Donald R. Wright

The case involved an appeal from a first-degree murder conviction in which the defendant argued that the jury foreman committed misconduct by telephoning an attorney during deliberations to ask about the classification of involuntary manslaughter and the meaning of diminished capacity. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the foreman's consultation created a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted, requiring a new trial. The court also provided guidance that the defendant's extrajudicial confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained without proper Miranda warnings. The decision rested on settled precedent that private communications with jurors about pending matters are presumptively prejudicial unless shown otherwise. Topics selected focus on the criminal conviction, jury procedures, and confession issues central to the opinion.

criminal lawprocedure

In King v. Thierry S., a minor was declared a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after being arrested without a warrant for misdemeanor vandalism that was not committed in the officer's presence. The court held that the arrest was illegal under section 625.1, which by its terms and legislative history requires a warrant for misdemeanor arrests outside the officer's presence, and that evidence obtained from the illegal arrest was tainted and should have been suppressed. The judgment was reversed because the wardship finding relied solely on that tainted evidence of railroad vandalism. The decision rested on rules of statutory construction, including Government Code section 9605, and the history of sections 625 and 625.1.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a 14-year-old minor, Roger S., who petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after his mother admitted him to Napa State Hospital under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6000(b), seeking release on grounds that the statute denied him procedural due process and equal protection compared to minors committed as wards under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. The California Supreme Court held that minors aged 14 or older possess a liberty interest entitling them to due process protections, including a hearing to determine if they are mentally ill or disordered, whether they are gravely disabled or dangerous to self or others, and whether admission would likely benefit them; these rights cannot be waived by a parent. The court reasoned that while parental authority to guide a child's development generally allows curtailment of a minor's liberty, admission to a state mental hospital implicates fundamental constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment and the California Constitution that require procedural safeguards when the state is involved in the confinement. The decision outlined minimum procedures for such admissions and noted interim use of LPS Act commitments until new legislation is enacted.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure

The case involved Lee Roy Hannon's appeal from convictions for attempted robbery and assault with a deadly weapon stemming from an incident outside a restaurant. The court rejected his claim that prearrest delay violated his right to a speedy trial, holding that under relevant precedents such delay must be intentional to support relief. It reversed the judgment, however, because the trial court gave a prejudicial jury instruction allowing consideration of certain evidence as tending to show consciousness of guilt when the circumstances did not support it.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the estate of Inez G. Fasken, a California resident who died in 1968 leaving property in both California and Texas to her son. The State Controller appealed an order that reduced the inheritance tax by $463,858, challenging the trial court's rejection of a state regulation for calculating the portion of the federal estate tax credit allocable to California when multiple states are involved. The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower tax amount, holding that the regulation violated federal due process by exceeding California's jurisdictional limits over out-of-state property. The core reasoning centered on the need to apportion the federal "pick-up" tax credit among states based on the location of taxable property, consistent with prior precedents like the Treichler decisions, rather than using a method that could disproportionately favor one state.

