Paul Ward

The case concerned a dispute over jurisdiction between the Arkansas circuit court and the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to decide whether John Brooks, who was killed in a highway collision while driving a truck loaded with asphalt, was an employee of Mid-State Construction Co. or an independent contractor. Brooks’ widow first filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Commission alleging employment status, then filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court seeking a ruling on the same issue. Mid-State petitioned the Arkansas Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to halt the circuit court proceedings. The court granted the writ, holding that declaratory relief is unavailable when the identical question is already pending before the Commission, consistent with prior precedent that such relief supplements rather than supersedes ordinary proceedings.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over an accidental death insurance policy where Clark Center, Inc., the beneficiary corporation, sought the policy proceeds of $47,664 plus a 12% statutory penalty and attorney's fees after the insured's death. The insurer did not deny liability but delayed payment while investigating the cause of death (including a homicide charge against a beneficiary) and corporate ownership details, eventually tendering the funds into court. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer on the penalty and fee claims, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the penal statute requires strict construction and that the insurer had acted in good faith by completing a reasonable investigation without disputing coverage or refusing payment.

business & regulatory

The case involved Edward Lee Jackson's appeal from his conviction for second-degree murder and 15-year sentence after he was found to have shot and killed Charles Newman Edwards outside a drive-in in 1967. Jackson raised five claims of trial error, including denial of a mistrial due to the victim's mother crying in view of jurors, refusal of a self-defense instruction, denial of a continuance to obtain evidence, improper reprimand of counsel, and improper jury selection due to racial composition and peremptory challenges. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on any issue, that no evidence supported a self-defense instruction, that Jackson failed to show diligence or prejudice regarding the continuance and bullet evidence, and that no constitutional violation was established in jury selection absent proof of systematic exclusion of Black jurors.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case was an appeal by Robert Ragsdale from his conviction for negligent homicide arising from a 1968 car collision on a state highway that killed a passenger in the other vehicle. No eyewitnesses testified, and the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence that included the results of a blood-alcohol test performed on Ragsdale by physicians solely for diagnostic and treatment purposes. The court reversed the conviction, ruling that the Arkansas doctor-patient privilege statute applies in criminal proceedings as well as civil ones and that the test results were therefore inadmissible over the defendant's objection.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether two promissory notes issued by Peoples Loan and Investment Company to B.B. Booth and his wife were usurious under Arkansas law. The trial court found both notes usurious based on unauthorized insurance charges in one and an immediate payment due date in the other. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the borrowers had authorized the insurance by signing the mortgage for Note #1, and that for Note #2, evidence of a good-faith mistake in the payment date should have been considered to show lack of intent to charge usurious interest.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerned a contractor's claim for payment after installing an air conditioning and heating unit in a building owned by the Bells and leased to the Camerons; the work was partially completed when the building was destroyed by fire. The trial court found that the Bells had directly contracted with the contractor for the installation and awarded judgment on a quantum meruit basis plus a lien on the property. On appeal the court affirmed, holding that the owners authorized the work, that quantum meruit recovery is permitted when a contract cannot be completed due to destruction of the property without fault, and that the lien was properly established. The decision relied on precedents allowing recovery for the value of work performed to avoid total loss to the contractor when the building no longer exists.

property

This case involved a foreclosure suit in which the mortgagees defaulted on a note secured by a deed of trust on real property; the mortgagee obtained a judgment and purchased the property at a commissioner's sale for the judgment amount, after which the chancery court confirmed the sale. The mortgagors later moved during the same term to set the sale aside solely on the ground of inadequate price, and the trial court granted the motion and ordered a resale. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed, holding that mere inadequacy of consideration, however gross, is insufficient to set aside a judicial sale absent any fraud, irregularity, mistake, or inequitable conduct. The court reviewed the testimony and concluded the evidence did not show the price was unconscionable or that any unfairness had occurred.

propertyprocedure

In Riegler v. Riegler, a divorced couple disputed liability on a bank note they had jointly signed before their 1966 divorce, with the ex-wife arguing she was merely an accommodation signer who received no benefits and that a prior chancery proceeding in their divorce had already resolved the issue. The trial court, sitting as a jury, rejected both claims and held the parties jointly liable. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the prior chancery case never addressed the parties' respective liability on the note and thus was not res judicata, and that substantial evidence showed the ex-wife had received benefits from the loan proceeds used to build their home, making her a co-signer rather than an accommodation maker under the UCC.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved Callie Webb, who sued the owners and lessees of a building after slipping on grease on an attached walkway and sustaining injuries, claiming negligence in allowing the hazard to exist on what she described as a public sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that Webb was a licensee on private property owned by Sonneman Trusts, to whom the defendants owed no duty of care except to avoid willful or wanton injury after discovering her presence, with no evidence of such misconduct. It further noted that the walkway was undisputedly on private property, not a public walkway, and that the defendants had not discovered her peril beforehand. A concurring opinion added that even if the walkway were public, liability would not attach absent an affirmative act by the defendants creating the condition.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case concerned a negligence claim brought by Gary Pilcher, a minor, and his parents against Aetna Casualty & Surety Company as insurer for St. Vincent Infirmary, alleging that hospital staff failed to keep operating areas and instruments free of germs, resulting in a post-surgical bone infection. A jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the complaint. The court held there was no substantial evidence that any negligence by the hospital was the proximate cause of the infection, noting that the germ could have entered Gary's system from numerous sources at various times, that such infections occur in about 5% of operations despite best practices, and that no expert testimony linked the hospital's conduct to the injury.

