Sikes v. Segers
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-10-15 · cited 9×
This case is the second appeal in a malpractice action brought by Sikes against Segers, following an earlier reversal of summary judgment in the first appeal. After Sikes discharged his attorney due to a perceived conflict of interest arising from a related defamation suit and a dispute over settlement tactics and evidence handling, the trial court allowed the attorney to withdraw but denied a continuance of the August 15 trial date. When neither Sikes nor new counsel appeared, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the denial of the continuance and resulting dismissal were improper under the circumstances, while declining to rule on the admissibility or suppression of tape recordings obtained in alleged violation of federal wiretap law.
proceduretorts & liabilitycriminal law
Arkansas Public Service Commission v. Pulaski County Board of Equalization
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-06-25 · cited 45×
The case concerned a challenge by the Pulaski County Board of Equalization to statewide property assessment practices under Arkansas law. The Board sought a statewide investigation and reassessment to ensure all taxable property was valued at its true market value as required by the state constitution, and asked that Acts 411 of 1973 and 188 of 1969 be declared invalid. The Arkansas Public Service Commission upheld the acts, finding that the constitution permitted classification of property and did not mandate current market value assessments. On review, the Pulaski County Circuit Court held both acts unconstitutional, ruled that assessments must be based on current market value without classification, and ordered the Commission to develop and implement a five-year plan to reassess all counties at market value, beginning with those having the greatest disparities. The Supreme Court framed the issues as whether constitutional "value" means fair market value and whether the legislature may classify property for taxation purposes.
taxesproperty
Andrews v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1979-04-02 · cited 17×
In Andrews v. State, the defendant was charged with capital murder for the January 1978 killings of J.R. Gillen and Maggie Gillen at their garage following an argument and was convicted after a jury trial, receiving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Prior to trial, the court denied Andrews' motions for appointment of a defense psychiatrist at county expense and for a declaration that the insanity defense statute was unconstitutional because it placed the burden of proof on the defendant as an affirmative defense; the court also found Andrews' confession voluntary after a hearing. On appeal, Andrews challenged the voluntariness of his statements, the denial of his motions, and an error in the charging information that cited the wrong subsection of the capital murder statute. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the confession was voluntary, the information sufficiently charged an offense despite the citation error with no showing of prejudice or surprise, and there was no reversible error in the other rulings.
criminal lawprocedure
Roberts v. Watts
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1978-07-03 · cited 14×
In Roberts v. Watts, the Drew County Quorum Court enacted an ordinance transferring the county clerk's statutory duties regarding disbursement of county funds to a new Department of Financial Management, and the clerk sued for a declaratory judgment that the ordinance violated Amendment 55 to the Arkansas Constitution. The chancellor ruled part of the ordinance unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded without reaching the merits, because the Attorney General had not been served with a copy of the proceedings as required by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-2510 when the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is challenged. The court explained that counties are municipal corporations, the statute applies to county ordinances, and notice to the Attorney General is especially important here given the potential statewide effect of interpreting Amendment 55 and Act 742 of 1977.
procedure
Atkinson v. BD. OF TRUST. OF U. OF ARK.
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1977-12-19 · cited 8×
The case concerned the constitutionality of Section 17 of Act 569 of 1975, an appropriation act for the University of Arkansas, which prohibited full-time law school professors, associate professors, and instructors from handling or assisting with lawsuits in state or federal courts. The trial court upheld the provision with limiting constructions, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the section violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found the classifications unreasonable because the affected and unaffected faculty positions had substantially similar teaching duties, with no record evidence justifying the distinctions in outside practice restrictions.
civil rightslabor & employment
Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1977-07-18 · cited 31×
This case arose when a trial court in a criminal prosecution granted defense counsel's request to conduct voir dire of prospective jurors in chambers, excluding the press and public to avoid adverse publicity for the defendant. Petitioners, a newspaper and reporter, sought a writ of mandamus challenging the exclusion after learning of it. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid, ruling that voir dire is part of the trial itself and that the public and press have a right of access to it absent unusual circumstances outweighing that right. The court reasoned that the press has standing to challenge such orders, the issue was not moot due to its capacity for repetition, and public interest in observing proceedings funded by taxpayer dollars supports openness in criminal trials.
criminal lawfree speechprocedure
Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Garner
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1977-02-28 · cited 13×
The case involved Barbara Garner suing Verson Allsteel Press Co. for negligence after she suffered hand injuries while operating a press brake machine at work, with claims that the manufacturer failed to equip it with safety features such as anti-repeat controls. A jury awarded damages to Garner and her husband, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the case. The court held that a directed verdict should have been granted for Verson because the employer had substantially altered the machine from its original single-operator mechanical foot-pedal design to a two-operator electrical system that removed the built-in safeguards, and expert testimony showed no industry custom or standard in 1964 required point-of-operation safety devices on such presses.
