Cites Knox v. Eden Musee Americain Co. — McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank (46 N. Y. 325); N. Y. & N. 3. B. B. Oo. v. Schuyler (34 N. Y. 30); lAckbarrow v. Mason (2 D. & E. 70); 3ern v. Nichols (1 Salk. 289), distinguished. Knox v. Eden Musee Americ
This case involves a bankruptcy proceeding where the referee ordered a creditor, S.S. Pierce Company, to return proceeds from transfers of after-acquired property under a chattel mortgage and certain accounts receivable from the bankrupt Markert, deeming them voidable preferences under the Chandler Act. The court affirmed the order requiring payment of $550 for the after-acquired merchandise, finding that the transfer was perfected only when the creditor took possession within four months before bankruptcy, making it a preference. However, the court recommitted the portion of the order concerning accounts receivable for further clarification or revision, as it was unclear which accounts had been properly identified in lists provided to the creditor. The core reasoning centered on the new provisions in Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act regarding when a transfer is deemed made, specifically when it is perfected against bona fide purchasers and creditors.
This case involves a stevedore injured while discharging cargo from the Mexican Steamship Uxmal at Baltimore, who filed a libel in rem against the vessel after it was later attached in Boston. The Mexican Ambassador petitioned to dismiss the action and recover a $7,500 deposit, asserting that the vessel belonged to the Republic of Mexico, was controlled through the Henequeneros of Yucatan association, and was employed in public service, thereby claiming sovereign immunity. The court examined the presidential decree and state regulations creating the association, which granted it independent juridical personality, allowed it to operate commercially with its own board and capital structure, and provided only limited government oversight or reversion rights in emergencies. Evidence showed the association had appeared generally, posted the deposit, and was named as owner in customs documents, confirming it was not acting as a governmental instrumentality. The petition was therefore denied, as the vessel was not proven to be in the Republic's possession and public service when attached, permitting the case to proceed on the merits.
This case involves a company seeking to recover floor taxes paid to Internal Revenue Collectors under a law later found unconstitutional. The plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to substitute the United States as the defendant after initially suing the collectors, as the Revenue Act of 1936 allowed suits against the US but the statute of limitations had expired for a new suit. The court denied the motion to amend, reasoning that suits against collectors are personal liabilities distinct from actions against the United States, so the substitution would constitute a new suit barred by the statute of limitations. Consequently, the motion to dismiss was allowed.
In the bankruptcy case of Berkshire Hardware Co., the Massachusetts Division of Unemployment Compensation presented a claim for unemployment compensation contributions based on wages paid by the bankrupt before a receiver took over the business. The referee disallowed the claim on grounds that it was an unprovable post-petition debt under the Bankruptcy Act and was not properly proved. The court determined that the contributions function as taxes eligible for priority under section 64(a)(4) of the Chandler Act, rather than debts subject only to state-law priority, but that the filed proof did not meet formal requirements though it could be amended. The court therefore permitted the claimant fifteen days to file an amended proof in proper form claiming tax priority, after which the claim would be allowed if corrected or the referee's disallowance would stand.
The owner of the power yacht Trim Too filed a petition in admiralty court seeking to limit liability under federal statutes (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 183, 188, 189) following an explosion on the vessel in May 1940 that caused one death and injuries to persons and property. The explosion occurred while the yacht was stored on land in a shed for winter repairs, with the owner’s captain and others working aboard. A claimant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the yacht was not a sea-going vessel and that the statute did not apply to an accident on land. The court held that it had jurisdiction, ruling that the limitation statutes apply to pleasure yachts regardless of commercial use and extend to non-maritime torts arising when a vessel is on land for repairs, based on the legislative history of the 1851 and 1884 Acts and precedents allowing admiralty jurisdiction over such limitation proceedings.
This case involved a complaint for an accounting brought in federal court by the sister and next of kin of a deceased widow against an administrator de bonis non with will annexed and the sureties on his probate bond, alleging that the administrator failed to make required payments from the estate to the widow and improperly paid income to a trustee. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that probate accounting and the review of probate court decrees are exclusively matters for the state probate court under Massachusetts law, and federal courts lack authority to entertain such suits or interfere with final probate decrees in the absence of fraud, which was not alleged.
