This case involves buyers who sought rescission of a land purchase contract, recovery of their $1,500 down payment, and reimbursement for expenses after discovering that the water supply (a well and springs) had been misrepresented by the sellers' agent as adequate for household, restaurant, and livestock use. The Chancery Court granted rescission based on the well misrepresentation but denied recovery for most improvements made after the buyers should have discovered the issue and allowed a materialmen's lien covering both parties. On appeal, the court held that the buyers were entitled to the down payment and well-related costs, plus the amount by which their house and fence repairs enhanced the property's value (to be determined on remand), because those expenditures occurred while the buyers still reasonably believed the representations were true; it also limited the plumber's lien to the buyers' interest in the land only, as the work was contracted by the buyers themselves.
This case involves a minority stockholder suing the majority stockholders and officers of Southern Mattress Co. to recover salaries and bonuses paid to them from 1941 to 1948, alleging they were excessive or improper. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint regarding the salaries, finding they represented reasonable compensation for the services rendered by the officers based on the work performed and comparable industry standards. However, it held that certain payments labeled as "stock bonuses" were actually illegal preferential dividends paid only to the majority stockholders. The case was remanded to determine the amounts of these improper dividends to be repaid to the corporation.
This case concerned an Arkansas resident's lawsuit against an Arizona insurance company to recover under an accident policy issued in California, with service attempted on the defendant via the state Insurance Commissioner under a statute authorizing such substituted service for unauthorized foreign insurers transacting business in Arkansas. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the statute did not authorize the service because the policy was not issued in Arkansas and there was no evidence the company was doing business in the state at the time of issuance. The court further concluded that allowing jurisdiction on these facts would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the claim did not arise out of any activities by the company within Arkansas, citing precedents such as Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough. The trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was therefore reversed.
In this ejectment action, the Purcell brothers claimed title to land conveyed by their grandfather in 1889 to their father "and his bodily heirs," asserting that the deed created only a life estate under Arkansas law converting common-law fee tails, with remainder to them. Weatherly, who had purchased the land in 1930 and made improvements, argued the deed conveyed fee simple title and alternatively sought reimbursement for those improvements under the Betterments Act. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that title belonged to the Purcells but submitted the improvements claim to the jury, which awarded Weatherly $7,760. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the deed's granting clause and habendum were consistent in creating a life estate plus remainder, that Weatherly possessed color of title and believed himself the fee owner when improving the land, and that the jury was properly instructed on valuing the improvements.
This case involved consolidated proceedings in which Mr. and Mrs. A sought to adopt a child they had cared for since 1948, after the natural mother placed the child with them and later provided written consent to the adoption under Arkansas statute; Mr. and Mrs. B, the child's natural parents who married after the consent, intervened to withdraw the consent, block the adoption, and obtain custody. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's rulings in favor of Mr. and Mrs. A, upholding the interlocutory adoption order and denying custody to the natural parents. The core reasoning was that a mother's consent to adoption of an illegitimate child, once given and relied upon through an interlocutory order and the adoptive parents' care of the child, could not be withdrawn to defeat the adoption, particularly given the mother's prolonged failure to support the child, the lack of a stable home with the natural parents, and the child's established bonds with Mr. and Mrs. A; the court also noted that the child's later legitimation by the parents' marriage did not retroactively invalidate the consent required at the time of the interlocutory order.
The case involved Grover Fuller's conviction for grand larceny after he admitted taking two cows from a pasture but claimed he honestly (though mistakenly) believed they belonged to him and that the pasture was not owned by the complainant. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The core reasoning was that the trial judge's repeated interruptions and remarks during defense witness testimony on the defendant's reputation and mental state cast improper aspersions on the witness and attorney, minimized potentially key evidence in the jury's eyes, and violated constitutional rules against judges commenting on facts or witness credibility. The court found the comments went beyond proper control of proceedings and risked prejudicing the defense.