William P. Lawlor

The case involved defendant William C. Borchers, who was indicted on multiple counts of larceny and embezzlement arising from his dealings with complainant Sarah M. Garrigus, including her delivery of a $2000 check and an unfilled note form in connection with a proposed loan and stock subscription arranged through Borchers. After some counts were abandoned, Borchers was convicted on four embezzlement counts; the trial court denied his motion for a new trial and entered judgment. The California Supreme Court reversed the convictions on counts one, five, and nine for insufficient evidence that the property belonged to the complainant or that Borchers was her agent or bailee, but affirmed the conviction on count three. For count three, the court reasoned that the evidence showed Borchers received the note as Garrigus's agent, was authorized to fill in its blanks, and then converted the completed instrument to his own use.

criminal law

This case involved a husband's action for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and the wife's cross-complaint for separate maintenance also alleging cruelty. The trial court found the husband's allegations true and the wife's untrue but denied a divorce to either party while awarding fees and costs to the wife. On appeal, the court held that when the evidence adequately supports and corroborates the complaint's allegations of cruelty, the trial court has no authority to arbitrarily refuse to grant the divorce. The court therefore reversed the judgment and directed entry of an interlocutory decree of divorce for the husband on grounds of extreme cruelty, along with appropriate orders for child custody, support, and property division.

