Ernest W. McFarland

Herbert Overton was charged with first-degree murder after shooting and killing a Maricopa County deputy sheriff during a traffic stop. A jury convicted him of second-degree murder, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The court held that the state failed to meet its burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant rebutted the presumption of sanity with expert psychiatric testimony that he did not know his act was wrong under the M'Naghten test. Lay witness opinions describing Overton as appearing "normal" or "rational" were insufficient because they did not address whether he understood the nature and quality of his act or knew it was wrong, lacking the required probative value based on adequate observation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns a property tax valuation dispute in which Four Corners Pipe Line Company challenged the Arizona State Department of Valuation's assessment of its pipeline assets, seeking a trial de novo in superior court under A.R.S. § 42-147 to establish a lower full cash value. The court clarified that the statute requires the taxpayer to prove by competent evidence that the approved valuation is excessive before the court may determine and substitute its own full cash value, and that terms such as arbitrary or fraudulent from other jurisdictions' cases are not imported into Arizona law. The company's evidence, based on speculative projections of future prices and conditions, failed to meet this burden. The court therefore held the original valuation presumptively correct and lawful, denied rehearing, and reaffirmed that the superior court's authority to set a new value arises only upon a finding of excessiveness.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over the proper valuation of a crude oil pipeline for property tax purposes in Arizona counties. The pipeline company argued for a lower assessment using projections of declining future throughput and income, while the state used capitalization of recent past income, resulting in a higher value. The trial and appellate courts sided with the company, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that the taxpayer failed to show the Department of Property Evaluation's method was inherently unjust or inequitable, and courts should not substitute their own valuation methods absent such a finding.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Mitchell, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of attempted kidnapping while armed with a gun and assault with a deadly weapon (a gun) arising from an incident in which he grabbed a junior-high-school student by the arm, pointed a gun at her, threatened to shoot if she screamed, and tried to force her toward his truck before she escaped by screaming. The trial court denied a motion for directed verdict, imposed concurrent 10-to-15-year prison sentences on both counts, and, after a bifurcated sanity phase, rejected the insanity defense. On appeal the Arizona Supreme Court held that the two convictions punished the same act in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1641 and therefore set aside the assault conviction and sentence; it affirmed the attempted-kidnapping conviction and sentence, finding sufficient evidence of an overt act and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing. The court also rejected challenges to the admission of certain testimony in the sanity phase.

