Canady v. Canady
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-12-22 · cited 22×
This case involves the division of property in a divorce between James and Connie Canady under Arkansas marital-property law, following a prior remand for specific findings on assets such as a homeplace, a dairy operation, a 20-acre tract, and a truck, where both parties had brought premarital property and made contributions during their six-year marriage. The chancellor ordered sales of properties and an equitable distribution, including equal division of certain marital assets and recognition of $35,115 in Connie's contributions to real property, while returning James's premarital interests with adjustments. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decree, holding that the statute (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214) prioritizes an equitable outcome over strict equal division or precise tracing of funds, allowing the trial court flexibility based on factors like length of marriage, contributions, and future needs, without requiring an accounting for business uses of marital funds. The court noted that the chancellor's approach achieved an equitable result consistent with the law's intent.
family lawproperty
West v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-11-17 · cited 30×
In West v. State, the appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse based on the 15-year-old prosecutrix's testimony that the defendant, a minister, picked her up, drove her to a remote area, and touched her breast without consent. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in granting the state's motion in limine to exclude evidence that the prosecutrix had made similar accusations against two other men on prior occasions, which the defense sought to introduce on cross-examination to challenge her credibility. The court reasoned that such evidence of prior accusations, if false, is relevant to the victim's credibility in sexual offense cases and should have been admissible. Although the court discussed the element of forcible compulsion under the statute, the reversal was based solely on the evidentiary ruling regarding the prior accusations.
criminal lawprocedure
Cathey v. Williams
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-10-27 · cited 17×
This case was a medical malpractice suit brought by the wife of a patient who suffered a permanent brain injury after a neurosurgeon delayed ordering a CT scan following a head injury. After a jury verdict for the defendants, the sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by permitting a family physician to testify as an expert on the standard of care for deciding whether to order an emergency CT scan. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the malpractice statute incorporates Evidence Rule 702 and allows a qualified general practitioner to opine on such auxiliary diagnostic decisions even when the defendant is a specialist, provided the witness demonstrates relevant knowledge through education, experience, and practice. The court emphasized that the testimony concerned a threshold decision within the family doctor's own area of expertise rather than the performance of neurosurgery itself.
torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure
Ricarte v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-10-13 · cited 67×
The case involved the conviction of appellant Ricarte for three counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of theft as an habitual criminal with ten prior convictions, resulting in consecutive sentences including life imprisonment. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the convictions because the trial court permitted Ricarte's wife, whom he married three days before trial, to testify against him over objection. The court reasoned that the Uniform Rules of Evidence had not been validly adopted by the legislature, leaving in place the 1943 statute that barred one spouse from being called to testify against the other in a criminal case without exception for the timing of the marriage, though the court adopted the Uniform Rules prospectively under its own rulemaking power.
criminal lawprocedure
Lasiter v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-10-13 · cited 22×
The case involved the conviction of appellant George Lasiter for raping his eight-year-old niece six times, resulting in six concurrent life sentences. Lasiter appealed the denial of a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the introduction of inadmissible evidence that Lasiter had previously raped his own daughter. The court determined that counsel's performance was deficient under the standards from Mason v. State, as the prior-bad-acts testimony was clearly inadmissible and highly prejudicial. Because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed without the unobjected-to evidence, the convictions were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
criminal lawprocedure
Wall v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-09-15 · cited 8×
The case involved Mike Wall, who was charged with rape for engaging in sexual acts with his ten-year-old stepdaughter, including fondling and oral sex. The jury convicted him and imposed a sentence of 40 years imprisonment. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the trial judge properly denied funds for additional psychiatric experts because the state hospital examination found no basis for an insanity defense and the defendant made no showing that his sanity was seriously in question. The court also upheld the admission of the defendant's voluntary confession and references to prior similar conduct with the victim, as such evidence would have been admissible at trial.
criminal law
McCarver v. Second Injury Fund
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-07-21 · cited 10×
This case involved a workers' compensation claim in which an employee suffered a back injury in 1979 and a later shoulder, arm, and hand injury in 1983, both while working for the same employer, resulting in a combined 30% impairment. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the Workers' Compensation Commission's ruling, holding that the Second Injury Fund was not liable for the extra 20% impairment beyond the sum of the individual injuries. The court reasoned that the 1981 statutory amendment to Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1313(i)(1) limits the Fund's role to cases where the employer would otherwise face liability exceeding the impairment that occurred during the worker's employment with that specific employer, so the employer's carrier must cover the full combined award when both injuries arise under the same employment.