family law

In People v. Selby, Norman Selby was charged with the murder of Theresa W. Moers but convicted of manslaughter after a trial in Los Angeles County; he appealed the conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The defendant argued that the deceased had died by suicide or accident during a struggle over a gun, and he challenged the admission of testimony about conversations between the deceased and her ex-husband shortly before her death, as well as jury instructions on the corpus delicti and the use of his extrajudicial statements. The court held that the conversations were properly admitted not to prove motive but to show the deceased's state of mind and refute the suicide theory, that the corpus delicti need only be shown by prima facie evidence before considering confessions, and that the jury could consider all evidence together in reaching its verdict. It also found no error in an oral instruction given during deliberations encouraging open discussion. The judgment and order were affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a claim by General Motors Acceptance Corporation against a sheriff for damages from the attachment of two automobiles that had been left in the possession of the Modesto Motor Company. GMAC asserted ownership based on assignments of conditional sales contracts from the Modesto Motor Company, but the trial court ruled for the sheriff and the district court of appeal reversed. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the sheriff, holding that GMAC failed to prove it had complied with the Motor Vehicle Act's requirements for transferring title through re-registration of the vehicles. The court reasoned that under the Act, title does not pass and the transfer is not effective until the required registration steps are completed, and GMAC offered no evidence of such compliance despite the time that had elapsed before the attachment. Because GMAC could not establish its ownership or right to possession, it could not prevail in the conversion action.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved petitioners seeking a writ of mandate to compel the Secretary of State to file articles of incorporation authorizing an all-nonpar-value stock issue, after the Secretary refused based on prior decisions and state constitutional provisions requiring shares of a single par value. The court granted the writ and ordered filing, determining that an entirely nonpar stock structure does not violate sections 3 and 12 of article XII of the California Constitution. The core reasoning was that those provisions permit stockholder liability to be computed on a numerical share basis (rather than exclusively a monetary one) so long as every share represents an identical interest and a unity of liability exists among all shares. The court distinguished earlier rulings that had addressed mixed par and nonpar classes, noting they did not resolve the validity of uniform nonpar stock.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a habeas corpus petition by an individual convicted in state superior court for violating the Wright Act by selling intoxicating liquor, resulting in a sentence of a $1,000 fine or, in default, six months in county jail; the court had stayed execution of this sentence for fifteen months to follow a concurrent federal sentence of fifteen months in the same jail. After completing the federal term and being released, the petitioner was rearrested and imprisoned under the state judgment, prompting challenges that the stay was invalid, the sentence improperly cumulative, and the term already served. The court discharged the writ and remanded the petitioner to custody, reasoning that the stay order was void because it was not issued as part of probation under Penal Code section 1203, the alternative imprisonment provision was a valid means of enforcing the fine under state precedent, and the federal-state sentence interaction did not render the state judgment satisfied or unenforceable. The decision relied on distinctions from cases involving direct imprisonment sentences and held that the petitioner remained subject to the original state commitment.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case In Re Watts addressed whether custody of a defendant in a capital case pending appeal from a conviction belongs with the sheriff of the county or the warden of the state prison. Justice Lawlor dissented, contending that Penal Code sections 1217, 1227, and 1243 establish a legislative policy placing the prisoner in the warden's custody from delivery after judgment until execution. The dissent reasoned that an appeal from the judgment automatically stays execution without a certificate of probable cause, and the statutes require the warden to retain custody to ensure the prisoner remains available for any subsequent execution order, with no statutory provision authorizing a transfer to the sheriff.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves W.A. Doble, who was joined as a codefendant in a criminal indictment and filed for a writ of prohibition to bar the San Francisco Superior Court from further proceedings in the action. The petition was a companion to a related case raising identical challenges to the indictment and trial process. The court denied the writ as to all counts, adopting the reasoning and holding from the companion proceeding without independent analysis.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved petitioners charged in an indictment with conspiracy under Penal Code section 182 to violate the Corporate Securities Act, along with six specific counts of violations under that Act. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition, arguing the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the conspiracy count failed to state an offense and the other counts were time-barred misdemeanors under the one-year statute of limitations in Penal Code section 801. The court addressed whether section 182 covers conspiracies to violate the Corporate Securities Act and whether the trial court could proceed on counts potentially punishable as misdemeanors. It interpreted Penal Code sections 15-17, 182, and 183 to hold that such conspiracies are encompassed and that charges punishable as either felonies or misdemeanors stand as felonies until judgment, without retroactive effect on the statute of limitations. The court denied the writ as to all counts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Walter H. Stevens, an attorney disbarred in 1917 following his 1915 federal conviction for conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, a felony involving moral turpitude; after serving his sentence and receiving a presidential pardon in 1921 to restore his civil rights, he petitioned the district court of appeal multiple times for readmission, with the petitions denied on grounds that he had not complied with statutory requirements for original bar admission, including examination by the Board of Bar Examiners. The California Supreme Court reviewed the denials and addressed whether readmission of a disbarred attorney must follow the exact procedures for new applicants under the Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that an application for restoration to practice is not equivalent to an original admission and that re-examination by the Board is not invariably required, though the court may exercise discretion to order such an examination in appropriate cases; it transferred the matter back to the district court of appeal for further proceedings consistent with this view.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involves Clyde E. Cate, who was admitted to practice law in California in 1912 and later faced disbarment proceedings in superior court on charges of violating his attorney oath and duties through acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, and corruption; judgment of disbarment was entered against him in 1918. This proceeding is Cate's third application for reinstatement after two prior unsuccessful attempts. The court notes that the issues presented are identical to those in the related matter of In re Application of Walter H. Stevens and therefore orders the case transferred to the district court of appeal, second appellate district, division two, for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in that decision.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the prosecution of defendant Garbutt for the first-degree murder of Mrs. Dorothy Lee Hunn in Pasadena on September 19, 1924. Garbutt was convicted by a jury, which imposed the death penalty, and he appealed from the judgment and the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that the shooting was accidental and that he had no legal responsibility. The court reviewed the conflicting accounts, including testimony from Frederick B. Gibson and the victim's child supporting the prosecution's version of events, as well as the defendant's statements claiming he intervened in a struggle between Gibson and the victim that caused the fatal shot. The opinion noted that the jury had rejected the defendant's account, that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support a felonious killing, and that no asserted errors warranted reversal.

