Cites Maryland Casualty Co. v. Shafer — APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. T. N. Harvey, Judge. Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
This case concerned a claim by Dennis Sullivan, Annie Sullivan Glennon, and the children of Mary Ann O’Brien to inherit as the brother, sister, and nieces/nephews of decedent John Sullivan, whose estate had been distributed to the State of California after the superior court found the evidence of heirship insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was adequate to establish the claimed relationship. The court reasoned that the decedent’s repeated statements to neighbors about his Irish birth, family names (including mother Ellen and siblings Dennis, Annie, and Mary), navy service bought off by his father, and move to California closely matched the detailed family history provided in the claimants’ depositions, with no indication of collusion or untruthfulness to justify rejecting the proof.
The case concerned whether the San Rafael city board of education retained authority over a high school district after the annexation of outlying elementary school districts for high school purposes only, or if state law required the county superintendent to call an election for a separate high school board. The court held that the city board of education continued to govern the enlarged district and denied the petition for a writ of mandate. The reasoning was that the Political Code distinguishes city high school districts from others, and the city's charter along with related statutes form a uniform plan under which the city board retains control, with annexed areas participating in board elections; school administration is a state matter without constitutional barriers to the governance structure.
This case involved an action to recover on a non-negotiable promissory note executed in exchange for shares of corporate stock, with defenses raised including fraud in the inducement and a counterclaim based on stockholder liability for corporate debts. The trial court excluded evidence of these defenses and the counterclaim, entering judgment for the plaintiff based in part on a prior judgment that had rejected similar fraud claims. The court held that the prior judgment did not bar the fraud defense here because the current note holder was not a party to that action, and further ruled that the counterclaim was timely and properly assertable against the joint and several liability on the note. Consequently, the judgment was reversed due to the erroneous exclusion of the counterclaim evidence.
This case concerned competing petitions by two adult children of the deceased to be appointed administrator of his estate under the Code of Civil Procedure. The probate court selected the son rather than the daughter, and the appellate court affirmed that choice. The court held that when two applicants are equally entitled to appointment and neither's competency is contested, the probate court has discretion under section 1367 to choose between them. It further reasoned that evidence showing the daughter had taken property from the decedent under circumstances likely to require the estate to sue her was properly considered as bearing on the suitability of her appointment, even though it did not disqualify her outright.
This case involved an attempt to enforce building restrictions on a residential lot in Los Angeles against its current owner, Martha Canady. The plaintiffs claimed rights based on an assignment from the original subdivider and a Torrens Land Act registration that referenced restrictions in an earlier deed. The court decided that the restrictions did not run with the land or create enforceable covenants benefiting neighboring properties, as the original deed lacked the necessary language for mutual agreements or a general plan. Therefore, the Torrens judgment did not expand the deed's effect, and the action to subject the property to the restrictions was dismissed.
The case concerned a breach of a May 1919 written contract for the sale of 2,000 bags of rice at $6.95 per hundred pounds ex-dock San Francisco in bond; the defendant refused delivery, and the plaintiffs bought equivalent rice on the open market at higher prices, then sued to recover the $7,350 difference in cash outlay. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for the full amount. The appellate court reversed, ruling that the proper measure of damages under the Civil Code required proof of the difference between the full original contract price (including the duty and dock charges assumed by the buyers) and the market value of equivalent rice under the same terms; because the substitute purchases were made f.o.b. without those charges, the plaintiffs had not established their actual loss and the matter had to be retried to determine whether and to what extent the judgment should be reduced.
