Richard L. Mays

This case is the second appeal of James Leggins' convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery, for which he received consecutive life sentences as an habitual offender. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the state cured an evidentiary deficiency from the first trial by introducing the defendant's indigency affidavit signed with a similar name, which together with the prior conviction record provided substantial evidence of identity under the idem sonans doctrine. The court also rejected the claim that Leggins was denied his choice of counsel, finding the request for new counsel was made only two weeks before trial without good cause or an identified replacement attorney, and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in denying a continuance to avoid disrupting the scheduled proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved John Wayne McGee's appeal from the revocation of his 1976 probation for theft of property and his 1979 suspended sentence, resulting in a total of nine years imprisonment after new offenses including rape and burglary. McGee argued that the trial court could not impose a sentence exceeding the combined four-year probation and three-year suspended terms under the 1979 amendment to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2332, citing Culpepper v. State. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the revocation, holding that no sentence had been pronounced at the time of probation, so the statutory limit on revoking a "sentence imposed" did not apply and the court retained authority to impose a fixed prison term upon revocation. The court distinguished probation (postponing sentence) from suspended execution of a sentence and rejected the challenge to the 1979 suspended sentence due to lack of timely objection.

criminal lawprocedure

In Norton v. State, the appellant was convicted of burglary of an office building after being seen opening its front door from inside following the sound of breaking glass, though nothing was taken from the premises and he was acquitted of charges related to a nearby home burglary and theft. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The court reasoned that burglary requires proof of both unlawful entry and specific intent to commit an imprisonable offense inside, and under the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Mullaney v. Wilbur and Patterson v. New York, the prosecution cannot presume or shift the burden of proving the intent element merely from evidence of illegal entry.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved petitioner Robert Goodall seeking a writ of prohibition to bar the Conway County Circuit Court from conducting a de novo trial on an appeal by local citizens challenging the Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Board's grant of a retail liquor license to him under Ark.Stat.Ann. § 48-311(E). The circuit court had denied Goodall's motion to dismiss the appeal, allowing it to retry the matter fully rather than reviewing the administrative record. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the statute's authorization of de novo review is unconstitutional under the state constitution's separation of powers because liquor license issuance turns on the Board's discretionary determination of 'public convenience and advantage,' an executive function not involving fixed private rights that courts may redetermine. The court reasoned that judicial review of such administrative actions is limited to checking for arbitrary or capricious action, rather than substituting the court's judgment for the agency's.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Dr. D. W. Kreutzer, whose employment contract as pathologist and lab director at Boone County Hospital was terminated with 60 days' notice by the Board of Governors. Kreutzer sued in chancery court, alleging the termination decision violated state open-meeting and public-notice laws, and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent his discharge until the claims could be resolved, arguing irreparable harm to his reputation, future employment, and patient care. The chancellor denied the injunction after finding insufficient evidence of irreparable harm, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the issuance of a temporary restraining order is discretionary and requires a showing that harm cannot be adequately redressed by money damages; here, the alleged losses from termination of an at-will contract were the type routinely compensable through a later judgment for breach or other claims.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the conviction of Ismet Divanovich for capital felony murder during a robbery, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for retrial after identifying multiple errors at trial, including the judge's threats to defense counsel that jeopardized impartiality, admission of testimony implying the defendant wanted to confess after consulting a lawyer, and cross-examination questions about prior misconduct unrelated to veracity. The court determined these issues violated rules of evidence and fair trial standards, though it found the evidence sufficient to support the charge and no error in admitting victim photographs or jury instructions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by Merlyn Jones and his wife against a radiation therapy institute and Dr. D.R. Harris more than two years after Jones received radiation treatment that allegedly caused severe injuries including radiation quadriplegia. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by Arkansas's two-year malpractice statute of limitations, but the Supreme Court reversed that dismissal. The court held that the complaint alleged sufficient facts of fraudulent concealment—such as the doctor's uncertain statements about the cause of the injury, failure to arrange timely follow-up, and delays in obtaining records—which, if true, could toll the statute and allow the action to proceed. The majority reasoned that these actions could reasonably be inferred as intentionally dilatory to prevent Jones from discovering or pursuing a claim before the deadline expired. A dissent argued the facts did not show concealment and would have affirmed the dismissal.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involves a dispute over the priority of liens on three lots of land in Arkansas, where appellees sought an equitable lien for the purchase price and claimed it should be superior to appellants' construction mortgage. After a previous appeal reversed a finding of usury on the construction loan, the trial court on remand held that the appellees' lien had priority. On this second appeal, the court affirmed without addressing the merits, ruling that the appellants should have raised the lien priority issue in the first appeal, as all matters that could have been determined then cannot be raised later to avoid piecemeal litigation.