taxespropertyfederal power

The case involved a juvenile, Ronald E., who petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus claiming unlawful detention by the Youth Authority. He argued that juvenile court orders were defective because he was not advised of his Boykin-Tahl constitutional rights (against self-incrimination, to confrontation, and to a jury trial) before admitting allegations in multiple petitions under the Juvenile Court Law, and that no waiver could be implied; he also challenged procedural aspects of his parole revocation. The court denied relief, holding that the petitioner had waived any constitutional defects by failing to raise timely challenges to the commitments and by not alleging a lack of knowledge of his rights or prejudice from any omissions. The decision emphasized that habeas corpus cannot substitute for appeals absent special circumstances excusing the delay, and that Boykin-Tahl protections apply to juveniles but require a showing that admissions were involuntary for collateral relief.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In People v. Enriquez, the defendant was convicted by jury of assault with a deadly weapon and voluntary manslaughter arising from a group fight at a public carnival in which the victim was stabbed multiple times. The Court of Appeal affirmed the assault conviction, rejecting claims that evidence of a prosecution witness's prior conviction was improperly admitted and that self-defense instructions were inadequate, because no timely objection was made and the general self-defense instructions given were sufficient under the facts. It reversed the manslaughter conviction, however, on the ground that the prosecution had not shown due diligence in locating an absent witness before introducing that witness's prior recorded testimony, rendering the error prejudicial. The court also addressed the admissibility of the defendant's post-arrest statements in anticipation of a retrial. The topics addressed include criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs in a private civil action for wrongful death, battery, and emotional distress arising from violence during a newspaper strike, who sought to compel deposition answers from defendant union officials by obtaining a court order granting the defendants use and derivative-use immunity against self-incrimination. The trial court denied the immunity motions, and the Supreme Court held that such an order should not be issued in a suit solely between private parties without first notifying prosecuting authorities of the proposed immunity's scope, giving them an opportunity to object, and confirming the absence of objection. The court's reasoning distinguished the case from People v. Superior Court (Kaufman), where the People themselves sought the order, and concluded that granting immunity over prosecutors' objections would improperly encumber future criminal proceedings and interfere with prosecutorial discretion by imposing a heavy burden on the state to prove independent sources for its evidence. The court outlined procedural conditions, including adequate advance notice and potential postponement, to balance discovery rights with criminal enforcement interests.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case concerned a defendant convicted of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury who, on the third day of trial, moved to dismiss his counsel and represent himself, citing concerns about counsel's performance. The California Supreme Court held that under the U.S. Supreme Court's Faretta decision, the right to self-representation is unqualified if asserted before trial but, once trial has commenced, becomes subject to the trial court's discretion. The court affirmed the denial of the midtrial motion, reasoning that the request came too late in the proceedings and that trial courts must balance the defendant's interests against potential disruption, with the lateness of the request weighed heavily when unjustified. The decision clarified implementation of Faretta in California by requiring inquiry into the reasons for delayed requests while leaving the ultimate ruling to the trial judge's sound discretion.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Ray v. Alad Corp., the plaintiff sued for injuries from a defective ladder manufactured by Alad I, which had sold its assets and dissolved before the accident; the defendant Alad II acquired the business, continued operations under the same name with the same equipment and personnel, but had not expressly assumed liabilities for prior defective products. The trial court granted summary judgment to Alad II on the ground that a successor corporation is not liable for the predecessor's tort obligations. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that strict tort liability extends to the successor under the narrow facts presented, because the plaintiff had no adequate remedy against the dissolved predecessor, Alad II had the knowledge and ability to spread the risk of injury through its current sales, and Alad II enjoyed the goodwill built by the predecessor without the corresponding liabilities.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In People v. Kaanehe, the defendant, owner of a cemetery, was charged with multiple counts of grand and petty theft for diverting funds from plot sales instead of depositing them into a required care trust, leading to the cemetery's closure and hardship for buyers. After the trial court denied his motions to dismiss and suppress evidence obtained from banks and others, he entered a negotiated guilty plea to two counts in exchange for dismissal of the rest and the prosecutor's agreement not to recommend a sentence. On appeal, the court held that challenges to the lack of appeal warnings and denial of a continuance were not cognizable without a certificate of probable cause, that bank records need not be suppressed because Burrows v. Superior Court does not apply retroactively, but that the prosecutor breached the plea bargain by sending a letter recommending against probation, entitling the defendant to resentencing or withdrawal of his pleas.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved two brothers convicted of second-degree burglary after they pleaded guilty following the denial of their motions to suppress extrajudicial statements. The defendants argued that their arrests lacked probable cause, that their confessions were obtained as a result of the illegal arrests, and that the trial court erred in not suppressing the statements or setting aside the information. The court determined that the arrests were indeed illegal because officers had no specific information of a recent crime and only general knowledge of burglaries in the area, and that the confessions were tainted under Brown v. Illinois and Wong Sun v. United States. However, the court held that challenges to the admissibility of such statements are not reviewable on appeal after a guilty plea, even with a certificate of probable cause, rendering the pleas improperly induced and requiring reversal of the judgments.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Herbert Charles Miller was convicted by jury of first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon after he and an accomplice robbed a jewelry store and shot a security guard during the crimes. On appeal, Miller challenged the imposition of enhanced punishment for inflicting great bodily injury during the robbery under Penal Code section 213, arguing that the injured guard was not the victim named in the information, and also contended that he could not be punished for multiple offenses arising from the same course of conduct under section 654. The California Supreme Court agreed that the robbery enhancement could not apply because the statute requires intentional great bodily injury to the robbery victim as charged, but upheld the burglary enhancement under section 461 since the guard was an occupant of the burglarized premises; the court also modified the judgment to address the multiple-punishment prohibition while affirming the underlying convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ronald Edwards, an ex-felon convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12021 after a friend lent him a pistol. The trial court denied probation despite a favorable presentencing report and imposed an augmented sentence based in part on Edwards's prior marijuana conviction. On appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed whether sentencing judges must always state reasons for rejecting a probation recommendation and whether the prior conviction could be used both to prove the offense and to increase the sentence term. The court held that stating reasons for denying probation is not constitutionally required and declined to mandate it through its supervisory powers, though it called the practice preferred; it also ruled that the prior conviction could not be used to augment the sentence when it was an essential element of the charged offense. The judgment was reversed for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Chi Ko Wong, a juvenile at the time of the offenses, who was initially subject to petitions in juvenile court for first-degree murder and first-degree robbery but was certified for prosecution in adult criminal court after a fitness hearing found him unsuitable for juvenile facilities. A jury convicted him of both offenses with findings of firearm use, and he appealed arguing that the juvenile court's unfitness determination was improper. The court held that an order certifying a juvenile for adult proceedings under section 707 is not appealable from the ensuing criminal conviction and must instead be challenged by collateral attack, and that even if the issue were properly before it the unfitness finding was supported by probation reports detailing gang associations, suspected involvement in other crimes, and lack of amenability to juvenile programs. The court also limited the firearm use enhancements under section 12022.5 to apply only to the robbery conviction.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In People v. Zamora, defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit arson, conspiracy to burn insured property, conspiracy to commit grand theft, and two counts of grand theft based on a 1968 residential fire that was suspected to be arson for insurance purposes and property development. The California Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that all charges were barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Penal Code section 800. The court reasoned that the limitation period for concealed thefts begins to run when there is sufficient knowledge that a crime has been committed, judged by an objective standard of when a reasonable person would have discovered the offense, rather than when authorities have enough evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt; here, the most recent overt acts and discoveries occurred more than three years before the 1972 indictment.

