This case concerns competing claims to title over tide lands and submerged lands in California that were conveyed by state patent, specifically portions within the two-mile limit of Wilmington and the rights reserved to the public. The court concurs in reversing the lower court judgment and directs the superior court to quiet title to part of the lands in the state and the remainder in the successors of the original patentee, subject to constitutional limits. The reasoning traces the state's sovereign ownership of tide lands upon admission to the Union, its power to alienate them via legislation, and the reservations in article XV, section 2 of the 1879 Constitution that protect public rights of access and navigation without broadly allowing uncompensated state reentry. The opinion emphasizes that grantees receive full estate subject only to those specified public servitudes and that prior grants like San Francisco's waterfront confirm the validity of such conveyances.
This case concerns the validity of a state-issued patent for tide lands claimed by the California Fish Company. The court held that the patent was void from the outset (ab initio), resulting in no conveyance of title and no basis for adverse possession claims. The concurring justice agrees with the judgment but limits the discussion to the specific facts of an invalid patent, noting that broader questions about the interests granted or public rights reserved in valid tide-land conveyances should be addressed in other cases where the patent is not void. The core reasoning rests on the absolute invalidity of the patent under the circumstances presented, without needing to define estates or reserved rights in a valid transfer.
The case concerns an appeal from a criminal conviction in which the court considered whether to reverse the judgment due to errors or abuses in pleading or procedure. Under a recent constitutional amendment (section 4 1/2 of article VI), reversal is prohibited unless an examination of the entire record shows that the errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice, defined here as the conviction of a person who is probably innocent. The justice explains that this requires a thorough weighing of the evidence rather than a cursory review, and that procedural errors alone do not qualify as a miscarriage. Because the justice had not reviewed the 4400-page record, they declined to concur in the judgment of reversal.
The case Duffy v. Hobbs, Wall & Co. concerns a workplace injury claim in which employee Duffy was allegedly harmed due to an out-of-repair guardrail, with the employer defending on grounds that Duffy, as foreman, bore responsibility for the defect. The majority denied rehearing of the matter. In dissent, the chief justice argued that the employer failed to meet its burden of proving Duffy's fault, as his duties extended only to obvious repairs rather than inspecting for hidden decay in structural timbers. The reasoning holds that any duty to dismantle and test the railing for concealed weaknesses would belong to a general superintendent, not the foreman of operations.
The case Rocca v. Boyle involves a dispute over whether the San Francisco district attorney may hire outside assistants for criminal investigations and prosecutions without compensation first being fixed by law or approved by the board of supervisors. The opinion, a dissent, disagrees with the denial of rehearing and the underlying judgment that would require the auditor to pay such claims without question. It reasons that necessity for extra personnel must be determined by the board of supervisors under the city charter, which treats the district attorney like other executive officers, and that allowing unilateral hiring would undermine the board's ability to control the municipal budget and levy taxes accordingly.
The case concerned a construction contract dispute in which a contractor sought to rescind the agreement and recover payment after the owner, Mrs. Butler, refused to pay for work performed in August. This opinion dissents from the denial of rehearing and maintains that the judgment favoring the contractor was invalid because the contractor lacked the right to rescind. The core reasoning is that the owner was entitled to withhold payment due to an outstanding claim by a subcontractor that exceeded the contractor's demand, and the owner's failure to cite that specific ground for refusal did not create an estoppel. The opinion concludes that these facts preclude any right to rescind the contract.
