cross-examination, and admissions of prior convictions. It concluded that the representation did not fall to the level of a farce or sham, and the conviction resulted from the strength of the evidence against the defendant. The court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case is a follow-up to the 1973 Boykin decision, in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that Department of Public Safety officers were entitled to compensatory time off (but not cash overtime pay) for hours worked beyond eight per day, directing the agency to implement a schedule while noting that monetary compensation required legislative action. After remand, the trial court approved a plan granting hour-for-hour compensatory time to current employees and also ordered cash payments to employees who had terminated before the 1973 decision plus $25,000 in attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court exceeded the scope of the prior mandate by awarding cash compensation to terminated employees, which violated statutes prohibiting overtime pay without legislative approval, and by granting attorneys' fees without statutory authority; however, the compensatory-time provisions for ongoing employees and the class-action notice procedures were upheld. The court therefore remanded with directions to vacate the awards for terminated employees and attorneys' fees.

labor & employmentprocedure

In State v. Boyles, Terry Boyles was convicted of robbery while armed with a gun after robbing a Prescott market in 1974, with testimony from his accomplice and police officers about his participation and statements. Boyles appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on intoxication as a defense to the specific intent element of robbery. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the evidence did not support giving the instruction because the weight of the testimony showed Boyles was not intoxicated at the time of the crime and the accomplice's statements on the issue were ambiguous at best.

