Otto Kaus

The case involved Bernard Lee Hamilton, who was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and kidnapping after the victim Eleanore Buchanan was found decapitated and with her hands removed; special circumstance allegations under the 1978 death penalty law were also found true, leading to a death sentence. The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on the underlying offenses but set aside the special circumstance findings and reversed the penalty judgment. The core reasoning centered on prejudicial error in the jury instructions regarding the requirement of intent to kill for the special circumstances, which violated standards established in cases like Connecticut v. Johnson, necessitating reversal of the death penalty portion while upholding the guilt phase.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the appeal of Steven Clark Silbertson from a judgment of death after his convictions for first-degree murder and robbery, along with a true finding on a robbery-murder special circumstance, for killing Randy Watkins during what began as a planned robbery at a 7-Eleven store. The California Supreme Court affirmed the guilt-phase convictions and related firearm-use findings but set aside the special circumstance allegation. The core reasoning was that, under the precedent of Carlos v. Superior Court, the robbery-murder special circumstance requires a finding of intent to kill, which was not properly established here.

criminal law

The case involved defendant David Rivera, who was convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory and burglary after a jury trial based on his alleged participation in a convenience store burglary during which a customer was stabbed and killed. The trial court admitted evidence of a prior armed robbery committed by the defendant to prove identity, along with his confession and a post-arrest statement to an officer, after finding that he had knowingly waived his Miranda rights. The California Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the prior robbery lacked sufficient shared characteristics with the charged offenses to support an inference of identity under Evidence Code section 1101(b), as the common marks did not set the crimes apart from others of the same type. The court did not reach the Miranda or voluntariness claims in full detail but focused the reversal on the improper admission of the prior offense evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Michael Todd Leach, who was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery after he and an accomplice lured victim Michael Messer to a remote location under the pretense of a drug deal, then robbed and stabbed him 48 times, resulting in findings of torture and robbery-murder special circumstances and a death sentence under California's 1978 death penalty law. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of guilt, including the convictions and special circumstance findings, but reversed the penalty phase judgment. The court's reasoning on guilt centered on the sufficiency of the evidence from accomplice testimony and Leach's own statements, the validity of aiding-and-abetting liability despite later-clarified jury instructions from People v. Beeman, and the rejection of claims regarding weapon-use findings and voluntariness standards for witness statements.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an agricultural employer, George Arakelian Farms, challenging the certification of the United Farm Workers as the employees' bargaining representative after a 1976 representation election. The employer raised multiple objections to the election process, four of which were summarily dismissed by the ALRB's executive secretary for failing to state a prima facie case, and the fifth was rejected after a hearing; the employer then refused to bargain, leading the board to impose a make-whole remedy for employee losses. On review, the California Supreme Court held that the summary dismissals were not subject to judicial scrutiny because the employer failed to timely exhaust administrative remedies by seeking board review or reconsideration. The court further upheld the make-whole remedy, finding that the board had correctly applied the standards from its prior J.R. Norton decision when reimposing the relief on remand. The ruling focused on procedural exhaustion requirements and the board's authority under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved defendant Robert Lee Massie, who was charged with murder with special circumstances and other felonies including robbery and assault, and who sought to plead guilty to the capital charges shortly before trial despite his attorney's opposition. The trial court accepted the guilty plea and imposed a death sentence after a penalty trial. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of death, holding that Penal Code section 1018 prohibits acceptance of a guilty plea to capital charges without the consent of defense counsel, as previously interpreted in People v. Chadd, and that the attorney's statements here did not constitute the required consent. The court reasoned that the statute's counsel-consent requirement serves as a safeguard against erroneous death sentences and must be strictly followed, regardless of the defendant's wishes. A dissenting justice argued that counsel's statements amounted to valid consent under the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

In Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, NFL player Fred Dryer sued the team for breaching his employment contract by removing him from the active roster. The Rams petitioned to compel arbitration under the grievance procedures in the NFL collective bargaining agreement, but the trial court denied the petition, finding the arbitration clause unconscionable under state law because it allowed the league commissioner to handle disputes affecting the integrity of the game. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal law under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act governs the dispute and preempts incompatible state doctrines such as adhesion contracts. The court reasoned that the NFL arbitration process satisfies minimum integrity standards, as the standard grievance procedure includes due process protections and the commissioner intervenes only in limited cases involving game integrity, not routine contract disputes.