torts & liability
Mason v. Jernigan
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1976-10-11 · cited 24×
This case was an original action in which petitioners sought to enjoin the Arkansas Secretary of State from certifying the popular name and ballot title for Proposed Amendment No. 59, an initiative to amend Amendment No. 34 (the "Rights of Labor" provision) of the state constitution. Petitioners claimed the popular name and ballot title were misleading, deceptive, partisan, and failed to adequately describe the measure's scope, particularly its provisions allowing certain union security agreements under specified conditions. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the titles as sufficient. The court reasoned that Amendment 7 requires liberal construction to facilitate voter rights, the Attorney General's approval carries weight, and the titles were impartial summations free of misleading slogans that fairly reflected the amendment's content.
labor & employmentelections
Holloway v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1976-09-20 · cited 27×
The case involved three defendants convicted by jury of robbing a restaurant and raping two employees at gunpoint, resulting in sentences of 21 years for robbery and life for rape. On appeal, the defendants argued errors including the denial of directed verdict instructions, being brought before the jury in jail uniforms, and a conflict of interest arising from the public defender's office representing multiple clients with potentially adverse interests. The court rejected these claims, finding that the evidence supported the convictions, any procedural issues were cured or did not prejudice the trial, and no actual conflict disqualified counsel under precedents requiring adverse interests rather than mere possibilities. The majority affirmed the judgments, with a dissent arguing that the public defender's divided loyalties violated client confidences and required reversal.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc. v. Edrington
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1976-04-19 · cited 9×
The case involved a plaintiff seeking damages for harm to his cotton crop caused by a contaminated herbicide, with claims of breach of warranty against the manufacturer and distributor and negligence against the transporter, Wheeling Pipe Line. The jury awarded damages and apportioned 50 percent responsibility each to the manufacturer and Wheeling, but the trial court granted the manufacturer judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment for the full amount against Wheeling alone. Wheeling appealed, arguing that it should only be liable for 50 percent because the claims involved different legal theories and the parties were not joint tortfeasors. The court affirmed, holding that the judgment n.o.v. removed the manufacturer from the case entirely, leaving only a tort claim against Wheeling, to which the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full damages as he was not negligent, and that apportionment among defendants does not limit a single defendant's liability to the plaintiff.
torts & liabilityprocedure
City of Batesville v. Grace
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1976-03-15 · cited 11×
This case involved landowners seeking to rezone two adjacent tracts along Highway 167 in Batesville from residential (R-1) to commercial (C-1A) use, after the City Planning Commission recommended approval, the City Council initially voted to approve, but the mayor vetoed and the council failed to override the veto. The landowners appealed to circuit court, which transferred the matter to chancery court where the chancellor found the mayor's veto arbitrary, ordered the rezoning, and imposed specific conditions on traffic access, buffers, and development plans. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that judicial review of municipal zoning decisions is limited to determining whether the city's legislative action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and that the chancellor had improperly conducted a de novo review and substituted its own judgment by originating and imposing detailed restrictions on the property. The court concluded that the city's refusal to rezone did not meet the standard for being arbitrary or unreasonable.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
Lee v. Vaughn
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1976-03-08 · cited 10×
The case concerned a guaranty agreement executed in Texas under which Carl W. Lee promised to pay the first $3,000 of a $4,000 promissory note assigned to B. J. Vaughn, with the contract expressly requiring Vaughn to mail notice to Lee within 15 days of any past-due installment. After the borrowers defaulted on multiple payments without timely written notice to Lee, Vaughn sued to enforce the guaranty, and the trial court entered judgment for Vaughn. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the guaranty must be strictly construed and that Vaughn’s failure to provide the contractually required notice discharged Lee from liability, as the notice provision was a condition precedent to enforcement. The court applied Arkansas law because neither party raised Texas law below and noted that the majority of jurisdictions follow the same rule for express notice conditions in guaranty contracts.
business & regulatory
Byars v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1976-02-02 · cited 17×
The case involved Danny Byars, who was convicted by a jury of possessing marijuana with intent to sell and deliver, resulting in a six-year prison sentence and $5,000 fine. The central issues were whether the affidavit supporting a search warrant for Byars' car met constitutional requirements under precedents like Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States, and whether any consent Byars gave to the search was voluntary. The court held that the affidavit was insufficient because it relied on vague hearsay from a confidential informant without detailing the basis for reliability or the informant's knowledge, rendering the warrant invalid. However, the search was upheld as lawful because officers' testimony established that Byars voluntarily consented by directing them to the marijuana in the trunk to avoid embarrassment, and such consent was not invalidated by the prior invalid warrant or his custody status.
