Rudi M. Brewster

This case involves a patent infringement dispute over U.S. Patent No. 5,649,131, which describes a communications protocol for exchanging information between a host processor and a terminal device. Following the Federal Circuit's vacation of a prior summary judgment order and its revised claim construction defining "terminal device," Defendant Dell moved for summary judgment of non-infringement, contending that its web servers do not meet the claim limitations because they exercise substantial control over the positioning of objects on client displays. The court denied the motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, holding that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding infringement, as the Federal Circuit's construction permits some host processor involvement in object positioning and the prior vacated order created no binding factual findings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved Qualcomm suing Broadcom for infringing two patents related to video coding standards, while Broadcom defended by claiming the patents were unenforceable due to Qualcomm's waiver. The court had previously found waiver because Qualcomm failed to disclose the patents to the Joint Video Team standards-setting organization despite a duty to do so. After considering additional evidence, the court decided that the patents, along with all their continuations, divisions, and derivatives, are unenforceable. The reasoning was that Qualcomm's intentional concealment breached its disclosure obligations under standards-setting rules, as established in prior case law like Rambus, warranting a broad remedy to address the misconduct.

business & regulatory

The case concerned Lucent's patent infringement claims against Microsoft regarding U.S. Patent Nos. 5,341,457 and RE 39,080, which cover audio coding methods and apparatus used in MP3 technology. A jury found the patents valid and infringed by Microsoft. The court separately ruled that Lucent had sole ownership and standing to sue, rejecting Microsoft's license defense based on the jury's factual finding that no post-April 1989 work was incorporated into the underlying patent. Microsoft moved for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial on infringement, validity, damages, and related issues, which the court assessed under standards requiring substantial evidence to uphold a jury verdict and allowing the court to weigh evidence for a new trial if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this patent case, Lucent sued Dell, Gateway, and Microsoft for infringing U.S. Patent No. 4,701,954, which covers methods for digital speech codecs that convert speech signals into electrical pulses, with the dispute consolidated in the Southern District of California and focused on claims 1, 2, and 6. The court granted Lucent summary adjudication on multiple issues, ruling that the patent claims were not invalid for anticipation, failure to name inventors under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), or lack of written description and enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, and that the laches defense was unavailable to Microsoft because Lucent sought only post-suit damages. The court also set the date of actual notice to Microsoft as May 9, 2003—the date of Lucent's answer and cross-complaint in response to Microsoft's declaratory judgment action—rather than an earlier date proposed by Lucent, while addressing related affirmative defenses raised by the defendants.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved environmental groups challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's issuance of an incidental take permit under the Endangered Species Act to the City of San Diego for a multi-species conservation plan covering development activities. The permit addressed seven vernal pool species, including fairy shrimp and rare plants listed as endangered or threatened. Builder groups intervened to contest aspects of the permit's scope. The court held that the permit violated the ESA, requiring the Service to re-initiate consultation, because the plan's mitigation measures relying on avoidance where practicable and off-site transfers were inadequate to protect the species' habitat and recovery needs, the fairy shrimp could not reliably be transplanted, and the record did not support assured funding by the City. The decision emphasized that the Service failed to evaluate impacts at the time of permitting and overlooked data from its own recovery plan.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves Qwest Communications seeking to collect on a multimillion-dollar judgment against New Media Telecommunications by alleging that its president Jonathan Weisz and his father conspired to fraudulently transfer over $1 million in company funds to shield them from creditors, including by wiping computer records. Qwest brought claims under California's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) to set aside the transfers, impose a constructive trust, and related relief. Jonathan Weisz moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing he was neither the debtor nor a transferee under the UFTA and that no conspiracy claim could lie. The court denied the motion in full, holding that the UFTA permits recovery against a person for whose benefit the transfer was made and that a debtor who conspires with others to conceal assets can be liable on a conspiracy theory for the underlying tort.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz seeking to invalidate or render unenforceable three patents owned by Feuling Advanced Technologies describing three-valve combustion chambers for internal combustion engines. After a bench trial on the issue of inequitable conduct during patent prosecution, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that James Feuling and his agents had engaged in multiple acts of inequitable conduct before the PTO, including falsely claiming small entity status for fee payments after licensing the patents to Ford, withholding information about related litigation against Indian Motorcycle and Batten, failing to disclose details of the Batten engine as potential prior art, and not investigating or disclosing information about an alleged Honda engine. The court held that U.S. Patent Nos. 5,501,191 and 5,638,787 are unenforceable due to this pattern of deception, with each of several independent findings sufficient on its own to support that result. The remaining issues in the case were scheduled for a later trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a challenge by off-highway vehicle associations to the Bureau of Land Management's temporary closure of portions of the Algodones Dunes in California to protect the threatened Pierson’s milk-vetch plant. The closures stemmed from a consent decree in a prior Endangered Species Act lawsuit. The court denied the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and granted the defendants' cross-motions, finding that the BLM had complied with NEPA procedures for the interim closure and possessed authority under FLPMA regulations to restrict vehicle use where it adversely affects endangered species or habitat. The decision emphasized deference to the agency's expert determinations and rejected arguments requiring an emergency finding or additional procedural steps.

environmentfederal powerpropertyprocedure

The case involves a declaratory judgment action filed by Injen Technology Co., Ltd. against Advanced Engine Management, Inc. (AEM) seeking a ruling of non-infringement of AEM's U.S. Patent No. 6,394,128 on an air safety valve, after AEM sent Injen a cease-and-desist letter. AEM moved to dismiss the case for improper venue in the Southern District of California or, alternatively, to transfer it under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) or 1404(a). The court held that venue was improper because AEM, headquartered in the Central District, did not 'reside' in the Southern District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), as its limited sales to five stores there (about 2% of business) were insufficient to establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction if the district were treated as a separate state. It denied dismissal but granted transfer to the Central District, where both parties are based, and alternatively granted transfer for convenience under § 1404(a).

procedure

The case involved a challenge by a property owner and citizens group to San Diego County's Resource Protection Ordinance, which defines wetlands more broadly than the federal Swampbuster provisions in the Food Security Act of 1985 by requiring only one of three criteria (hydric soils, wetland hydrology, or hydrophytic vegetation) instead of all three. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the federal definition preempted the local ordinance under the Supremacy Clause, arguing it interfered with federal wetland conservation incentives tied to agricultural subsidies. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's, holding that Swampbuster is Spending Clause legislation lacking preemptive force over unconsenting state and local governments. Alternatively, the court found no clear congressional intent to displace traditional state and local authority over land use and wetlands regulation, which remains an area of state primacy even where federal spending programs create narrower definitions.

environmentfederal power

The case concerns whether the Ministry of Defense of Iran's confirmed ICC arbitration judgment against Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. is immune from attachment or garnishment by two U.S. creditors holding default judgments against Iran for deaths caused by Iranian-sponsored terrorism. The court granted the Ministry's motion as to creditor Stephen Flatow, ruling the judgment immune from his lien because Flatow had elected compensation under the Victims Protection Act of 2000 and thereby relinquished attachment rights to regulated assets. It denied the motion as to creditor Dariush Elahi, holding that the judgment remains subject to attachment under exceptions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for certain terrorism-related claims. The core reasoning examined the interplay between the Antiterrorism Act, the Victims Protection Act's election options, FSIA commercial-activity and terrorism exceptions, and the limited review authority under the New York Convention.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a patent infringement claim by Nichols Institute Diagnostics against Scantibodies Clinical Laboratory over U.S. Patent No. 6,030,790, which stemmed from an international PCT application. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) because it omitted a known co-inventor. While the motion was pending, the patent's owners and inventors successfully obtained a Certificate of Correction from the PTO under 35 U.S.C. § 256 that added the missing inventor. The court denied the summary judgment motion as moot in light of the PTO's correction and directed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint reflecting the updated patent. The ruling turned on the legal effect of the PTO certificate resolving the inventorship issue without need for further court proceedings.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This patent case involves SAES Getters suing Aeronex for alleged infringement of its '588 Patent on a method for removing oxygen from ammonia gases. Aeronex sought leave to amend its answer to add a counterclaim for infringement of its own '955 Patent on hydride gas purification and to name SAES Getters' subsidiary SPG as an additional counterdefendant, after SPG filed a related declaratory judgment action in another district. The court granted the motion under Ninth Circuit law applying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and 13(f), which permit amendment when justice requires, particularly given the early stage of litigation, lack of prejudice, and equitable factors outweighing concerns over the parallel filing. Core reasoning focused on liberal amendment standards, the relation of the counterclaim to the original dispute, and application of the first-filed rule without finding improper forum shopping.