labor & employmentfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a dispute between client Barbara Waters and her former attorney Ray Bourhis over whether the contingency fee collected from a settlement in a lawsuit against her psychiatrist was subject to the fee caps in Business and Professions Code section 6146 under MICRA. The attorney had moved for summary judgment, arguing that the underlying action was not one for professional negligence and thus not subject to the limits, and the trial court granted the motion. The California Supreme Court reversed, finding triable issues of fact as to whether the client was informed of and consented to the pursuit of non-MICRA theories solely to avoid the fee caps. The core reasoning centered on the complaint's inclusion of negligence claims, the insurance coverage for professional services, and the requirement of client consent for exceeding statutory fee limits.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether plaintiffs could recover the combined limits of two separate uninsured motorist policies issued by State Farm for injuries sustained by Susan Welch in a collision with an uninsured vehicle, or whether an antistacking clause limited recovery to the $15,000 limit of one policy. The California Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the insurer, ruling that the clause was enforceable and that State Farm had no further liability after paying $15,000. The court reasoned that the policy language tracked the statutory authorization in Insurance Code section 11580.2(d) for limiting and prorating damages when multiple coverages apply, that the clause remained valid even though both policies came from the same insurer, and that the record raised no triable issues on noncontractual claims such as fraud or breach of the covenant of good faith. The court did not reach the insurer's alternative res judicata argument based on a prior arbitration petition.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a claim for workers' compensation death benefits by the widow of a Santa Rosa Junior College mathematics instructor who was killed in a car accident while driving home from campus with student papers to grade. The instructor regularly performed grading and other work at his home in the evenings, a practice common among faculty due to campus interruptions, though the college neither required nor encouraged it. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board awarded benefits on the ground that the home qualified as a second jobsite, creating an exception to the going and coming rule that normally bars compensation for injuries during an employee's commute. The California Supreme Court reversed, concluding that an employee's voluntary decision to work at home does not transform the residence into a second jobsite unless the employer mandates such work as a condition of employment.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether a trial court retains discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to strike a prior serious felony conviction when imposing a five-year enhancement under section 667. The defendant had pleaded no contest to multiple charges including robbery and admitted a 1982 serious felony prior; the trial court imposed the enhancement consecutively but believed it lacked authority to strike the prior. The Supreme Court held that section 667 and article I, section 28(f) of the California Constitution, both enacted by Proposition 8, do not clearly eliminate the court's traditional section 1385 power, following the rule from People v. Williams that such authority is preserved absent explicit legislative intent to the contrary. The court therefore vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing with an accurate understanding of the trial court's discretion.