torts & liability

Larry Wright was convicted of rape after the victim identified him as the perpetrator and sentenced to life imprisonment, with his defense relying on an alibi corroborated by family. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine him about specific prior bad acts to impeach his credibility and in denying a mistrial after a prospective juror disclosed owning the property where the incident occurred. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that a testifying defendant is subject to the same evidentiary rules as other witnesses, allowing cross-examination on credibility, and that striking the juror for cause adequately addressed any bias without requiring a mistrial, as the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a layaway agreement for a color television set, where buyer Ned Downing paid a $100 deposit to seller Arnold Wood in January 1966 with the balance due upon later delivery. The parties disagreed on the delivery timeline—Wood claimed it was within 30 days, while Downing said it was after his house was completed around March—and Wood sold the set to another customer in late April without refunding the deposit when Downing attempted to complete the purchase in May. Downing sued to recover the $100, and the trial court (sitting as a jury) entered judgment in his favor. The appellate court affirmed, finding substantial evidence supported Downing's version of the agreement and that Wood failed to provide reasonable notice before reselling the set under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-706(3).

business & regulatoryproperty

In Childs v. State, three defendants convicted of grand larceny for stealing $500 from Kroger Stores appealed their nine-year sentences, claiming the trial court erred by admitting their confessions without counsel in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, allowing testimony labeling them habitual criminals, and permitting improper remarks in the prosecutor's closing argument. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendants had not requested attorneys during interrogation, that no timely objections preserved the issues for appeal, and that the closing argument did not rise to reversible error under state precedent. The majority reasoned that Miranda warnings were given and that any waiver or procedural defaults precluded reversal. A dissent argued that one defendant's confession was obtained after he requested counsel and should have been excluded.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether Brown Broadcast, Inc., the purchaser of a radio station, assumed obligations under a pre-existing five-year contract with Pepper Sound Studios, Inc. for sound production and promotion materials. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that Brown assumed the contract, that Pepper could enforce it in Arkansas courts despite being a foreign corporation, and that both Brown and the original owners remained liable for payments. The core reasoning was that the sales agreement explicitly required the buyer to acquire all current contracts and agreements, evidence showed Brown knew of and used the services, and the contract had been executed and accepted in Tennessee.

business & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury claim brought on behalf of a five-year-old boy who was injured when his neighbor backed a car out of a carport and the open door struck the boy's hand, which was resting on a post; the boy had been playing in the neighbor's yard with the neighbor's children. The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant owed no duty of ordinary care unless he knew or should have known the boy was in danger, consistent with premises-liability rules for licensees or invitees, and a jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instructions were erroneous because the injury had no causal connection to the condition of the premises. The court reasoned that when the premises' condition is irrelevant to the accident, the defendant owes the standard duty of ordinary care, as established in prior precedent like Linxwiler v. El Dorado Sports Center, Inc.

torts & liability

Billy C. Hall was charged with grand larceny under Arkansas law for stealing a 1957 Dodge automobile valued over $35, convicted by a jury, and sentenced to one year in the penitentiary. On appeal he raised five claims, including that the trial court wrongly excluded evidence of the car's starter value, should have instructed the jury on temporary deprivation as a possible misdemeanor, and mishandled the admission and voluntariness of his confession. The court held the starter evidence irrelevant because the charge concerned the whole vehicle, found no factual support for a temporary-intent instruction, determined that the trial judge properly followed statutory procedures for assessing the confession outside the jury's presence before submitting the issue to them, and concluded the defendant had been advised of his rights. All assignments of error were rejected and the conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a workers' compensation claim by Lester H. Raulston against his employer, Jeffery Stone Company, and its insurance carrier for total disability due to silicosis from workplace exposure to silica dust. The referee denied the claim, but the full Commission approved it and the circuit court affirmed; the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision. The court found that substantial evidence showed Raulston had been employed and exposed to silica dust for more than five years, that his disability resulted from silicosis as defined by statute, and that the Commission had not improperly placed the burden of proof on the employer.

labor & employment

In Jackson v. State, the appellant challenged his 1964 burglary conviction via habeas corpus, arguing that incriminating statements made without warnings and a pistol seized from his motel room were improperly admitted at trial in violation of constitutional rights. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. The court held that Escobedo and Miranda do not apply retroactively under Johnson v. New Jersey, the warrantless search was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances consistent with Ker v. California and Mississippi law, and the pistol was adequately identified and valued by the owner.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by dairy farm owners against the City of Springdale for pollution of a creek running through their property, caused by the city's sewage disposal plant, which allegedly caused permanent damage preventing its use as a Grade A dairy operation. The plaintiffs sought $175,000 in damages, and after trial a jury awarded $38,000. The city appealed, arguing primarily that the three-year statute of limitations barred the claim because the pollution and any resulting injury began years earlier, along with challenges to the damage amount and certain evidentiary rulings. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that for permanent injury to real property from ongoing pollution the limitations period begins when the permanent damage becomes obvious, that the jury's finding of obviousness in 1963 was supported by substantial evidence, and that the damage award was also supported by substantial evidence of the difference in property value before and after the injury.

environmentpropertyproceduretorts & liability

In Fisher v. State, appellant Deola Fisher Sr. was tried and convicted of second-degree murder for fatally shooting Peter Collier, receiving a 15-year prison sentence; he appealed on multiple grounds including the denial of a continuance for an absent witness, several mistrial motions over remarks and procedures during jury selection and argument, challenges to jurors employed by the victim, denial of access to witness statements, admission of his post-arrest statement to police, and the refusal of an additional manslaughter instruction. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of these rulings, that no actual prejudice was shown, and that the case was not governed by Miranda requirements since it was tried before June 1966. The court reasoned that the evidence was sufficient, the absent witness's potential testimony was not shown to be material, various incidents caused no harm to the defendant, and other claims lacked merit under established precedents.

criminal lawprocedure