Marvin R. Baxter

The case concerned a defendant facing first-degree murder charges who notified the prosecution of his intent to introduce expert evidence of neurocognitive deficits stemming from brain trauma or dysfunction. In response, the prosecution obtained a court order under Penal Code section 1054.3(b)(1) for the defendant to submit to pretrial mental examinations by prosecution-retained experts. The defendant sought protective orders limiting prosecutorial access to the examinations and results until he actually introduced mental-state evidence at trial, citing Fifth Amendment self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment counsel rights. The California Supreme Court held that the defendant had waived those rights to the extent necessary for a proper rebuttal examination, that the prosecution could receive the results pretrial, and that the bar on direct or derivative use outside rebuttal adequately protected the privilege without requiring additional measures such as real-time monitoring bans or mandatory in-camera review.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Martin Manzo, who was convicted under Penal Code section 246 for maliciously and willfully discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle after standing outside his truck and shooting a passenger inside, with evidence showing the gun had crossed the threshold at the time of firing. The Court of Appeal reversed that conviction, reasoning that the statute's text was ambiguous and invoking the rule of lenity to hold it did not apply when the discharge occurred from inside the vehicle. The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal on this point, holding that extrinsic aids to statutory construction establish the Legislature's intent for section 246 to cover a person outside an occupied vehicle shooting into it even if the gun crosses the plane, making the rule of lenity inapplicable.

criminal lawguns

This case concerned defendant Seth Cravens's conviction for second degree murder on an implied malice theory, along with other assault and threat charges, arising from a group confrontation that began at a bar and ended with Cravens striking Emery Kauanui outside Kauanui's home, resulting in Kauanui's death. The Court of Appeal reversed the murder conviction for insufficient evidence of implied malice, but the California Supreme Court reversed that ruling and reinstated the conviction. The court held that the evidence showed both the objective element (an act whose natural consequences are dangerous to human life) and the subjective element (knowledge of the danger and conscious disregard for life), based on Cravens's instigation of the attack, delivery of an unexpected powerful blow to an unaware victim, and related circumstances. A dissent argued that the record did not establish the defendant's subjective knowledge that the single blow endangered the victim's life.

criminal law

This case involved Eduardo Mil, Jr., who was convicted by a Kern County jury of first-degree murder along with true findings on burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstances. The Supreme Court of California reviewed whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of those special circumstances for a defendant who was not the actual killer, specifically the requirements of acting with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant. Although the jury was fully instructed for an actual killer, it lacked complete instructions for a non-killer, leading the Court to determine that the instructional omission was subject to harmless-error analysis but was prejudicial in this instance based on the evidence of the defendant's involvement. Consequently, the Court reversed the special circumstances findings and the life imprisonment without parole sentence, remanding for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a 15-year-old defendant tried as an adult and convicted of murdering a 72-year-old woman and committing multiple first-degree burglaries, with the key issue being the admissibility of his confessional statements made during custodial interrogation after he had waived his Miranda rights but later asked to speak with his mother and made other statements. The California Supreme Court held that the standard from Davis v. United States applies equally to juveniles, requiring any post-waiver invocation of the right to counsel or to remain silent to be sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand it as such a request. Applying this standard, the court concluded that the defendant's requests and statements were not unambiguous invocations, so the investigators were not required to cease questioning and the statements were properly admitted at trial. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment that had found error in admitting the statements.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves defendant Randy Eugene Garcia, who was convicted by a Los Angeles jury of first-degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, burglary, robbery, and related offenses stemming from two home invasions in Torrance in 1993, with special circumstances that made the murder eligible for the death penalty. After the jury imposed a death sentence, the trial court denied post-trial motions, and the California Supreme Court reviewed the automatic appeal. The court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, concluding there was no prejudicial error at trial. A concurring opinion addressed the defendant's challenge to the grand jury selection process, finding insufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination against Hispanic applicants despite potential vulnerabilities in the nomination system.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Crandell McKinnon, who was tried and convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of firearm possession by a convicted felon, and the multiple-murder special circumstance, resulting in a death sentence after a penalty phase. On automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, the judgment was affirmed in full. The court reviewed the prosecution's evidence, which included eyewitness testimony describing the unprovoked shootings of Perry Coder and Gregory Martin, forensic links to the murder weapon found in a vehicle associated with the defendant, and the defendant's incriminating statements to a fellow inmate. It also addressed claims concerning jury selection procedures, including challenges to prospective jurors' death penalty views, and found no reversible error in the trial court's rulings or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an environmental organization challenging the issuance of a permit by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board authorizing a power plant to draw cooling water from a harbor and slough, in connection with a plant expansion also approved by the state Energy Commission. The California Supreme Court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to review the water board's decision via administrative mandamus despite the parallel Energy Commission proceedings. The court further concluded that the trial court properly remanded the matter to the water board for additional analysis on one key issue before denying relief after the board reaffirmed its finding. Finally, the court ruled that the water board had correctly applied a cost-benefit analysis under Clean Water Act section 316(b) to determine that the plant's cooling water intake system reflected the best technology available for minimizing environmental impact.