criminal law

The case involved defendant Charles Tyree Green, charged with robbery and murder, who sought to suppress statements made during a police interview, his seized work coveralls, and later confessions on grounds that they resulted from a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings or from an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the California Supreme Court reviewed that ruling via writ. The court held that Green was not in custody for Miranda purposes during the interview because, under the objective test, a reasonable person in his position would not have felt subjected to restraints comparable to a formal arrest, as the officers treated him as a witness, used non-coercive procedures, and made no show of authority suggesting he was not free to leave. The court also noted support for the inevitable discovery of the coveralls even if consent had been withheld.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lavell Frierson's appeal from a death penalty judgment after his retrial conviction for first-degree murder with special circumstances (robbery and kidnapping), along with related offenses. In an earlier reversal, the court had found inadequate representation for failing to investigate a diminished capacity defense; on retrial, Frierson explicitly asked his new counsel to present such evidence at the guilt and special circumstances phase, but counsel declined to reserve it for the penalty phase, and the trial court ruled that counsel controlled the decision. The Supreme Court held that counsel may not unilaterally refuse, over the defendant's objection, to present any defense to charges carrying a minimum penalty of life without parole, requiring reversal of the special circumstance findings and penalty judgment while affirming the underlying convictions. The reasoning centered on the fundamental nature of the right to present a defense in capital cases, distinguishing it from other strategic decisions and from statutes requiring joint consent for guilty pleas. The opinion emphasized that an explicit conflict between defendant and counsel triggers court intervention on this issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether a trustee in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, Safeco Title Insurance Company, owed a common law duty to a defaulting trustor, I. E. Associates, to make reasonable efforts to locate and provide actual notice of default and sale beyond the mailing procedures specified in Civil Code section 2924b. Associates had purchased property and later defaulted on payments managed by a third party; Safeco mailed notices to the addresses in the deed of trust and conducted limited searches, all of which were returned undelivered, before proceeding with the sale. Associates sued Safeco for negligence and breach of trust after learning of the sale only upon distribution of surplus proceeds. The court granted summary judgment to Safeco and affirmed on appeal, holding that the statutory notice procedures are exclusive and that the Legislature intended them to occupy the field without additional common law duties. The reasoning emphasized that requiring further efforts would introduce cost, uncertainty, and litigation into the foreclosure process while the existing rules already balance notice safeguards with efficiency.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved defendant Michael Ramkeesoon's conviction for first-degree murder and robbery, with use of a deadly weapon, based on the killing of Robert Mullins after an encounter that began at a bar. Ramkeesoon testified that he met Mullins, stayed at his apartment, acted in self-defense during a struggle involving a knife, and only afterward formed the intent to take Mullins' property such as a wallet and watch. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on theft or larceny as lesser included offenses to robbery. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the omission left the jury with an unwarranted all-or-nothing choice on the robbery and related felony-murder counts, and that the verdicts did not necessarily resolve the factual issue of when the intent to steal arose.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Griffin Development Company, which sought a special use permit from the City of Oxnard to convert its 72-unit apartment complex into condominiums. The city denied the permit because the complex failed to meet mandatory and advisory standards for condominium conversions, including parking requirements and unit sizes, which were applied through a local ordinance and resolution. The California Supreme Court upheld the denial, ruling that the city had authority under its police power to regulate such conversions and that the ordinance was reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives like ensuring housing quality and addressing community impacts. The court further held that the denial did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of property, as the regulations did not eliminate the existing use of the apartments or deprive the owner of economically viable use.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned an indigent prisoner, Terry Yarbrough, who was serving a sentence for murder and faced a civil wrongful death lawsuit seeking substantial damages; he sought appointment of counsel to defend him after being served while incarcerated. The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior ruling in Payne v. Superior Court that due process and equal protection require providing indigent incarcerated civil defendants access to the courts to protect their personal and property interests, with appointment of counsel available only as a last resort when no other means suffice. The court emphasized that the trial court's power to appoint counsel exists independently of any authority or obligation to order compensation from public funds, and it clarified that trial courts must evaluate such motions ex parte to identify genuine cases where rights are at stake. The opinion directed attention to guidelines from Payne while noting that the underlying civil action involved potential default judgment issues but did not automatically trigger counsel appointment.

civil rightsprocedure

In People v. Babylon, defendants Babylon and Hyatt were convicted in municipal court of violating Penal Code section 593e by selling devices intended to facilitate unauthorized reception of over-the-air subscription television transmissions from a licensed multipoint distribution service (MDS) carrying HBO programming. The appellate department reversed on grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied, but the Court of Appeal ultimately reversed the convictions after the Legislature amended the relevant provisions during the appeal. The court held that the defendants were entitled to the benefit of the change in law, which no longer criminalized the sale of the equipment at issue because it merely received and down-converted signals without decoding or addressing them. This result followed from the principle, established in cases such as People v. Rossi and In re Estrada, that absent a saving clause, criminal defendants receive the benefit of ameliorative statutory amendments while their appeals are pending.

criminal law

The case involved a board-certified gynecologist convicted of raping two patients during pelvic examinations while they were unconscious of the act under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (4). At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of similar incidents involving two other patients despite prior acquittals in those matters, which the jury was instructed to consider only for showing a common method, plan, or scheme. The California Supreme Court reversed the convictions, ruling that admission of the evidence violated Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 because neither identity nor intent was at issue and the evidence was not independently admissible to prove opportunity. The court found the error prejudicial given that the case turned on witness credibility and the improper corroboration of the complaining witnesses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a taxpayers' suit challenging a land transaction in which City of Albany council member Hubert Call sold his parcel on Albany Hill to the city through an intermediary developer, Cebert Properties, Inc., as part of a larger development deal while Call served on the council. The California Supreme Court held that the transaction violated Government Code section 1090, which bars public officials from having a financial interest in contracts made by their agency, rendering the contract void even though Call abstained from some votes and disclosed the interest. The court ruled that the Calls must repay the city the $258,000 purchase price plus interest as restitution, but the city could retain title to the land, and no liability attached to the other defendants including the developer and fellow council members. The core reasoning emphasized the statute's strict prophylactic purpose to eliminate conflicts of interest, requiring full disgorgement from the interested official regardless of good faith or abstention, while allowing the public entity to keep the benefit of the performed contract.

criminal lawproperty