criminal lawprocedure
Baker v. Odom
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1975-11-10 · cited 5×
The case involved fifty-nine neighbors suing to enjoin the operation of a dirt motorcycle racetrack as a private nuisance due to noise, dust, and related disturbances affecting their nearby residential properties. The trial court granted a permanent injunction barring both motorcycle and automobile races after finding the activities interfered with the neighbors' use and enjoyment of their land. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the injunction as to motorcycle racing, holding that the evidence established a nuisance by a preponderance, but modified the decree to remove the prohibition on automobile racing because insufficient evidence had been presented on that activity and racetracks are not nuisances per se. The court also rejected arguments that the chancellor should have been disqualified or that pretrial discovery limits constituted an abuse of discretion.
propertytorts & liability
Lewis v. Conlee
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1975-10-27 · cited 22×
The case concerned a referendum petition filed by citizens of Forrest City, Arkansas, seeking voter approval on Ordinance No. 1340, which repealed the local Civil Service Commission and altered appointment and grievance procedures for police and fire chiefs. The City Council acknowledged the petition's sufficiency but scheduled the referendum for the November 1976 general election, more than 21 months later, pursuant to its Ordinance No. 611 and Amendment No. 7 of the Arkansas Constitution. The trial court denied a writ of mandamus, ruling that the election date was a matter of legislative discretion. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that an unreasonably long delay frustrated the intent of the referendum process under Amendment No. 7, and directed the council to set the election for a reasonably prompt date.
elections
Wright v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1975-10-20 · cited 13×
In Wright v. State, Robert Wright and John Southerland were convicted of robbing John's Liquor Store in Little Rock and each sentenced to 12 years in prison. The court affirmed Wright's conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported it, including his arrest within 20 minutes and two miles of the scene while driving a blue Falcon matching witness descriptions, blood in the car consistent with a robber being struck, and possession of cash nearly identical to the stolen amount including a roll of dimes. The court reversed Southerland's conviction and remanded the case, ruling that his arrest was illegal due to lack of probable cause from an unreliable confidential informant tip, which tainted the subsequent lineup identification, and that the in-court identification was not shown to be independent of the unlawful arrest.
criminal lawprocedure
Freeman v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1975-09-15 · cited 16×
In Freeman v. State, three defendants were convicted by an Arkansas jury of possessing heroin with intent to deliver and each sentenced to 30 years in prison. On appeal, they argued that the trial court erred by denying a continuance after they retained new counsel nine days before trial, by denying a mistrial based on local newspaper and radio reports mentioning a co-defendant's guilty plea, and by admitting evidence of loaded pistols found in their car near the transaction site. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance because counsel had adequate time and no specific prejudice was shown, that the seated jurors had not been exposed to the publicity, and that the pistols were admissible as res gestae evidence relevant to proving criminal intent. The court rejected all three points of error and upheld the judgments.
criminal lawprocedure
Arkansas Gazette Company v. Pickens
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1975-05-12 · cited 67×
The case concerned whether committees of the University of Arkansas Board of Trustees must allow newspaper reporters to attend their meetings under the state's Freedom of Information Act. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that such committees are required to conduct open meetings. The court reasoned that the Act's declaration of public policy favoring open government, combined with its broad definition of "public meetings" covering boards and organizations supported by public funds, applies to subgroups like committees, which must be interpreted liberally to achieve transparency.
free speech
Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc.
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1975-04-28 · cited 30×
The case involved a negligence action brought by Carl and Doris Cobb, on behalf of their minor daughter Carla Ann, against Indian Springs, Inc. (owner of a mobile home park), its employee security guard James Babbitt, and driver Danny Creed after Carla was struck by Creed's car near a bus stop in the park. Babbitt had picked up Carla and other minors while patrolling and driven them to the stop. The trial court directed a verdict for Indian Springs and Babbitt and dismissed Creed for lack of proper service. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the directed verdict, reasoning that under the Palsgraf foreseeability standard there was at least a jury question as to whether Babbitt's conduct created a risk of harm to Carla that defined a duty owed to her.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Poole v. Bates
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1975-03-10 · cited 8×
In Poole v. Bates, the buyer of an automobile challenged the installment sales contract as usurious under the Arkansas Constitution, arguing that the seller's receipt of a 35% commission on credit life insurance, which was included in the financed amount and thus subject to interest, violated the 10% interest limit. The trial court ruled in favor of the sellers, finding no usury, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the buyer had requested the insurance rather than being required to purchase it as a condition of financing, the premium was not excessive, and the transaction was bona fide without fraud or compulsion. Additionally, a typographical error in the contract's total price figures did not render the contract usurious, as the payment amounts were correctly stated and the finance charges were calculated on the proper balance after trade-in allowance.
business & regulatory