Ray Thornton

In Shelnutt v. Laird, Alfred Shelnutt sued Melba and Max Laird for tortious interference with a contract, claiming that the Lairds had induced Don McMann to breach his reciprocal will agreement with his late wife Dixie McMann, thereby diminishing the estate that would have passed to Shelnutt as a third-party beneficiary and causing the estate to incur substantial legal fees. The trial court dismissed the complaint on multiple grounds, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed solely on statute-of-limitations grounds. The court held that the Lairds’ allegedly interfering acts—drafting a new will, transferring assets into trusts, and contesting the original will—were completed no later than November 8, 1999, when Melba Laird filed the will contest, so the three-year limitations period began then and had expired by the time Shelnutt filed suit in April 2003. The court rejected Shelnutt’s argument that the tort was continuing or that damages were not ascertainable until later, noting that he had cited no authority for a continuing-tort theory in this context and that damages could have been calculated when the will contest was filed.

torts & liabilitypropertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved Beverly Maxwell's conviction after a bench trial for criminal attempt to obtain prescription drugs by fraud, based on evidence that she or an associate called in a fake prescription for Darvocet and Phenergan at a pharmacy using a nonexistent nurse's name from a doctor who was out of state and had no record of the patients. Maxwell was sentenced to sixty months' probation as a habitual offender. On appeal, she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to inadequate discovery and allowing her son to testify. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the sufficiency challenge was not preserved because counsel failed to renew the motion for dismissal at the close of all evidence as required by Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1, and that the ineffectiveness claim could not be reviewed because it was not developed at trial or in a post-trial hearing but merely deemed denied after thirty days.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the Arkansas Hearing Instrument Dispenser Board’s disciplinary action against licensee O.G. Vance for alleged unethical conduct in selling hearing aids, including pressuring a customer to buy on a specific date to use a coupon and making inconsistent claims about the quality of programmable versus non-programmable devices. The circuit court reversed the Board’s findings for lack of substantial evidence and due-process violations, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision directly under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the customer’s testimony provided substantial evidence supporting the Board’s factual findings and that the statute’s prohibition on “unethical conduct” was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to regulated business activity. The court also found the challenge to the Board’s sanctioning discretion moot because no monetary penalty, suspension, or revocation had been imposed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and affirmed the Board.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Pratt v. State, Thomas Lee Pratt was convicted of raping a three-year-old child based on the victim's statements to others and his own confession to police after waiving Miranda rights. On appeal, Pratt challenged the denial of his motion for a directed verdict, the admission of the child's statements without cross-examination, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on sexual indecency with a child as a lesser-included offense of rape. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Pratt's general directed-verdict motion failed to specify any deficient element of the offense and thus waived the sufficiency challenge under Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1. The court further reasoned that sexual indecency with a child requires proof of additional elements, such as the defendant's age and solicitation of the victim, that are not necessary for rape, so it is not a lesser-included offense under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(b).

criminal lawprocedure

In Johnson v. State, appellant Johnny Johnson appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and arson after a jury found him guilty of killing Johnny Archer, burning his trailer home, and receiving consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and twenty years. Johnson argued that the evidence was insufficient, that statements he made to fellow inmates should have been suppressed, that the convictions rested on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and that autopsy photographs were improperly admitted. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that substantial evidence—including inmate testimony about Johnson's confessions and expert testimony on the fire—supported the verdicts, that several claims were not preserved or lacked supporting authority, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs to help explain the cause-of-death determination.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to appellant Bobby Jones's eligibility to seek a position on the Helena-West Helena School Board and the Phillips County Circuit Court's order directing that he not be certified as the winner of the September 16, 2003 election. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Jones's brief, abstract, and addendum remained insufficient under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2 even after he was given an opportunity to cure the deficiencies by filing substituted materials, which prevented review of the underlying issues including whether the challenge was pre-election or moot. The court therefore affirmed for noncompliance with the rule rather than reaching the merits.