criminal law

This case involved a wrongful death action by a parent against a streetcar company after a child was struck and killed in the street, with the railroad raising contributory negligence and challenging the plaintiff's verdict on grounds of attorney misconduct. The dissent addresses claims that plaintiff's counsel improperly accused the defendant of suppressing evidence by not calling its grip-man as a witness, despite adverse trial court rulings on that argument. The opinion concludes that any such misconduct did not warrant reversal of the judgment under the state constitution's miscarriage-of-justice standard, noting that two juries and the trial court had found for the plaintiff, the evidence supported liability, and the record did not show prejudice to the defendant. It emphasizes the trial court's superior position to assess the effect of the remarks and the presumption of regularity in the proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case was an interpleader action brought by Los Angeles Trust & Saving Bank as escrow holder of an agreement between lessee Shirley C. Ward and sublessee Walter H. Fisher (later assigned to Grand Avenue Company) modifying rights under a lease of Los Angeles premises. The defendants disputed whether Fisher had performed conditions precedent to delivery of the agreement, with Ward demanding cancellation and Fisher demanding delivery; the bank, unable to decide, sought a court ruling and recovery of its attorneys' fees. The trial court allowed the interpleader but denied fees, and the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an escrow holder is not an express trustee under Civil Code sections 2250 and 2273 so as to be entitled to reimbursement for expenses, and that attorneys' fees are recoverable only when provided by contract or statute, which did not cover interpleader actions. The court rejected analogies to trusteeship and out-of-state authorities permitting fees in interpleader, noting that section 1021 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs fee recovery and excludes this scenario.

procedureproperty

The case concerns the validity of a residuary bequest in a codicil to the will of Susan Mary Gowan Johnston, directing the remainder of her estate to the San Diego County Hospital after her husband's death, in light of a statute limiting charitable bequests. The superior court decreed that the bequest to the county hospital exceeded the one-third limit on charitable dispositions under Civil Code section 1313 and thus resulted in partial intestacy, with the excess going to the heirs. On appeal by the state and county, the California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a county hospital does not qualify as a "state institution" under the exception in section 1313, because it is owned and operated by the county rather than the state, as supported by prior case law distinguishing state from municipal institutions.

property

This case concerned a procedural dispute in an appeal from a superior court judgment in a contract action, where the defendant sought to challenge the denial of a motion for new trial but served a proposed bill of exceptions after the statutory deadline. The plaintiff objected to the bill's timeliness only after previously accepting service without reservation, moving for an extension of time to file amendments, and pursuing a motion to dismiss the appeal on unrelated grounds. The trial court sustained the objections and dismissed the bill proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's conduct constituted a waiver of the timeliness objection, as the request for an extension without expressly reserving the right to object implied acceptance of the late filing. It therefore issued a writ of mandate compelling the trial judge to settle and certify the bill of exceptions.

procedure

The case involved a will contest after Kate W. Bassett's death, where an earlier attested will leaving her estate to Nancy Willis had been admitted to probate, but her sisters sought to revoke it and probate a later destroyed holographic will leaving the estate to one sister. The trial court denied probate of the holographic will due to its destruction and insufficient witnesses but held that its inconsistent provisions nonetheless revoked the earlier will, resulting in the decedent dying intestate. On appeal, the public administrator argued the court exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due process by addressing revocation beyond the pleaded issues. The California Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that under Civil Code sections 1296 and 1297, a later will's inconsistent provisions revoke an earlier will and may be proven by one witness for revocation purposes, even if not sufficient for probate of the later will itself.

propertyprocedure

In In re Wilson, the petitioner, who had pleaded guilty to burglary with explosives under Penal Code section 464, sought habeas corpus relief after being resentenced to 25 years in county jail on the ground that the crime was a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The court held that section 464 defines a felony punishable by 25 to 40 years in state prison because the chapter containing the statute specifies the place of confinement, making general misdemeanor classification rules inapplicable. It further ruled that the information sufficiently stated an offense for purposes of habeas review, that prior imprisonment under the original sentence did not implicate double jeopardy protections which apply only to trials, and that the writ should be discharged with directions to vacate the county jail sentence and impose a proper state prison term.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the prosecution of defendant Garcia for unlawful possession of a concealable firearm under a 1923 California statute, based on his status as a foreign-born, non-naturalized person. Following his conviction in Sacramento County, Garcia appealed, raising the same issues as in the companion case of People v. Quarez. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, adopting the reasoning from the Quarez decision without further elaboration.

gunscriminal lawimmigration

The case involved a defendant convicted under a 1923 California statute for possessing a concealable revolver while being an unnaturalized foreign-born person. The prosecution's evidence consisted of the defendant's possession of the weapon and his extrajudicial statements admitting foreign birth in Mexico, with no other proof on that element. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that foreign birth was an essential part of the corpus delicti that could not be established solely by the defendant's out-of-court admissions without independent corroborating evidence.

criminal lawgunsimmigration