criminal law

This case arose from a 1970 car collision at an intersection in Mesa, Arizona, where both drivers claimed the other ran a red light; the Johnsons sued the Elliotts for negligence and the Elliotts counterclaimed, but the jury found for neither side. The trial court granted the Elliotts a new trial citing errors including improper admission of expert testimony on confabulation without foundation, refusal to allow questioning of their expert on amnesia and memory effects from the crash, and misstatements of law by counsel. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the trial court had improperly relied on several of these grounds because timely objections were not made and the errors were not fundamental, but affirmed the new trial order as to the Elliotts' counterclaim because the court had improperly limited their expert's testimony on memory. The court vacated the new trial order as to the Johnsons' claims. The decision turned on rules requiring timely objections to preserve error and limits on a court's sua sponte new-trial authority under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 59.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over an agreement for the lease of property and construction of an additional building following the sale of corporate stock in Joy Enterprises, Inc., a mobile home manufacturer. The lessee sought specific performance or damages after the lessors failed to build the structure and contested the validity of the lease. The trial court directed a verdict for the lessors, but the appellate court reversed, ruling that the written agreement's terms combined with the parties' conduct—such as payment and acceptance of rent and the lessee's improvements—estopped the lessors from denying the landlord-tenant relationship. The court reasoned that the essential lease terms were sufficiently defined and that estoppel principles applied to enforce the relationship despite the absence of a formal lease document. The matter was remanded for a new trial to resolve remaining issues regarding the parties' responsibilities.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Belcher, the defendant pled guilty to armed robbery and received a suspended sentence with probation, but his probation was later revoked after he was found in possession of a firearm. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss based on a delay beyond the 20-day limit for a preliminary revocation hearing under Criminal Rule 27.7 and relied on the probation officer's hearsay testimony about the violation. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the revocation and sentence, holding that the time limit is not jurisdictional and the defendant showed no prejudice from the delay, which was under two months as permitted by due process standards. The court also ruled that the hearsay evidence was reliable and admissible under Rule 27.7(c)(3) because it was corroborated by the defendant's guilty plea to the related weapon charge, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedents on probation revocation hearings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James Lee Guthrie, who was convicted by jury of the unlawful sale of heroin and sentenced to five to seven years in prison with a mandatory minimum of five years before parole eligibility under A.R.S. § 36-1002.02. After the Arizona Supreme Court twice affirmed the judgment and sentence on direct appeal, Guthrie petitioned for postconviction relief under Rule 32.1, claiming newly discovered evidence of rehabilitation during his release on appeal bond that warranted reconsideration of his sentence for possible probation. The court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify a sentence already upheld on appeal and that the mandatory minimum term did not violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the Arizona Constitution or the Eighth Amendment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Christopher Miller's conviction for armed robbery of a Phoenix convenience store, where he appealed on the grounds that the trial court improperly denied his public defender's motions to withdraw and continue the trial so that retained counsel could take over. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court reasoned that while defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel of their choosing, that right is not absolute and may be forfeited by dilatory conduct, such as waiting until the day before trial after multiple postponements to seek substitution. It further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as the public defender had provided effective assistance with adequate preparation time and the evidence against Miller was overwhelming.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Robert Morrow's appeal from convictions on two counts of kidnapping and one count of lewd and lascivious conduct after he allegedly lured two ten-year-old girls into his truck, took them to a remote location, and committed sexual acts with them. Morrow challenged the trial court's denial of his post-trial motion for psychiatric examination of the victims, its refusal to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence pinpointing the crime scene, and alleged state interference with obtaining alibi witnesses. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no abuse of discretion because the victims testified consistently and maturely, the purported new evidence was too vague to likely alter the outcome, and any inconsistencies or actions by police did not prejudice the defense or undermine the victims' testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Riggins, defendant Charles Sam Riggins appealed his jury conviction and sentence for armed robbery under Arizona law, raising three claims: that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to reopen its case after resting to prove the victim's money was taken; that the evidence was insufficient to establish a robbery occurred; and that the court erred by refusing to ask two requested voir dire questions about presuming guilt. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held there was no abuse of discretion or double jeopardy violation in reopening the case, as it was merely a nonprejudicial reordering of evidence offered in good faith; the evidence was sufficient because the victim had the money before the attack and it was missing afterward amid violence; and the voir dire questions were not required under the rules since other questions covered reasonable doubt and the extent of examination is discretionary.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Kevil, Richard Kevil appealed his jury conviction for robbery after he and his wife were found guilty of robbing a man they met in a Tucson bar, with evidence including the victim's wallet recovered from their apartment and the victim's identification of Richard as the assailant. The defendant challenged the trial court's denial of access to the victim's mental health records for impeachment purposes due to the victim's history of paranoid schizophrenia and memory issues, as well as the admission of police expert testimony on the modus operandi of similar robberies without prior disclosure under criminal procedure rules. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim was not under the prosecutor's control so his records were not subject to mandatory discovery, that the officer was qualified as an expert based on experience, and that any late disclosure caused no prejudice to the defense. The court rejected claims that the trial judge abused discretion in these evidentiary rulings.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Natividad, the defendant, an indigent Mexican national with uncertain English proficiency, was convicted after a jury trial of possession of marijuana for sale and transportation of marijuana based on evidence found in his car trunk. On appeal, he argued that the trial court's failure to inform him of his right to a state-funded interpreter or to provide one throughout proceedings violated due process by denying him the ability to confront witnesses, assist in his defense, and receive effective counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine the severity of any language barrier and whether the defendant was entitled to notification of interpreter rights, reasoning that an indigent defendant unable to understand English is entitled to translation assistance if needed and that silence does not waive the right when the court is on notice of difficulties. The court noted that all interrogations had been in Spanish and no interpreter was used except for the defendant's testimony.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In State v. McDonald, the defendant was convicted by a jury of armed robbery after a home invasion in Phoenix and sentenced to 60 years to life in prison. On appeal, he argued violations of his speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment due to delays from extradition and separate Oklahoma charges, improper in-court identifications from photo lineups, jury irregularities involving security measures, and an excessive sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, applying Barker v. Wingo factors to find the delay not attributable to the state and no prejudice, upholding the identifications and trial procedures as proper, and concluding the sentence was within statutory limits without abuse of discretion by the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a juvenile in Maricopa County charged with burglary and petty theft after entering a home with others who stole money; the juvenile court directed a verdict on theft, found no burglary, but adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on a trespass finding. The Court of Appeals reversed the adjudication, ruling that trespass was not a lesser included offense of burglary. The Arizona Supreme Court held that trespass under A.R.S. § 13-712(9) is not a lesser included offense of burglary under A.R.S. § 13-302(A) because the burglary statute does not require unlawful entry and can be committed with the owner's permission if there is intent to commit theft or a felony, and rejected claims that juvenile appellate procedures violated equal protection or due process. The court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In State v. Tostado, the defendant, a Mexican national working illegally in the U.S., was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder after stabbing his former girlfriend and her new boyfriend to death following an altercation. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by admitting rebuttal testimony about a prior incident in which he had allegedly threatened the victim with a knife, that the prosecutor improperly inferred premeditation from his request for a knife, and that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation or deliberation to deny his motion for a directed verdict on first-degree murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the rebuttal evidence was admissible as an exception to the general bar on prior-crime evidence because it was offered to show intent rather than propensity, that the defendant failed to preserve some objections at trial, and that substantial circumstantial evidence supported the trial court's denial of the directed verdict. The court also found the prosecutor's inferences reasonable based on the trial testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Gamble, the defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery after being identified by the victim as one of two men who grabbed him on a Phoenix street, took $42 from his pockets, and fled; he was sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison and appealed solely on the ground that the trial court's jury instruction defining robbery omitted the word "felonious" from the statutory definition. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the omission did not constitute fundamental error. The court reasoned that the defendant's only defense was mistaken identity rather than lack of specific intent, making the missing term immaterial to the jury's determination of guilt under the facts presented. The court further noted that errors in intent instructions are not reversible when specific intent is not at issue in the case.

criminal law