Grimmett v. Digby
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-11-26 · cited 16×
This case involved an Arkansas state trooper, Jimmy Grimmett, who was sued for damages after causing a car accident while on duty; he sought to dismiss the suit by arguing it was effectively an action against the state barred by Article 5, Section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution, which would place exclusive jurisdiction with the Claims Commission. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that a negligence action against a state employee for violating duties shared with the general public does not constitute a suit against the state. The court's reasoning relied on its prior decision in Kelly v. Wood and on constitutional provisions in Article 2, Sections 7 and 13, which guarantee the right to a jury trial and a remedy for injuries, preventing the legislature from assigning exclusive jurisdiction over such claims to the Claims Commission without a constitutional amendment. The decision allowed the underlying tort suit to proceed in court rather than before the Commission.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Shiras v. Britt
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-11-13 · cited 19×
The case involved a challenge to a trial judge's orders excluding the public and press from a suppression hearing and a proffer of inadmissible testimony during a criminal conspiracy-to-murder trial, and conditioning a reporter's attendance on prior censorship of any resulting story. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus after the fact to address the exclusions. The court granted the writ, holding that the orders violated Arkansas statute requiring that all court sittings be public and open to every person. The decision rested on state statutory and common-law principles emphasizing public observation of judicial proceedings funded by taxpayers, without reaching federal constitutional claims under the First or Fourteenth Amendments.
criminal lawfree speechprocedure
Teas v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-10-01 · cited 24×
The case involved appellant Edward Leon Teas, charged in two separate felony informations with selling morphine and marijuana to the same informant on different dates in December 1977. The trial court joined the offenses for a single trial, admitted evidence of Teas's prior drug sales, and denied his motion to suppress a confession, resulting in maximum sentences on both counts to run consecutively. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the offenses were not part of a single scheme or plan and thus required severance under Criminal Procedure Rule 22.2, that the prior sales evidence was inadmissible, and that the confession was involuntary because it was induced by implied promises of leniency or reward in exchange for cooperation with police. The court found the trial court's voluntariness determination contrary to the totality of the evidence on that issue.
criminal lawprocedure
Newton v. Clark
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-07-02 · cited 16×
The case involved a personal injury lawsuit by Felix Allen Clark, who was injured when his pickup truck collided with the rear of a stalled log truck owned and operated by Moses Newton on a highway bridge during a thunderstorm; Clark sued both Newton and contractor Bill Fitzgerald, alleging negligence by Newton in operating the truck without tail lights and by Fitzgerald in negligently selecting an incompetent independent contractor. A jury awarded Clark $155,000 in damages against both defendants. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Fitzgerald was entitled to a directed verdict because Newton was not Fitzgerald's independent contractor but merely a supplier of logs who chose Fitzgerald for credit after delivery, and there was no evidence that Fitzgerald knew or should have known Newton was incompetent. The court also held that the trial court erred in admitting a blood alcohol test of Clark because it did not comply with statutory requirements for physician supervision and approved testing methods.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Frakes v. Hunt
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-06-25 · cited 19×
The case concerned whether an illegitimate child could inherit from her father under Arkansas law after the U.S. Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Trimble v. Gordon struck down a similar statute on equal protection grounds. Linn Hunt died intestate in 1972, and Marie Frakes sued in 1977 claiming to be his sole heir to over 400 acres of land, arguing that the Arkansas statute barring such inheritance was unconstitutional. The trial court found the statute invalid but ruled against Frakes on the facts of her claim. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the outcome, holding that Trimble does not apply retroactively to deaths or title distributions occurring before April 26, 1977, to avoid disrupting settled property titles and expectations of reliance on prior law. The court cited similar prospective-only rulings from Kentucky and Tennessee and noted potential conflicts with statutes of limitations and pretermitted child rules.
family lawpropertycivil rights
Stoner v. Houston
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-06-11 · cited 32×
This case involved a dispute between neighboring landowners in Arkansas where Mary Lou Stoner, whose property was surrounded by the Houstons' land, hired a bulldozer to clear old logging roads without permission, damaging trees and disturbing the soil. The Houstons sued for trespass and timber damage under state statute, and a jury awarded $1,000 for timber damage, $1 in actual trespass damages, and $10,000 in punitive damages, which the trial judge then trebled to $3,000 for the timber under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-105. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the judge improperly trebled the damages because the jury had already been instructed to consider malice and award treble damages if warranted, and that the separate awards constituted an impermissible double recovery for the same incident. The court also addressed supporting evidence of malice based on prior disputes but found the trebling and double-recovery issues required reversal, while noting that nominal damages alone could not support punitive damages.