criminal law

The case involved Albert Daniels' conviction for first-degree burglary after he was observed stealing clothing from a store at 11:30 p.m. and apprehended nearby. Daniels appealed, arguing primarily that his expert testimony on insanity required acquittal because the state offered no rebuttal expert, that jury instructions improperly referenced a presumption of sanity, and that the state failed to prove the nighttime element of the offense or properly handle his confession. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that expert opinions on mental state are merely evidence for the jury to weigh alongside all facts, that the state must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue is raised but did so here through lay testimony and circumstances, and that the evidence and instructions on voluntariness and other issues were adequate.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brown, the defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery after entering a bar, holding up the bartender and a customer at gunpoint, and taking cash before fleeing. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's jury instructions regarding general and specific intent, the refusal to give a separate intoxication instruction to negate specific intent, and the sentencing as a second offender despite no prior conviction being charged in the case. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the instructions adequately addressed the requirement of specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of property and properly incorporated the statutory rule on intoxication's effect on intent. However, it vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing because the record was unclear whether the trial court had improperly treated the defendant as a repeat offender under the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Van Winkle, the defendant was tried and convicted on five counts of second-degree rape and one count of lewd and lascivious acts against his fourteen-year-old daughter, based on incidents occurring over several days in August 1968, and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of seven and one-half to fifteen years. On appeal, the defendant raised claims including a violation of double jeopardy due to lack of credit for pre-trial confinement, improper admission of evidence from another child regarding prior similar acts, an erroneous refusal to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor read a forbidden question from a deposition, and the exclusion of character witness testimony. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence of guilt was substantial, that any trial errors such as the improper question were harmless because the trial court struck the question and instructed the jury, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and sentencing rulings.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In State v. Shannon, the defendant was charged with armed robbery after demanding money from a store clerk while holding an object that appeared to be a gun but was never confirmed as such; the armed allegation was stricken, and following a bifurcated trial on guilt and insanity, the jury found him guilty and legally sane. On appeal, Shannon challenged the bifurcated trial procedure in light of State v. Shaw, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of theft from the person, and the insanity instruction under the M'Naghten Rule. The court held that Shaw applied only prospectively and did not affect this completed trial, that the facts did not support a theft instruction because the taking was accomplished by force or fear rather than surreptitiously, and that the M'Naghten instruction was proper based on the expert testimony presented. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Price, the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and sale of marijuana to an undercover officer after a single transaction in which he obtained and delivered the drug for $125. The court held that under A.R.S. § 13-1641, the possession and sale constituted one transaction, requiring vacation of the possession conviction and sentence. On the sale conviction, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the prosecution improperly impeached the defendant with specific acts of unconvicted misconduct and collateral matters without laying a proper foundation, violating established rules against such impeachment. The decision was based on prior Arizona precedents applying the transactional test and limiting impeachment evidence to felony convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Reeden, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after declining to testify at trial, at which time he had prior felony convictions that could have been used to impeach his credibility. After those convictions were reversed on appeal and the charges dismissed, he moved for a new trial under Arizona criminal procedure rules, arguing the reversal constituted newly discovered evidence that eliminated the impeachment risk. The trial court denied the motion, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant could not claim prejudice from not testifying because he had known the status of the convictions and could have addressed any impeachment questions at trial; the court also noted that prior convictions remain usable for impeachment until formally set aside. The decision rested on established precedent allowing impeachment by felony convictions and the rule that a defendant's choice not to testify precludes later complaints about that decision.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Robert Heaney's petition to the Arizona Supreme Court seeking review of the Committee of Examinations and Admissions' decision not to recommend him for admission to the state bar after he scored just below passing on the February 1970 bar exam. Heaney had filed a petition with the Committee for regrading but it was summarily dismissed for failing to comply with court rules requiring two committee members to submit written opinions that specific exam papers were unfairly graded, along with a detailed statement of the alleged errors rather than a general claim of unfairness. The court held that it has inherent authority to regulate bar admissions and that its Rule XI governs such reviews, which explicitly bars direct court petitions for grade disputes absent fraud, coercion, or unfair treatment and requires strict adherence to the specified procedures before any review is granted. Finding no such allegations and that Heaney's petition amounted only to a statistical and general challenge, the court dismissed the petition and directed that any remedy lay in first seeking committee review under the rules.

procedure

The case concerned the priority between materialmen's liens and mortgages on six apartment buildings in a larger construction project. Southwest Savings and Loan Association sought to foreclose its mortgages, while claimants asserted liens for materials and labor supplied to the properties. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the materialmen's liens took priority over the six mortgages because the lienholders lacked actual or constructive notice of the unrecorded mortgages when they began work, and the liens related back to the start of labor or delivery of materials on each individual building rather than the overall project. The court further held that lien amounts must be based on the reasonable value of materials actually incorporated into each specific building. It remanded the case for further proceedings to determine those amounts consistent with this approach.

property

In State v. Rackley, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after shooting Harold Terry during a dispute in the Arizona desert and was sentenced to life imprisonment; he appealed on the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to make objections or conduct extensive cross-examination. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the right to counsel requires only representation that is not a farce or sham, and that the trial attorney's familiarity with the evidence and strategic choices did not meet this threshold. The court noted the largely undisputed facts, including the defendant's admission to firing the first shot and eyewitness accounts of the second, and found no prejudice from counsel's approach. It also clarified that the state's witnesses were accessories after the fact rather than accomplices, but their testimony was supported by independent evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendants David Joseph Andrews and Jean Ellen Hughes, who were convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon against Tempe police officers V. E. Jones and Fred Grantham following a traffic stop and high-speed chase in which shots were fired at the officers from the defendants' vehicle. The trial court sentenced each defendant to concurrent terms of 25 to 30 years on each count. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, that the defendants were not entitled to instructions on lesser offenses or relief on double jeopardy grounds, that the flight instruction was proper, that the sentences were within statutory limits, and that a prior decision invalidating bifurcated trials for insanity defenses did not apply retroactively to require reversal here.