electionsprocedure

This case involved Glenn George appealing his convictions on nine counts of possessing visual or print medium depicting sexually explicit conduct of children under Arkansas law, following a jury trial that resulted in a sentence of ninety years imprisonment and fines. The court addressed challenges to the search warrant used to seize evidence from his apartment, including claims of insufficient probable cause due to lack of a specific time frame in the affidavit, improper seizure of additional items, technical irregularities, and a speedy trial violation. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for probable cause and that the warrant was valid, with additional seizures justified under criminal procedure rules. It also ruled that no speedy trial violation occurred because delays from the defendant's requested continuance were excluded from the calculation. The court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from a Freedom of Information Act request by the president of the Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association seeking an unredacted email forwarded to the Insurance Commissioner that discussed tort-reform legislation and opposition strategies. The trial court denied the Insurance Department's motions for summary judgment and a protective order, ruling that the email was a public record and ordering its production in discovery. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial court's order was not final, lacked a Rule 54(b) certificate, and did not fall within the narrow Gipson exception for interlocutory review of orders that decide the ultimate issue of a case. The court emphasized that Arkansas appellate rules generally bar review of non-final discovery and protective orders to prevent piecemeal litigation.

procedurecivil rights

This case was a class-action illegal-exaction suit brought by non-resident taxpayers against the Arkansas Director of Finance and Administration, challenging Ark. Code Ann. § 26-51-301(d) which restricted use of reduced income-tax tables to full-year state residents and alleging violations of the Interstate Commerce Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Privileges and Immunities Clause. The trial court ruled the taxes paid for 1991-1993 were coerced and ordered refunds along with a distribution plan and attorney fees from a common fund. On appeal the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the taxes were paid voluntarily and therefore could not be recovered under the common-law voluntary-payment rule applicable to illegal-exaction claims. The court explained that its prior decisions had not yet addressed this voluntary-payment issue and that the rule barred refunds without reaching the constitutionality of the statute or the cross-appeal on fees.

taxescivil rightsfederal power

The case Jones v. State involved the conviction of appellant Jonah Vaughn Jones for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, both class C felonies, after police stopped a vehicle he was driving and found a syringe on his person along with plastic bags containing methamphetamine residue behind the driver's seat. Jones challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for constructive possession and argued there was no usable amount of the drug, and he also objected to the jury instructions in the penalty phase that did not permit the jury to impose only a fine. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient under standards for constructive possession and that the small quantity met the usable-amount requirement from prior case law, but it remanded for resentencing due to the erroneous penalty-phase instruction. The core reasoning applied settled precedents on directed verdicts, circumstantial evidence of dominion and control, and the need for accurate jury instructions allowing consideration of all sentencing options.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over title to property in Little Rock that was sold at a tax auction due to unpaid taxes from 1996-1998 by the Yedea Trust, with Richard Mays as trustee. The appellant challenged the sale, arguing inadequate notice and improper publication of the legal description, seeking to set aside the conveyance to St. Pat’s Properties, LLC. The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted quiet title to the appellees, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commissioner of State Lands complied with statutory notice requirements under Ark. Code Ann. § 26-37-301 by mailing notice to the record address, that certain arguments were not preserved for appeal, and that a duplicate certified mail receipt was properly admitted into evidence.

propertytaxesprocedure

The case involved Robert Hampton's conviction for nonsupport under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-401, a Class D felony, based on allegations that he failed to pay court-ordered child support for his son over a six-year period, resulting in arrears exceeding $2,500. The trial court denied Hampton's motion in limine to limit the charging period and restitution calculation under the three-year statute of limitations, and a jury found him guilty, leading to supervised probation and a restitution order of $6,437.10. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and restitution, holding that the evidence, including testimony that the child was under eighteen, was sufficient to support the verdict, that the statute of limitations for a continuing offense began running only when the conduct ended and thus did not bar prosecution, and that the limitations period did not restrict the amount of restitution recoverable. The court reversed the court of appeals' unpublished decision that had overturned the conviction.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved David Seibs, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and a terroristic act after throwing a tire iron at a car during a dispute, resulting in one victim's death. Seibs appealed his dual sentences, contending that the terroristic act was a lesser-included offense of manslaughter under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110 and thus could not support separate convictions. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that appeals from guilty pleas are generally prohibited except for conditional pleas under Ark. R. Cr. P. 24.3, challenges to evidence at a separate sentencing hearing, or post-trial motions contesting sentence legality—none of which applied, as the motion was filed and denied before sentencing and did not target sentencing-phase evidence. The court did not address the lesser-included offense issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Mark Cambiano's appeal of the Arkansas Board of Law Examiners' denial of his application for readmission to the bar following his 2000 disbarment. Cambiano had been disbarred after pleading guilty to a federal felony charge related to causing a bank to file a false currency transaction report, and he sought readmission in 2003, arguing that the five-year waiting period under the Procedures should not apply to him because his misconduct predated the rule or because interim suspension time should count toward it. The court affirmed the Board's denial, holding that the five-year waiting period applied to attorneys disbarred after the 1998 amendments and that Cambiano's application was filed too soon, as the practice of law is a privilege rather than a protected right, with no due process, ex post facto, or equal protection violations established. The court also rejected relitigation of the disbarment date and found no authority supporting crediting suspension time against the waiting period.