environmentprocedurefederal power

This case concerned the interpretation of Labor Code section 4659(c), which requires annual cost-of-living adjustments to workers' compensation benefits for total permanent disability and life pensions, tied to increases in the state average weekly wage. The dispute centered on whether these adjustments should begin prospectively on the January 1 after payments actually start (the permanent-and-stationary date for total disability or exhaustion of partial disability payments for life pensions), retroactively to the January 1 after the injury date, or retroactively to January 1, 2004, in all cases. The California Supreme Court held that the statute requires prospective application starting the January 1 after the worker first becomes entitled to and begins receiving the indexed payments. The court reached this conclusion by applying standard principles of statutory construction to determine the Legislature's intent from the language and purpose of the provision.

labor & employment

The case involved homeowners Jesus and Theodora Garcia, whose adult son intentionally set fire to their home, leading insurer Century-National to deny their claim under a policy excluding coverage for losses from the intentional act or criminal conduct of 'any insured.' Century-National sued for a declaration of no coverage, and the Garcias cross-complained for breach of contract and related claims, arguing the exclusion conflicted with statutory requirements. The trial court sustained the insurer's demurrer, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, but the California Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the policy's use of 'any insured' created a collective exclusion barring even innocent coinsureds, which provided less coverage than the standard fire policy form mandated by Insurance Code sections 2070 and 2071 that refers only to 'the insured.' Because the policy was not substantially equivalent to or more favorable than the statutory standard form, the exclusion was invalid as to innocent insureds.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Cortez v. Abich, a worker hired to help demolish a roof during a major residential remodeling project (which added over 750 square feet, including new rooms and a garage) was seriously injured when part of the remaining roof collapsed; he sued the homeowners in tort for negligence and premises liability, claiming violations of Cal-OSHA safety standards. The trial court and Court of Appeal granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the project qualified as excluded "household domestic service" under Labor Code section 6303(b). The California Supreme Court reversed on that issue, ruling that the extensive demolition and construction work fell outside the statutory exclusion. The court's core reasoning rested on the plain language of the Cal-OSHA definition of "employment," which carves out only household domestic service and does not cover large-scale remodeling projects involving structural changes and multiple trades.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case concerned whether California's mediation confidentiality statutes barred evidence of private conversations between a client and his attorneys about mediation strategy and settlement in a later malpractice lawsuit by the client against those attorneys. The Supreme Court held that the statutes apply to such discussions, rendering them inadmissible in the civil action unless waived by all participants under statutory procedures, and reversed the Court of Appeal's contrary ruling. The core reasoning was that the plain language of Evidence Code section 1119 broadly protects any statements or writings made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to a mediation in any civil proceeding, with no judicially created exceptions even where they might affect a malpractice claim.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved three defendants who were members of the Southside Chiques gang and were convicted of forcible rape and sexual penetration while acting in concert, along with active participation in a criminal street gang and gang enhancements under Penal Code sections 186.22(a) and (b). The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and enhancements. The court held that the substantive gang offense under section 186.22(a) does not include an unwritten requirement that the promoted felonious conduct be gang-related, based on the statute's plain language. It further concluded that sufficient evidence supported the enhancement's first prong because the sex offenses were committed for the benefit of and in association with the gang, and that the second prong's specific intent element requires only intent to promote any criminal conduct by gang members, not necessarily separate gang-related acts.

criminal law

This case concerned the prosecution's role and access to information in in-camera hearings under Penal Code section 1326(c) when a criminal defendant issues third-party subpoenas duces tecum in a capital murder prosecution. The trial court permitted some ex parte in-camera reviews of subpoenaed records without notifying the People, and the Court of Appeal limited the prosecution to minimal participation while denying it knowledge of the subpoenaed parties' identities or the documents' nature. The California Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the People have a due process right to notice, presence, argument (if desired by the court), and disclosure of the subpoenaed party's identity and document descriptions, subject to protections such as redactions for privilege or work product, partial ex parte segments, and delayed release of records until the defense intends to use them at trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings applying these standards.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether findings from a federal agency's investigation under the AIR 21 whistleblower protection statute could bar a subsequent state-court lawsuit through collateral estoppel. Kevin Murray filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Labor alleging retaliation by Alaska Airlines for reporting safety issues to the FAA; after an investigation, the Secretary of Labor dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence connecting the protected activity to adverse employment actions. Murray did not request the available de novo hearing before an administrative law judge or pursue judicial review, allowing the findings to become final. The California Supreme Court held that these findings have preclusive effect in later litigation because the administrative scheme afforded an opportunity for a full adversarial hearing and appellate review, and Murray's choice not to invoke them rendered the agency's resolution conclusive on the issues decided.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether a defendant facing recommitment proceedings under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) has a due process right to avoid trial and civil commitment if found mentally incompetent. Defendant Ardell Moore, previously convicted of sexual offenses and committed as an SVP, sought to stay his recommitment trial on competence grounds, arguing his diagnosed mental disorders prevented him from understanding the proceedings or assisting counsel. The California Supreme Court held that no such due process right exists and reversed the Court of Appeal, concluding that allowing incompetence to halt SVPA proceedings could block commitments for dangerous offenders and undermine the statute's purpose of secure confinement and treatment. The court distinguished the case from People v. Allen, which addressed a different due process claim, and aligned its holding with uniform out-of-state decisions and other California civil commitment schemes.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved defendant Franklin Lynch, who was convicted of the first-degree murders of three elderly women (Pearl Larson, Adeline Figuerido, and Anna Constantin), along with multiple counts of residential burglary and robbery of five elderly victims in 1987. The jury found true special circumstance allegations of burglary murder, robbery murder, and multiple murder, and returned a death verdict, which the trial court entered as a judgment of death. On automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, the defendant raised various challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and other aspects of the guilt and penalty phases. The court affirmed the judgment in full, holding that the evidence supported the convictions and special circumstances and that no prejudicial errors occurred.

criminal law

In this case, defendant Rodrigo Perez fired a single shot from a moving car at a group of seven police officers and one civilian standing close together in a parking lot, believing them to be rival gang members, and wounded one officer in the hand. He was convicted of eight counts of premeditated attempted murder (seven as to the officers and one as to the civilian), along with various assault and other charges. The Court of Appeal affirmed the multiple attempted murder convictions on the ground that the victims' proximity meant the shot endangered all of them, but the California Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence supported only a single count of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer. The court reasoned that attempted murder requires specific intent to kill a person, and firing one indiscriminate shot at a group without targeting any particular individual or intending to kill everyone in the group establishes intent to kill only one victim. The court noted that the defendant could properly be convicted and punished separately for the multiple assault counts arising from endangering each person in the group.

criminal law

In People v. Tate, defendant Gregory O. Tate was convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle, with true findings on allegations that he personally used a knife and that the murder occurred during the commission of robbery and burglary, resulting in a death sentence. On automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in full. The court reasoned that the evidence, including the defendant's possession of the victim's car and stolen items, bloodstains on his clothing, and details from the crime scene indicating forced entry and a struggle, supported the jury's findings, and that no prejudicial errors occurred during the guilt or penalty phases of the trial.

criminal law

In People v. Herrera, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder and gang-related offenses after allegedly shooting a rival gang member; the key issue at trial was whether preliminary hearing testimony from a former gang member witness who had been deported to El Salvador could be admitted because the witness was unavailable. The trial court found the witness unavailable after the prosecution presented evidence of his deportation and the lack of an extradition treaty with El Salvador, and allowed the testimony to be read to the jury. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the prosecution failed to show due diligence. The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal, ruling that the prosecution's undisputed evidence satisfied the good-faith and due-diligence requirements under the federal and state confrontation clauses and the Evidence Code.

criminal lawprocedure