criminal lawprocedure

In Allen v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court could order a criminal defendant to disclose the names of prospective defense witnesses so that the names could be read to potential jurors during voir dire, with the prosecution barred from contacting those witnesses until their names surfaced at trial. Petitioner Charles Allen refused to comply and sought a writ of prohibition. The court granted the writ, holding that the compelled disclosure violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under the state constitution. Relying on its earlier decision in Prudhomme v. Superior Court, the court reasoned that disclosure is impermissible if it conceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case or tend to incriminate the defendant, and it reaffirmed that California's constitutional protections are more solicitous of the privilege than current federal law requires.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Rockwell v. Superior Court, Steven Douglas Rockwell petitioned for a writ of prohibition to bar the Ventura County Superior Court from retrying special circumstances allegations tied to a first-degree murder charge, claiming that Penal Code sections 190 through 190.3 unconstitutionally allowed the death penalty without adequate consideration of mitigating factors. The California Supreme Court issued the writ, concluding that the statutes violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because they failed to provide standards for the sentencing authority to focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. The court reasoned that the California procedures were substantially similar to the mandatory death penalty schemes in North Carolina and Louisiana that the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana, as they did not ensure a meaningful opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances or the individual offender's character and record. The decision rested solely on federal constitutional grounds and did not address state constitutional issues or whether capital punishment is per se invalid.

criminal law

In Goodman v. Kennedy, plaintiffs sued an attorney for negligence, fraud, and violations of state securities law after incurring losses on shares purchased from the attorney's clients, who were corporate officers. The complaint alleged that the attorney negligently advised his clients they could issue stock dividends and sell them without jeopardizing a Regulation A exemption from SEC registration requirements, and that he omitted material facts during a phone call with one of the plaintiffs' attorneys. The California Supreme Court affirmed dismissal after sustaining a demurrer, ruling that an attorney owes no duty of care to third parties dealing at arm's length with the client unless the advice was intended to be relied upon by them or they were intended beneficiaries of the transaction. The court further held there was no duty to disclose during the conversation absent any misleading statements by the attorney.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In People v. Walker, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after evidence showed he participated in an incident where the victim was shot and robbed in an alley, with testimony linking him to a firearm recovered nearby. The primary legal issue was whether Penal Code section 12022.5's enhanced penalties for firearm use in felonies require the defendant to have personally used the weapon, as opposed to merely aiding and abetting others who did. The California Supreme Court ruled that the statute mandates personal use by the defendant to trigger the enhancement. However, because the defendant received a life term for the murder conviction itself, the court held that the firearm finding could not result in any additional penalty under section 12022.5. The decision turned on the plain language of the statute, distinctions from related provisions like section 12022, and precedents interpreting firearm use in the context of accomplices.

criminal lawguns