propertytorts & liabilityprocedure
Harper v. Caskin
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-04-23 · cited 49×
The case involved stepfather Carthal Deane Harper and mother Loraine Harper petitioning to adopt Loraine's minor son without the consent of the biological father, James Dennis Caskin, under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-207(a)(2), which permits adoption without consent if a non-custodial parent has failed significantly for at least one year without justifiable cause to communicate with or support the child. The trial court denied the petition, determining that the evidence did not establish such a failure by the father. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial, holding that petitioners bear a heavy burden to prove the statutory conditions by clear and convincing evidence and that the father's health problems, limited income, and other circumstances provided justifiable cause for his limited communication and support during the relevant period.
family law
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. First Pyramid Life Insurance Co. of America
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-04-02 · cited 19×
The case involved the Arkansas State Highway Commission using eminent domain to take 58.39 acres from land owned by First Pyramid Life Insurance Company for a freeway project, with the parties disputing the amount of just compensation after the Commission initially deposited $44,960. Appraisal experts for the landowner testified to damages ranging from $495,000 to $640,950, while the Commission's experts estimated $46,945 to $73,743, and the jury awarded $495,000. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the landowner to elicit testimony that an expert appraiser had been hired by the Commission but not called as a witness. The court reasoned that under established precedent, neither party is bound by rejected expert opinions obtained for condemnation cases, and evidence of such employment is irrelevant to determining just compensation and risks prejudicing the hiring party.
propertyprocedure
Brandenburg v. Brooks
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-01-29 · cited 14×
In Brandenburg v. Brooks, the appellants claimed an easement by necessity across the appellees' adjacent land to access their property, asserting that the natural terrain made other routes impossible except by tractor. The trial court directed a verdict for the appellees after the close of the appellants' proof. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding there was substantial evidence that the appellants were entitled to an implied easement based on reasonable necessity arising from the terrain at the time of the original severance, which would pass to subsequent owners. The court observed that such an easement requires more than mere convenience but found the evidence sufficient under that standard. It also noted a minor noncompliance with briefing rules but declined to order a reprint.
property
Brown v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-01-29 · cited 12×
In Brown v. State, the defendant appealed an interlocutory ruling in his upcoming rape trial that barred any mention of prior sexual contact between him and the prosecuting witness, which he argued was relevant to his consent defense. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, finding that the evidence of their past relationship met the standard for relevance under Uniform Rule of Evidence 401 because the witness had previously invited the defendant to her apartment and was scantily dressed when she let him in, making consent more probable. The court remanded the matter for further proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure
Dena Construction Co. v. Herndon
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-01-09 · cited 19×
The case concerned a workers' compensation claim by Hayden Herndon, who suffered a heart attack while employed by Dena Construction Company using a jackhammer to lay cable. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission found that the heart attack arose out of and in the course of his employment and that Herndon was permanently and totally disabled; the circuit court affirmed those findings. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination on causation, based on testimony from Dr. Cullen linking the work activity to aggravating Herndon's preexisting condition. However, the court reversed the finding of permanent total disability because post-bypass surgery medical evidence from Dr. Leachman indicated potential rehabilitation and the record lacked substantial evidence of ongoing total incapacity, and it remanded the case for further development of Herndon's current condition.
labor & employment
Hughes v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-12-18 · cited 28×
The case concerned the revocation of a suspended sentence imposed on Harvey Hughes after his guilty plea to a third offense of selling intoxicating beverages in a dry county in Arkansas. The trial court had suspended Hughes's five-year sentence on conditions including compliance with liquor laws and good behavior; after the state filed a petition alleging a new sale of whiskey in Sevier County, the court revoked two years of the sentence following a hearing. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the revocation, rejecting claims that the proceedings violated due process (including issues with the judge's off-record contact with Hughes's doctor, discovery under Rule 17.1, an alleged warrantless search, and vagueness of the suspension conditions), equal protection, or the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and finding that some arguments were not preserved or lacked merit. The court reasoned that the evidence of the sale was sufficient, the conditions were adequately communicated, and procedural requirements had been substantially met or waived.
criminal lawprocedure
International Harvester Corp. v. Hardin
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-12-18 · cited 10×
The case involved a six-year-old child who suffered severe foot injuries when a neighbor backed a riding garden tractor over her feet while using it as a lawn mower. The child, through her father, sued both the operator for negligence and the manufacturer, International Harvester, alleging defective design due to the absence of safety features such as a rear cow catcher, blade guards in reverse, or other protective devices, along with failure to warn. The jury found both parties negligent and apportioned liability equally, awarding damages. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment against the manufacturer, holding that the trial court erred in excluding the company's designated employee representative from the courtroom under evidence rules and that the plaintiff's expert testimony on alternative designs was speculative and lacked substantial evidence to support a finding of defective design, as no such devices were shown to exist on comparable mowers. The judgment against the operator was affirmed.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Grays v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-11-13 · cited 19×
The case Grays v. State concerned an appeal from a conviction for burglary as a habitual offender, where the defendant claimed the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering and criminal trespass. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the evidence provided no rational basis for acquitting the defendant of burglary while convicting him of a lesser offense, as the facts supported either guilt of the greater charge or innocence. The court's reasoning relied on the Arkansas Criminal Code provision requiring lesser-included-offense instructions only when evidence could justify convicting on the lesser charge, noting that all elements of burglary were present and the defendant's actions aligned with that offense rather than a mere trespass or entry without intent. A dissent contended that the defendant's own statements created a factual question supporting a criminal trespass conviction, making the instruction mandatory under the statute.