procedurecriminal law

In Parish v. State, appellant Joe Parish was convicted by a jury in Cleburne County Circuit Court of raping his fifteen-year-old daughter N.P., receiving a ten-year sentence, after being charged with two counts of rape involving N.P. and her friend A.H. Parish appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the two counts and by denying his rape-shield motion to introduce evidence of N.P.'s prior sexual conduct with her stepfather. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings, holding that the offenses were properly joined because evidence of each incident was admissible in the trial of the other under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show a common scheme or plan. The court further held that the proffered rape-shield evidence was irrelevant to Parish's guilt or innocence and that any minimal probative value for impeachment was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect under the rape-shield statute.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Arkansas Department of Human Services petitioning to terminate Pamela Jefferson's parental rights to her thirteen-year-old daughter D.J. after the child was adjudicated dependent-neglected due to sexual abuse by relatives and placed in foster care. Jefferson, who had not participated in initial proceedings, appeared at the adjudication hearing without counsel, was advised of her rights, and chose to proceed pro se; subsequent review hearings found she had not complied with court-ordered requirements such as residential treatment, stable housing, employment, and therapy. The trial court granted termination after finding the mother had received services but failed to achieve stability, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that her waiver of counsel was valid and that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based on her inability to correct the conditions that led to removal over more than twelve months.

family law

This case involved former employees of a nurse-staffing business who allegedly took confidential documents, databases, tests, and other materials to start a competing company, leading the original company to sue for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets under the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act, conversion, and civil conspiracy. The trial court found misappropriation occurred and awarded damages of over $262,000 based on the fair market value of the materials under the tort claims of conversion and conspiracy after requiring an election of remedies. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Trade Secrets Act provides the exclusive remedy for damages arising from misappropriation of trade secrets and preempts separate tort claims for the same conduct. The court reasoned that the Act requires damages measured by the plaintiff's lost profits or the defendant's unjust enrichment rather than market value, and the record did not support an award under the statutory standard.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case stems from a domestic abuse protection order against Jay Abramson and a subsequent award of over $9,000 in attorney’s fees to Michelle Eldridge. Abramson filed a timely appeal only from the fees order and sought to consolidate it with his untimely appeal from the protection order itself, while Eldridge challenged the trial court’s ex parte consolidation order. In a prior decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court had limited any review to the fees award alone. In a companion case, the court determined that Abramson had failed to preserve the attorney’s fees issue for appeal. Because no substantive issues remained for review, the court held that the consolidation question was moot and dismissed the appeal.

family lawprocedure

The case involved appellant Myron George, who was arrested after a deputy found what appeared to be a meth lab on his property; he was charged with being an accomplice to manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine, and the trial court denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence from a later warrant-based search. At trial the court directed a verdict on a theft charge but the jury convicted George on the remaining counts, resulting in a ten-year sentence. On appeal George challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of suppression, but the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed only the latter issue after noting the appellate record contained no transcript or other account of the suppression hearing. Because the record was unclear whether the hearing occurred off the record in violation of Administrative Order No. 4 or whether any recording was simply omitted, the court remanded for a limited on-the-record hearing before a certified reporter to develop the evidence and arguments on the suppression motion; if the evidence is found illegally obtained a new trial will be ordered, otherwise the convictions stand.

criminal lawprocedure

In Carlew v. Wright, the case arose from a 1999 car accident in which Jerry Carlew pulled out of a parking lot and collided with Evie Wright's vehicle while attempting a left turn across traffic lanes; neither driver saw the other due to an obstructing truck. Wright sued Carlew for negligence, and a jury found Carlew 60 percent at fault and Wright 40 percent at fault, awarding her $43,200 in damages after reduction. Wright moved for a new trial, arguing the verdict was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court granted the motion, finding it shocked the conscience and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a new trial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 59 because the evidence supported the conclusion that the jury's apportionment was clearly against the weight of the testimony regarding Carlew's failure to yield and Wright's lack of fault. The court also affirmed other evidentiary and procedural rulings or declined to review them in light of the new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure