Cites Jenkins v. Anderson — APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sonoma County denying admission of a will to probate. George H. Cabaniss, Judge. Reversed.
This case involved a dispute between a buyer and seller of real property under installment contracts. The buyer delivered shares of stock to the seller's agent to be sold and applied to the contract payments, but the agent converted most of the proceeds. The trial court entered judgment for the seller, but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the seller was liable for the full value of the stock under principles of agency and ostensible authority, as the agent was authorized to collect payments. The court also rejected the defense of an account stated, finding that the adjustment of contracts did not alter the written agreement in the required manner.
This case involved a bank, as judgment creditor of A.W. Gorman, seeking to impose a lien on residential property in Atherton that had been held in joint tenancy during the Gormans' marriage and later awarded to his ex-wife Myrtle Mantz in divorce proceedings. The underlying debt stemmed from a 1926 guaranty by Gorman of a loan to a business associate, which the trial court found to be a community obligation. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment protecting Mantz's original one-half interest in the property but reversed as to the other half-interest that had been transferred to her from Gorman on January 3, 1931, holding that this portion remained subject to the community debt and could be reached by the creditor despite the divorce decree and property settlement. The court's reasoning centered on the timing and character of the property transfer relative to the incurrence of the community obligation, distinguishing between the spouses' separate interests and the portion traceable to the husband. A dissent argued that the creditor failed to show the debt benefited the community and that laches barred the claim.
In Gore v. Market Street Railway Co., a pedestrian was struck by a streetcar while crossing to a safety station to board it and obtained a jury verdict for personal injury damages. The court reversed the denial of the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The evidence showed she was fully aware of the approaching car yet proceeded into its path without precaution, while the motorman used ordinary care, had no reason to anticipate her movement from a position of safety, and could not have avoided the collision even if he had seen her earlier; the last clear chance doctrine therefore did not apply.
The case involves a dispute over the custody of a child born in 1927, adopted by the petitioner and her former husband, following their 1933 divorce in South Dakota, which divided custody seasonally between the parents. The petitioner, now residing in California, filed an action in Los Angeles Superior Court seeking full custody, prompting the husband to seek the same; the trial court indicated it would follow the South Dakota decree without modification but then issued conflicting temporary custody orders, including one allowing the child to be removed from the state. The California Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the superior court from entering any orders that would place the child beyond the reach of California court process before final judgment in the custody action. The core reasoning was that shifting temporary custody to enable removal from the jurisdiction or to undermine potential appeals and supersedeas writs would exceed the trial court's authority, as it could nullify the effects of ongoing litigation. The topics selected reflect the case's focus on domestic relations and judicial process.
The case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney Thomas P. McCue by the State Bar of California, based on six charges of improperly soliciting professional employment, known as ambulance chasing, in violation of professional conduct rules. A local committee recommended a 60-day suspension, which the Board of Governors increased to four months after review. On appeal, the court examined the full record, rejected claims of bias, and found sufficient evidence of willful solicitation in five charges, including through an intermediary acting with the petitioner's knowledge, along with his prior disciplinary history. The court adopted the Board's recommendation and ordered McCue suspended from practicing law for four months.
This case involved a member of a nonprofit golf club seeking to resign and be released from future obligations after paying all dues and tendering his membership certificate. The club refused to accept the resignation based on its bylaws requiring board approval. The court held that the bylaws provision allowing the club to arbitrarily withhold consent to resignation was invalid as unreasonable and arbitrary under the Civil Code governing nonprofit corporations, which permits members to cease membership on just and reasonable terms. The judgment was reversed, allowing the member to resign.