propertyprocedure

The case involved an employee of an independent contractor who was injured while working on energized electrical lines for Petit Jean Electric Co-Op and who sought damages from the co-op on theories of negligence, assumed contractual duties, negligent selection of contractor, and vicarious liability for inherently dangerous work. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the employer's tort liability to an independent contractor's employees. The court held that the co-op owed no duty to de-energize or isolate lines or to warn of obvious hazards integral to the contracted work, that contractual reservation of inspection rights did not impose safety duties or establish control, that no evidence supported negligent selection, and that the inherently dangerous work exception did not impose liability under these facts. The court therefore affirmed dismissal, finding no genuine issue of material fact.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In George v. State, the appellant was tried for first-degree murder after shooting Jerry French, with witnesses providing conflicting accounts of whether the shooting was intentional or accidental. The trial court admitted a prior consistent written statement from witness Betty Westmoreland to support her testimony after defense counsel highlighted a discrepancy during cross-examination. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the second-degree murder conviction, holding that prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible to bolster witness credibility unless offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, which did not apply here because the statement did not predate the witness's potential motive. The court further rejected arguments under evidence rules for completeness or rehabilitation, finding the admission was not harmless as it could have affected the credibility assessment central to the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Boone v. State concerned the revocation of appellant William Leslie Boone's five-year suspended sentence for false imprisonment after his 1979 convictions on escape and criminal impersonation charges. The court affirmed the revocation judgment but modified it to award credit for 114 days of prior jail time. It reasoned that the statutory 60-day limit for a revocation hearing runs from arrest on the suspension violation itself, not from a warrant or unrelated arrests, and that jail credit applies only to custody tied directly to the offense underlying the original sentence rather than to wholly separate charges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the convictions of Charles Lewis Wallace for kidnapping and capital murder after he and co-defendants abducted and drowned a victim in 1977, resulting in sentences of 15 years and life imprisonment without parole. Wallace appealed, claiming denial of a speedy trial due to the 19-month delay between arrest and trial, improper exclusion of evidence about the victim's brother, errors in refusing certain jury instructions on reasonable doubt and related matters, and other issues like ineffective counsel. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the delay did not violate speedy trial rules after accounting for excludable periods and that the trial court had properly covered the relevant legal standards in its instructions while excluding irrelevant evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether an automobile insurance policy covered damage to a newly acquired pickup truck under its automatic insurance clause for additional vehicles. The insured owned a used car dealership with uninsured vehicles, which the insurer argued excluded coverage, but the trial court found a latent ambiguity in the policy language and, based on parol evidence, determined the parties intended coverage for personal use vehicles. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the finding of coverage for the loss after reducing it by the policy deductible but reversed the award of a statutory penalty and attorney's fees because the judgment did not match the exact amount sued for. The court reasoned that ambiguities in insurance contracts are construed against the insurer and that the trial court's factual findings on intent were not clearly erroneous.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved an appeal by New Hampshire Insurance Company challenging a $12,500 attorney's fee award to Sheila Quilantan under Arkansas statute after she obtained summary judgment for $45,237.50 on a fire insurance policy claim that the insurer had refused to pay. The court had previously found the fee excessive due to lack of supporting evidence but allowed further proceedings, after which the trial court reinstated the original amount based on additional testimony. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the award, holding that attorney's fee determinations are within the trial court's discretion and reviewing factors such as the attorney's 38 years of experience, 91-100 hours spent on the case, the results obtained, and customary local fees, which provided a rational basis for the amount.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute over an escrow contract for the sale of a slaughter and meat processing business, in which the sellers sued the buyers for breach and cancellation of the contract due to alleged failures to make annual installment payments. The chancellor initially ruled for the sellers based on payment records but later vacated that judgment, permitted the buyers to amend their answer to raise additional defenses regarding expenditures for repairs and improvements under a deferred payment provision, and after rehearing ruled for the buyers. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the chancellor acted within her discretion to modify the judgment within the allowed 90-day period to address an inadequately explored issue and avoid potential error, and that allowing the amendment did not constitute an abuse of discretion absent prejudice or surprise to the sellers.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Fairchild v. State, the appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery after approaching a woman outside a club, jerking open a door she was holding, grabbing her dress, and holding his hand under his shirt while demanding money. The Supreme Court of Arkansas found sufficient evidence of physical force to support a robbery conviction but insufficient evidence that the appellant represented he was armed with a deadly weapon, as the victim did not perceive his hand under his shirt as threatening. The court therefore modified the conviction to the lesser included offense of robbery and reduced the sentence to three years imprisonment. The majority reasoned that the victim's lack of appreciation for any implied threat meant the conduct did not satisfy the aggravated robbery statute, despite the appellant's admitted intent.

criminal law

In Robinson v. State, the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole for killing two women during an altercation at a shopping center after a tense exchange involving accusations of a hex. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses such as first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, despite evidence of his mental state including expert testimony indicating impulsivity and a possible dreamlike state at the time of the crime. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the record contained sufficient evidence to support an instruction on second-degree murder because the jury could have found a lack of premeditation and deliberation. The court reasoned that without such an instruction, the jury faced an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and acquittal, particularly after rejecting the insanity defense. It also addressed related issues like the admissibility of crime scene photographs and mental capacity instructions but found no error there.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Hilton Hilltop, Inc. seeking a contempt citation against the Arkansas Secretary of State for refusing to file its approved articles of incorporation despite a court order. The circuit court dismissed the petition without a hearing on the merits, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed this dismissal. The court reasoned that the petition was improperly initiated by an unverified petition rather than an affidavit, as required for contempt proceedings occurring outside the court's presence, and that proper service by summons was necessary since the Secretary of State was not a party to the original action. Additionally, the petition could not be construed as a request for review under the Administrative Procedure Act because it sought punishment rather than review of an agency decision.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Leza Price, Jr., who was convicted by a jury of theft of property and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment plus a fine; the conviction was affirmed on appeal. The primary issue was whether the trial court properly admitted portions of a recorded telephone conversation in which Price referenced involvement in other car thefts, which he argued were irrelevant and prejudicial. The court held that under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes is admissible if it has independent relevance to prove elements such as knowledge or intent, and it must also be evaluated under Rule 403 to ensure its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The references were deemed independently relevant to show guilty knowledge and to corroborate accomplice testimony, and any potential prejudice did not substantially outweigh their value, especially given the lack of a requested cautionary instruction. The court also affirmed the denial of a mistrial based on the prosecutor's closing argument.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff, as administratrix of her mother's estate, alleged that the defendant physician was negligent in administering Demerol without disclosing known risks such as respiratory depression. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's case due to the absence of expert medical testimony establishing a disclosure standard. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the judgment, holding that even under a minority patient-need standard for informed consent, evidence of the incidence of risks and feasibility of alternatives was required to assess materiality of the nondisclosure. The court discussed the divide between the majority professional-standard approach and the minority patient-centered approach but concluded the evidentiary gap was dispositive under either view.

torts & liabilityhealthcare