criminal lawprocedure
Harkness v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-11-13 · cited 52×
The case involved a motion by petitioner Alfred D. Harkness for permission to file an appeal record two days after the 90-day deadline due to his attorney's inadvertent miscalculation of the filing period. The court granted the motion to docket the record as a belated appeal. It accepted as true the uncontroverted affidavit showing the error and reasoned that denial would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel amounting to a denial of constitutional rights, which would in turn provide grounds for postconviction relief and a new trial. The decision was reached as a pragmatic matter to avoid that outcome.
criminal lawprocedure
King v. Westlake
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-11-13 · cited 19×
The case arose from a rear-end automobile collision in which plaintiff Harry Westlake obtained a $15,000 judgment against defendant Wanda King, who carried only $10,000 in liability insurance. King appealed, contending that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff's medical witness to testify via videotaped deposition and by permitting plaintiff's counsel to question prospective jurors about liability insurance and the effect of verdicts on insurance premiums. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that videotape was an acceptable substitute for live testimony under the Uniform Rules of Evidence and state deposition statutes, especially since a stenographic transcript was also introduced. The court further held that the voir dire questions were asked in good faith to probe juror bias and did not improperly disclose the existence of insurance to the jury.
proceduretorts & liability
Parker v. Ramada Inn
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-10-30 · cited 19×
The case involved Theodore Parker, a cook discharged by Ramada Inn after missing a shift due to oversleeping following seven consecutive workdays; he applied for unemployment compensation benefits, which were denied by the Employment Security Division under a statute disqualifying claimants discharged for work-related misconduct. The denial was upheld through the Appeals Tribunal, Board of Review, and Circuit Court. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that a single unexcused absence can qualify as misconduct when it shows disregard for standards of behavior an employer has a right to expect, such as reliable attendance for essential restaurant roles. The court also rejected procedural arguments for default judgment, noting that the Employment Security Act allows tribunals flexibility in evidence and procedure to determine substantial rights, and judicial review is limited to whether the Board's conclusion was reasonable based on the record.
labor & employmentprocedure
Swindler v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-07-17 · cited 39×
The case involved John Edward Swindler's appeal from his conviction for capital felony murder and death sentence for killing a Fort Smith police officer at a service station. The primary issue on appeal was the trial court's denial of a change of venue, which the defendant sought based on extensive pretrial publicity that highlighted his recent release from federal prison, his status as a fugitive wanted for two murders in South Carolina, and community mourning efforts for the slain officer. Multiple witnesses testified that public sentiment in Sebastian County was so strongly against the defendant that an impartial jury could not be seated, with many prospective jurors excused for cause during voir dire after revealing fixed opinions of guilt. The court upheld the denial of the venue change, reasoning that the jury selection process, including peremptory challenges and excusals, had produced a panel capable of deciding the case based on the evidence presented at trial despite the publicity.
criminal lawprocedure
Davis v. Kolb
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-03-27 · cited 7×
In Davis v. Kolb, appellant Ronnie Davis obtained a timber deed from appellees for a 294-acre tract under a consideration structure that allocated the first $10,500 to the sellers, the next $2,000 to Davis, and split the remainder fifty-fifty after removal costs. The chancellor set aside the deed, finding that Davis had misrepresented his experience as a timber buyer and that the deed lacked consideration. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the setting aside of the deed by applying the unconscionability provision of the Uniform Commercial Code (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-302), made applicable to timber sales by § 85-2-107, because Davis had no capital invested and no risk while the timber's actual value greatly exceeded his representations.
propertybusiness & regulatory
Bank of Ozark v. Isaacs
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-03-20 · cited 22×
The case Bank of Ozark v. Isaacs was an appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court challenging a trial court decision. The court dismissed the appeal because the appellant's abstract failed to include the pleadings or the trial court's decree, contained only minimal testimony excerpts, and improperly used photographs of exhibits instead of abstracting them as required by Rule 9(d). The core reasoning is that Supreme Court justices, who have no prior knowledge of the case, must be able to follow the same path as the trial court through the complaint, answer, decree, and relevant evidence to assess any claimed errors, which the deficient abstract prevented. As a result, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling without reaching the merits.
procedure