procedure

In Martin v. City of Oceanside, plaintiff Mark Martin sued the city and two police officers after they entered his home without a warrant during a welfare check on his roommate, searched the premises with guns drawn, and briefly detained him until his identity was confirmed. The complaint alleged federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations by the officers and the city, plus state-law claims for trespass, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on the § 1983 claims, dismissing them with prejudice, and dismissed the remaining state claims without prejudice. It reasoned that the officers’ warrantless entry was reasonable under the emergency-aid and community-caretaking exceptions to the warrant requirement, that any factual disputes about announcements were immaterial, and that the officers were therefore entitled to qualified immunity or that no constitutional violation occurred. The court denied the defendants’ objections to the late opposition and deemed the plaintiff’s continuance motion moot.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved whether Federal Insurance Company had a duty to defend Upper Deck against three lawsuits alleging that its marketing of trading cards with randomly inserted high-value chase cards amounted to illegal gambling in violation of RICO and California law. The court granted Federal's motion for summary judgment and denied Upper Deck's motion, ruling that Federal had no duty to defend. The core reasoning was that the complaints did not allege bodily injury caused by an occurrence under the policy, as Upper Deck provided no evidence that customers becoming hooked on the cards was unexpected or resulted from an accidental happening rather than the insured's intentional conduct.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involves Sprint, a wireless telecommunications provider, seeking to install facilities in the City of San Marcos's public rights-of-way and challenging the city's requirement to obtain a Conditional Use Permit under its municipal code, which includes fees, public hearings, and discretionary approval standards. Sprint filed suit alleging violations of federal statutes such as 47 U.S.C. §§ 253 and 332(c)(7), preemption of local rules by federal law, and various state law claims. The court granted the motion to dismiss in part as to certain federal claims, constitutional preemption arguments, and state/tort claims for failure to state a claim or lack of ripeness, while denying dismissal on other federal claims under §§ 253 and 332 that were deemed sufficiently pled. It declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, viewing them as raising novel and complex issues separate from the federal questions.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproperty

In this case, wireless provider Sprint sought to install telecommunications facilities on public rights-of-way in the City of San Marcos but objected to the city's requirement of a conditional use permit under its municipal code, claiming the process was preempted by the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. The court granted a partial preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of specific ordinance provisions that gave the city unlimited discretion over permit conditions, duration, and approvals, while denying relief as to the underlying requirement to obtain a permit. The core reasoning was that Sprint showed probable irreparable harm from service gaps and customer loss, along with likely success on the merits that the discretionary provisions violated 47 U.S.C. § 253 by effectively prohibiting service, but the permit requirement itself was not preempted and severable provisions could remain. The court declined jurisdiction over related state law claims.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., GTE sued Qualcomm asserting that its cellular phones incorporating Preferred Roaming List software infringed the 728 patent on technology for selecting cellular frequencies based on system identification codes (SIDs), preferring home SIDs then nonhome nonnegative SIDs. Qualcomm counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. The court granted Qualcomm's motion for summary judgment of no infringement and denied GTE's motion for summary judgment of infringement, holding that the Qualcomm phones do not literally infringe claims 2, 6, and 7 of the 728 patent or infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. The ruling rested on the court's construction of the patent claims and comparison showing that Qualcomm's phones use different selection methods involving geo-regions and do not follow the patented sequence for choosing working frequencies. All other pending motions were denied as moot.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Dumas v. Major League Baseball Properties, Inc., plaintiffs who purchased trading cards alleged that the cards' "chase" feature constituted an illegal gambling scheme and brought a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The court vacated its prior orders and dismissed the RICO claim without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) because they failed to allege an injury to their business or property. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs received the benefit of their bargain—the trading cards and an opportunity to win prizes—so there was no economic loss, despite the alleged illegality of the gambling activity. All pendent state law claims were dismissed without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

In Rodriquez v. Topps Co., Inc., purchasers of trading cards (or their guardians) sued the manufacturer, alleging that the sale of cards offering a chance to win cash-prize "chase" cards constituted illegal gambling and violated the federal RICO statute. The court vacated its prior order and dismissed the RICO claim without leave to amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) because they failed to allege an injury to their business or property. The core reasoning was that RICO standing requires proof of economic harm from the racketeering conduct, not merely participation in allegedly unlawful activity, and the plaintiffs had received the cards and chance to win that they paid for. The court then dismissed the pendent state-law claims without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedureproperty