Annabelle Clinton Imber

The case involved a dispute over the validity of a power of attorney signed by decedent Billy Joe Smith in favor of his brother-in-law Larrie Owen, which Owen used to transfer the decedent's real property to his siblings. Appellant Sondra Jones, the estate's beneficiary under the decedent's unrevoked will, challenged the power of attorney on grounds that it was not properly acknowledged by the notary. The court held the power of attorney invalid because the notary signed the acknowledgment certificate before the decedent executed the document and without personally witnessing or verifying the signature as required by statute. As a result, Owen lacked authority to make the transfers, and the court reversed the circuit court's ruling upholding the power of attorney while affirming the imposition of a constructive trust over the remaining estate property.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved Amanda Gail Holt's convictions in Pulaski County Circuit Court for manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture, maintaining a drug premises, and exposing a child to methamphetamine, resulting in a 612-month sentence. The Arkansas Court of Appeals had reversed the manufacturing and maintaining convictions for insufficient evidence but upheld the others; the Arkansas Supreme Court granted review and examined the sufficiency of the evidence as if the appeal originated there. The court found substantial evidence—including a warm hotplate, stained salt container, matchboxes, camp fuel, glass jars, bi-layer liquids, hypodermic needles, coffee filters, and children's clothing in the bedroom where Holt had been staying, plus the strong chemical odor, decontamination needs, and positive hair follicle tests on the children—to support all convictions under the relevant statutes. It therefore affirmed the circuit court's denial of directed verdicts on all counts and reversed the Court of Appeals in part.

criminal lawprocedure

In Cantrell v. State, the defendant appealed his convictions in two consolidated cases for attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, possessing drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture, maintaining a drug premises, and failure to appear, which resulted in a 145-year prison sentence. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence on both points raised. Regarding the drug convictions, the court held that Cantrell failed to preserve his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge because his directed-verdict motions addressed only the charged offense of manufacturing and did not specifically address the elements of the lesser-included attempt offense on which he was convicted. On the failure-to-appear sentence, the court concluded that Cantrell's claim of an illegal sentence based on lack of habitual-offender notice was a due-process argument that had to be raised at trial to be preserved for appeal and could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a contractor's claims against an engineering firm for professional malpractice based on a soils report and against cities for breach of contract and related claims arising from unexpected subsurface conditions during wastewater facility construction. The court affirmed the dismissal of the malpractice claim against GHBW, holding that the three-year statute of limitations began running when the soils report was prepared in 2001 rather than when the construction contract was signed in 2002. It reversed the summary judgments for Garver and the Cities, determining that material issues of fact existed regarding the interpretation of exculpatory clauses in the contract and whether differing site conditions were present under the federally mandated clause.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In Kelley v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of raping a child under fourteen years old and sentenced to forty-seven years in prison as a habitual offender. On appeal, he challenged the circuit court's admission of evidence under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b), including certified records of his two prior Texas convictions for indecency with a child and testimony from another individual alleging similar misconduct when the witness was a minor. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was admissible because it tended to prove motive, intent, preparation, plan, or knowledge in the current case involving sexual offenses against minors. The court also rejected arguments that any error was not harmless, concluding that the limiting instruction was sufficient and that the evidence was properly considered by the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a tort action filed by Kevin Lawrence against Barrett Cato and others alleging negligence in the discharge of a firearm that injured Lawrence at a residence. Cato, a member of the Arkansas National Guard, was served with process while on uniformed duty and moved to dismiss, asserting that service violated Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-62-403, which exempts organized militia members from civil process while attending military duty. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the statute unconstitutional under the separation-of-powers doctrine and Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, holding the statute constitutional as substantive legislation that creates a right not superseded by procedural rules, rendering the service invalid and depriving the circuit court of jurisdiction over Cato.

proceduretorts & liability

In Fort Smith School District v. Beebe, multiple Arkansas school districts and a taxpayer sued state officials, alleging illegal exaction through the diversion of Amendment 74 property tax revenues and Educational Excellence Trust Fund proceeds to cover desegregation costs in Pulaski County and to adjust foundation funding levels, rather than providing them as additional aid. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the state officials, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that Amendment 74 imposes no limit on the legislature's appropriation of excess revenues, that education funding decisions are based on assessed adequacy needs rather than available resources, and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any supplanting of state funds or other misapplication of the specified revenues.

taxescivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned claims by Joe Deichman, as trustee of a family trust that owned Yell County land, against Travis Lumber Company and others for the unauthorized cutting and removal of timber in 1997-1998 pursuant to a forged deed. Deichman asserted claims for trespass, conversion, and statutory double or treble damages under Arkansas Code sections 15-32-301 and 18-60-102, seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the jury's compensatory damages award of $347,714.25 was excessive because it substantially exceeded the evidence of the timber's value and related costs, and therefore affirmed the judgment only on the condition that Deichman accept a remittitur reducing the compensatory award to $161,845.30 and the treble damages accordingly; otherwise the case would be remanded for a new trial. The court rejected the cross-appeal seeking prejudgment interest, finding the damages too uncertain for such an award, and rejected other claims of error regarding jury instructions, evidence, and the scope of the trustee's authority.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved Nathan Gilcrease's convictions by a Pulaski County jury on two counts of capital murder and two counts of kidnapping arising from the abduction and shooting deaths of Sean Johnson and Monte Johnson, for which he received life sentences without parole. Gilcrease challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that accomplice testimony from Albert Reed and Mariah Powell was not adequately corroborated, and also raised evidentiary issues including the trial court's restriction on cross-examining Reed about potential bias from an unfulfilled plea agreement. The Arkansas Supreme Court first addressed the sufficiency claim and found sufficient corroborating evidence independent of the accomplices to support the verdicts, but it ultimately reversed and remanded on the cross-examination ruling. The court reasoned that full cross-examination to expose an accomplice's bias is essential when that testimony provides the direct link to the defendant, that the excluded questions about Reed's expectations were not properly limited by concerns like harassment or irrelevance, and that the error warranted reversal without need for a proffer.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Herman Brock's attempt to establish a family cemetery on his agriculturally zoned property in Conway, Arkansas. After the city planning commission and council denied his application for a required conditional-use permit under a local zoning ordinance, and the mayor declined to issue a permit despite approval from the Arkansas Department of Health, Brock sued for a mandatory injunction and declaratory relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the mayor, finding no conflict between the city's land-use authority and the health department's permitting power under state law. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that properly adopted municipal zoning ordinances take precedence and that Brock's failure to timely appeal the city council's denial precluded relief regardless of the health department's recommendation.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who refiled a complaint against a foreign corporation seeking damages for alleged injuries. The summons served on the defendant's agent incorrectly stated a 20-day period to answer instead of the required 30 days, and the plaintiff neither corrected the summons nor requested an extension within the 120-day service period under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant due to the defective service and, as this was the second dismissal, entered it with prejudice under Rule 41. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that service requirements must be strictly complied with exactly as set forth in Rule 4(b), actual knowledge does not cure defects, and the mandatory time limits of Rules 4(i) and 41(b) barred any amendment or further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned John H. Brown's postconviction challenge under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 to his conviction for first-degree sexual assault of his niece. Brown argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and use a calendar that the prosecution had not disclosed during discovery, which could have helped establish an alibi or impeach the victim's testimony about the date of the alleged offense. The circuit court granted Rule 37 relief, finding both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the circuit court's prejudice analysis was insufficient and required further findings on whether the undisclosed evidence would have created a reasonable doubt about guilt.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Stites, the State appealed from a circuit court order suppressing evidence of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia discovered inside a locked safe during execution of a search warrant at the defendant's residence for drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and firearms. The circuit court had granted the suppression motion on the ground that the warrant did not specifically authorize a search of the safe. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, reasoning that the scope of the warrant extended to any container large enough to hold the items listed in the warrant and that it was reasonably necessary to open the safe while the search was ongoing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose when defendants in a wrongful-death lawsuit, Thomas Kelly, M.D., and Cooper Clinic, P.A., sought to intervene in the probate division proceedings that had appointed the plaintiff, Kenneth Edwards, Jr., as administrator of his father's estate. The appellants contended that Edwards was unqualified to serve because he was a convicted felon under Ark. Code Ann. § 28-48-101(b)(3), but the probate court denied the motion to intervene, finding both that the appellants lacked a recognized interest in the probate matter and that their application was untimely. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that timeliness under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 24 is a threshold requirement committed to the trial court's discretion; it held that the appellants had notice of the qualification issue as early as 2005 yet waited nearly two years to act, rendering their intervention petition untimely. Because the motion failed on timeliness grounds, the court did not reach the remaining arguments concerning intervention of right or permissive intervention.

procedurecriminal lawfamily lawtorts & liability

The case involved a consumer's claim against DaimlerChrysler under the Arkansas Lemon Law for repeated transmission defects in a new truck purchased in 2003, after the manufacturer failed to respond to repair and refund demands. The trial court rejected the manufacturer's motion to enforce an alleged settlement reached by prior counsel and, following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, awarded damages plus attorney's fees, copy costs, and mileage expenses. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no enforceable settlement because the evidence showed no meeting of the minds on material terms and the factual finding was not clearly erroneous. The court further held that the Lemon Law's provision for recovery of reasonable "expenses" allowed the contested costs, distinguishing them from standard taxable costs under court rules and interpreting the statute to make prevailing consumers whole.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Grays v. Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed whether a father could offset his child support arrears with a lump-sum Social Security disability payment made directly to his adult son. The circuit court had granted judgment against Edward Grays for $13,787.63 in arrears and additional costs, denying any credit for the $15,835 payment received by the son. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that crediting the payment would be inequitable given the mother's long-term financial struggles due to the father's repeated failures to pay support, even prior to his disability, and that the payment did not alleviate those past burdens.

family law

This case involved a challenge to the Clark County clerk's certification of signatures on a petition seeking to place a local "wet/dry" initiative on the November 2008 ballot, which would have allowed retail sales of alcoholic beverages in the county. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's ruling that upheld the certification, holding that the petition did not have enough valid signatures to qualify. The court reasoned that Amendment 51 to the Arkansas Constitution requires a person to be a registered voter before signing an initiative petition, so signatures collected on the same day as voter registration applications were invalid; it also invalidated two forged signatures after evidence shifted the burden of proof to the proponents, who failed to rebut it. With those signatures removed, the petition fell below the statutory threshold, and the court directed that the measure not appear on the ballot or be counted.

electionsbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Jimmy Jones, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder with a firearm enhancement and sentenced as a habitual offender to thirty-eight years' imprisonment. Jones appealed the circuit court's denial of his request to strike a juror for cause after the juror expressed fear of possible retribution from a courtroom spectator she recognized, though she stated she did not know which side the spectator supported and affirmed she could remain fair and impartial. The State cross-appealed the circuit court's decision to allow Jones to introduce evidence of the victim's prior conviction as reverse victim-impact evidence during sentencing. The court held that the juror need not be struck because her lack of knowledge about the spectator's allegiance meant any feared retaliation could not influence her verdict, and it declined to reach the merits of the State's cross-appeal because the objection to the evidence was not preserved contemporaneously.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge by petitioner Jerry Cox to the popular name and ballot title of Proposed Amendment 3, which would amend the Arkansas Constitution to authorize the General Assembly to establish, operate, and regulate state lotteries whose proceeds would fund scholarships and grants for in-state college students. Cox argued that the ballot title was insufficient because it failed to disclose a repeal of the existing constitutional lottery ban, define the term "state lottery," or address potential impacts on casino gaming. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the petition to remove the measure from the November 2008 ballot. The court held that the ballot title was an impartial summary that gave voters a fair understanding of the amendment's scope and was free from misleading omissions or tendencies. It reasoned that a ballot title need not detail every possible consequence, define commonly understood terms, or address speculative future effects on other laws.

elections

In Terry v. White, attorney Eddie Christian, Jr. appealed a contempt finding by the Washington County Circuit Court after he issued new subpoenas seeking emails and other documents on behalf of client John David Terry, despite prior court orders staying all discovery following partial dismissal of the underlying complaint on sovereign immunity and pleading grounds. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the contempt order, concluding that the June 26, 2007 order was clear in barring any further discovery indefinitely until further court direction, as shown by both its text and the judge's statements during hearings about maintaining the status quo pending potential new dispositive motions. The court declined to address the attorney's separate claim of judicial bias because no objection or recusal motion had been made below.

procedure