labor & employment
Zini v. Perciful
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-06-30 · cited 18×
The case involved an attempt to probate three separate documents as the will of Angelo Zini after his death in 1983, with challenges to the validity of all three instruments. A master took testimony and found none of them valid—one was typewritten but unwitnessed, and the other two were handwritten but illegible with strike-throughs, lacking clear intent or dispositive language. The appellants appealed, arguing that one document should qualify as a holographic will under the presumption against intestacy. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment because the appellants failed to abstract or quote the text of the instruments in their brief as required by Rule 9, instead only referencing the transcript, making it impossible for the court to review the documents on appeal.
procedureproperty
Stewart v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-06-23 · cited 22×
In Stewart v. State, the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole based primarily on a confession obtained after his arrest on a warrant for a related misdemeanor. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the arrest warrant was invalid because the supporting affidavit was not sworn to by the complainant, the municipal judge had pre-signed blank warrants without reviewing the affidavit or making a probable cause determination, and the clerk issued the warrant instead. The court found that the good faith exception from United States v. Leon did not apply due to the officer's knowledge of the procedural defects and the magistrate's abdication of his judicial role under Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 7.1, making the confession inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The court remanded for a new trial, noting that other issues like fingerprint evidence could be addressed with more complete proof.
criminal lawprocedure
Tarry v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-06-09 · cited 51×
In Tarry v. State, the defendant was convicted of burglary, robbery, and two counts of rape based on a single nighttime incident involving one victim, with sentences set to run consecutively except for the burglary and robbery terms. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial judge improperly entered the jury room during penalty deliberations to answer questions about concurrent sentencing and parole eligibility without following statutory procedures. The core reasoning was that Arkansas law requires any jury requests for information on evidence or law to be addressed in open court with counsel present or notified, creating a presumption of prejudice from noncompliance that the state failed to rebut. The opinion separately upheld that the two rape convictions were valid because the acts involved distinct conduct separated by time and required separate impulses, rather than constituting a single continuing offense.
criminal lawprocedure
Hooper v. Ragar
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-06-02 · cited 12×
In this case, limited partners in a real estate venture sued the general partners for fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty after the general partners allegedly sold property below market value and took secret profits, while the general partners counterclaimed for slander. The circuit court tried the tort claims before a jury, which awarded the plaintiffs $150,000 in compensatory damages. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint asserted tort claims rather than a pure accounting action, that other procedural objections were not preserved below or lacked merit, and that the evidence supported submitting the case to the jury.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liabilityprocedure
Thomas v. State
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-05-19 · cited 15×
This case involves a retrial for rape in which the defendant, after an initial guilty plea and subsequent federal court relief, was convicted by a jury in Ashley County and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in denying a continuance to investigate the jury panel's racial composition, admitting the defendant's signed statement, and finding the evidence sufficient despite challenges to proof of force. The court also held that while testimony about the impact on the victim's marriage should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the victim's identification, physical evidence, and the defendant's statement.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
Durham v. Durham
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-05-05 · cited 21×
This case is a divorce action between a married couple where the wife was granted a divorce on the ground of indignities and custody of their child. The wife appealed the chancellor's decisions on the division of a military pension, a money-market certificate, and the amount and duration of alimony. The court affirmed the lower court's rulings, holding that the husband had no vested interest in a military pension that could be divided as marital property, that the certificate was marital property to be divided equally based on credibility determinations, and that alimony was appropriately limited to six months to allow the wife to renew her teaching certificate.
family lawproperty
Bryant v. Southern Screw MacHine Products Co.