criminal lawguns

This case involved a petition for special action by the Maricopa County Attorney seeking to permanently enjoin a superior court from holding a jury hearing to determine whether Josephine Haletky, who had been committed to a mental hospital after a bifurcated trial finding her not guilty by reason of insanity on an assault charge, should be released. The petition followed the court's prior decision in State v. Shaw declaring the bifurcated trial provisions of A.R.S. § 13-1621.01 unconstitutional on due process grounds. The court held that Shaw is not retroactive and does not invalidate prior commitments from bifurcated trials, and that the remaining separable portions of the statute governing post-commitment release procedures (including the jury hearing on dangerousness) remain enforceable. It therefore denied the requested injunction, dissolved the temporary stay, and allowed the superior court proceedings to continue under the valid statutory provisions.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Saiz, Terry Saiz was tried and convicted of narcotics possession after police executed a search warrant at a residence, observed him fleeing out the back door, noted fresh puncture wounds on his arm, and found drug paraphernalia and packets containing narcotics. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the warrantless arrest was lawful and the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court held that probable cause existed based on the defendant's flight from the premises being searched, the officers' direct observations, and the practical need to prevent evidence destruction during warrant execution, consistent with statutory standards and U.S. Supreme Court precedent on probable cause. Related challenges to the search warrant and joinder were resolved in a companion case, and the evidence supported a finding of joint possession.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a motion for rehearing filed by the appellee insurance company in a dispute with Porter over liability for personal injury damages. The prior opinion had reversed a superior court ruling and remanded the matter, noting that Porter sustained $10,000 in injuries for appeal purposes but holding him entitled to a $7,500 judgment. The court clarifies that the $10,000 amount was assumed only for purposes of the appeal and that the actual damages must still be determined through further proceedings in the lower court. With this modification to its opinion, the motion for rehearing is denied.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Riley, the defendant was convicted of robbery under A.R.S. § 13-641 for his role in a holdup at a finance company office and sentenced to five to six years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he aided and abetted the crime, that the lack of appointed counsel at his preliminary hearing violated due process, and that the trial court erred by refusing one of his requested jury instructions. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that witness testimony identifying the defendant at the scene provided substantial evidence of his involvement, that Coleman v. Alabama's right-to-counsel rule was not retroactive and no prejudice was shown, and that the refused instruction was adequately covered by others that were given.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Benjamin Verrue's appeal from his conviction for possession of a narcotic (heroin) after police executed a search warrant at his home, found drug paraphernalia and packets on the kitchen table and in his pockets, and arrested him along with others present. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the search warrant was valid because the affidavit and the officer's sworn testimony before the magistrate provided sufficient underlying facts to establish probable cause, including the informant's reliability based on prior occasions. The court further ruled that the evidence showed actual and joint possession with knowledge rather than mere constructive possession, and that the partial testing of packets (with untested ones excluded) was sufficient for the jury to find guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a challenge to an amended criminal complaint charging Morris Starsky with disorderly conduct under A.R.S. § 13-371 for maliciously disturbing the peace through tumultuous or offensive conduct and applying violent, abusive, or obscene epithets. The Superior Court certified to the Arizona Supreme Court the question of whether the complaint charged an offense, based on arguments that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and infringed on First Amendment free speech rights. The court held that the statute was not void for vagueness because it used commonly understood terms to clearly define punishable conduct when done maliciously and willfully, and it had been in substantially similar form for decades. The court further concluded that the statute did not unconstitutionally limit freedom of speech, as constitutional protections have limits and the state may punish conduct that disturbs the peace even when intertwined with expression.

criminal lawfree speech