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-04-28 · cited 10×
The case involved an employee with 21 years of service at a manufacturing company who was fired in 1984 after allegedly accepting a $100 check from a supplier in exchange for placing an order. He sued for wrongful discharge and for the manner of his termination, which he claimed was outrageous. The jury awarded damages on the wrongful discharge claim, but the trial court granted the employer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, ruling that the employment was at will. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the employee handbook did not create an enforceable promise of continued employment or discharge only for cause, and that under settled state law an indefinite-term employment contract could be terminated by either party at any time. The court found no evidence that the employment was anything other than at will.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Etheridge v. Shaddock
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-04-07 · cited 4×
This case concerned a mother's petition to modify a divorce decree and obtain custody of the parties' two children from the father, based on his marriage to his first cousin. The chancellor denied the petition after finding no material change in circumstances warranting modification. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial. The court held that the father's remarriage, which was invalid under Arkansas law but validly performed in Texas, did not justify a custody change because Arkansas recognizes out-of-state marriages unless they involve close blood relatives that strongly offend public policy, consistent with prior precedent emphasizing the validity of marriages lawful where celebrated.
family law
Attaway v. Davis
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-04-07 · cited 14×
This case involved a petition by Hester Davis to condemn a right-of-way across the Attaways' property to access her landlocked 12-acre tract, which she purchased in 1967. The county court and circuit court approved the right-of-way under Arkansas statute Ark. Stat. Ann. § 76-110, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court reasoned that no statute of limitations barred the claim because the right to access is continuing in nature for landlocked owners. It further held that access via a navigable lake was not a reasonable alternative given modern reliance on motor vehicles, and that any permissive trail across neighboring land did not provide a permanent right. The court also rejected the admissibility of certain evidence regarding prior ownership intent as immaterial to the dispute.
property
Cox v. Whitten
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-03-10 · cited 2×
In this case, the court considered whether a will provision leaving remainder interests in Arkansas land to the 'children' of the testatrix's brothers included an adult who was adopted by one brother in 1976, long after the testatrix made her will in 1951 and died in 1960. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's summary judgment that had favored the adopted child, instead quieting title in the natural child of another brother. The court's reasoning focused on determining the testatrix's intent by viewing the language from her perspective at the time of the will, concluding that the term 'children' was not meant to encompass post-death adult adoptions, consistent with the majority rule that such inclusions would improperly divert property to non-blood relatives.
propertyfamily law
City of Hot Springs v. Creviston
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-03-03 · cited 59×
This case was a taxpayer suit challenging the City of Hot Springs' $3 million bond issue, secured by a gross receipts tax on hotels and restaurants, to pay off debts of a privately owned amusement park that had defaulted on earlier county bonds. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's ruling that the bonds were invalid. The court held that the bond proceeds primarily bailed out private creditors rather than serving a public purpose and that the state constitution requires voter approval by election for municipal bonds pledging tax revenues. It rejected arguments that the bonds qualified as exempt pure revenue bonds and overruled prior precedent allowing such issuances without elections when taxpayer funds are at risk.
electionstaxesbusiness & regulatory
Lawyer v. Lawyer
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-02-03 · cited 25×
This case involved a divorce action in which both spouses sought a divorce on grounds of personal indignities after a 16-year marriage with two minor children. The chancellor granted the divorce to the wife, awarded her primary custody of the children along with alimony and child support, divided the marital property, and ruled that the husband's potential five-year termination benefits under his State Farm employment contract constituted marital property subject to division. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the custody award, finding it was not clearly erroneous given the mother's close relationship with the children and the chancellor's opportunity to observe the witnesses. The court reversed on the termination benefits, holding they were not marital property because they represented speculative deferred compensation for lost renewal commissions rather than vested rights acquired during the marriage.
family lawproperty
Potter v. Easley
Supreme Court of Arkansas · 1986-02-03 · cited 23×
This case is the second appeal in an Arkansas divorce proceeding between David J. Potter and his former wife Betty (now Easley) over the sale and division of the marital homeplace. The Supreme Court affirmed confirmation of the public sale, reasoning that the appellant could not properly halt the bidding midway with a supersedeas bond after participating and that courts must protect the integrity of judicial sales to ensure bidder confidence. It also upheld equal division of the net proceeds under the law of the case doctrine from the first appeal, rejecting the appellant's request for a proportionate division based on contributions to the property's acquisition. The majority declined to revisit the characterization of property appreciation, while a dissent argued for flexibility in the law of the case to correct prior errors.
family lawpropertyprocedure