John T. Adams

The case concerned whether certain Denver property (lots and an office building) owned by the Colorado Seminary, which operated the University of Denver, was exempt from city taxes for 1924-1932 under the seminary's 1864 territorial charter and the state constitution. The seminary sued to enjoin the assessments and levies, and the trial court granted the injunction; the supreme court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the charter and constitution exempt property whose income is devoted exclusively to the seminary's educational purposes and that is necessary to carry out its design, as established in prior decisions, and that the seminary had continuously operated the school without forfeiting its rights despite using the University of Denver name and acquiring the property via a conditional gift and lease.

taxesproperty

The case involved a creditor, Tinglof, seeking a declaratory judgment that his transcript of judgment against a husband had priority over real property awarded to the wife in a separate maintenance action. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the petition. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the wife had an equitable interest in the husband's property from the time of filing the lis pendens in the maintenance suit, which gave her claim priority over the later judgment. The court reasoned that equity courts have inherent power to award alimony or property in separate maintenance suits, making the decree effective as of the lis pendens filing date.

family lawproperty

The case involved the Colorado National Bank suing the Colorado National Company, a newly formed corporation, to enjoin its use of a similar name on grounds that it infringed the bank's established goodwill and would likely mislead the public into believing the company was an affiliated entity, given a known custom among banks. The trial court overruled the defendant's demurrer and entered a permanent injunction, which the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged prospective injury from unfair competition without needing to plead specific damages, competitive overlap, or fraudulent intent, as the admitted tendency of the name to deceive the public justified equitable relief regardless of whether the underlying custom was legal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over rights to water from the J.D. Ward ditch No. 2 in Colorado, where plaintiff Nellie S. Hurt sought to enjoin defendants Harry C. Davis and Jane T. Davis from diverting water onto their land (the east eighty acres). The matter is a continuation of prior litigation in which the Supreme Court had previously reversed an injunction for lack of probative evidence and remanded for further proceedings. On retrial, the plaintiff presented no new evidence supporting her claim of an oral agreement permanently transferring all ditch and water rights from the original owner, while the defendants introduced additional defenses and evidence; the sole witness testimony indicated only a limited, non-exclusive neighborly arrangement. The trial court nevertheless issued a similar injunction, which the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof to establish superior title and directing dissolution of the injunction with prejudice.

propertyprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Munson, who had collected insurance proceeds belonging to the estate of Harriette Lombard and failed to account for them to the administratrix. After inquisitorial proceedings under C.L. 1921 section 5378 in the county court, a separate civil action resulted in a money judgment against Munson, followed by an order in the probate matter directing payment or imprisonment for contempt. Munson petitioned the district court for certiorari to review the county court's actions, but the district court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the petition; the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal. The court reasoned that the county court had jurisdiction, the judgment was conclusive on the facts and amount owed, Munson's voluntary appearance cured any service issues, and the commitment order was a valid enforcement mechanism for civil contempt or body execution in recovering estate assets, with no jurisdictional defects or reviewable irregularities shown.

procedureproperty

In Haldane v. Potter, real estate brokers sued a buyer for a $20,000 commission allegedly due under a contract in which the buyer agreed to pay that amount as part of the purchase price for mining claims. The trial court sustained the buyer's special demurrer for nonjoinder of the sellers as defendants and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sellers were not necessary parties because the suit was based solely on the buyer's promise to pay the commission, a contract made for the plaintiffs' benefit, and the sellers had no interest in the controversy that would be affected by the judgment. The court reasoned that under the Code of Civil Procedure, only parties with an adverse interest or whose presence is indispensable for a complete determination need be joined, and the sellers did not qualify. The case was remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a tenant who sued the owner of an apartment building for personal injuries after slipping and falling on ice hidden under snow on a private cement sidewalk on the defendant's property while leaving for work. The trial court granted a nonsuit and dismissed the case, but the supreme court reversed that judgment. The court held that the plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of negligence, as evidence showed the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition, regularly maintained the walks, and failed to remove the ice or make the area safe. The court further reasoned that the question of the defendant's breach of duty and the plaintiff's care were factual issues that should have been submitted to a jury rather than decided by nonsuit, and that the plaintiff did not assume the risk merely by using the walkway.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involves a writ of error seeking review of a lower court judgment in favor of the plaintiffs regarding claims arising from a fire loss. The disputes stem from the same fire as those in a companion case, Detroit Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Gagliardi, decided the same day, with similar facts and applicable law. The court held that its ruling in the companion case was decisive here and therefore affirmed the judgment below.

propertyprocedure

The case involved partners who operated a merchandise business whose inventory was destroyed by fire; they sued Detroit Fire & Marine Insurance Company to recover under a fire insurance policy after the insurer refused payment. The insurer defended on the ground that the policy was void because one partner had submitted a ledger containing exaggerated sales figures, which the insurer alleged was a fraudulent misrepresentation made to inflate the loss claim. The trial court denied the insurer's motions for directed verdict, excluded certain opinion testimony, and entered judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiffs; the appellate court affirmed, holding that factual disputes over fraud were resolved against the insurer on conflicting evidence, the excluded testimony was properly rejected as speculation or invading the court's role, and no trial errors warranted reversal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a surety company on the bond of a court-appointed receiver for the Colorado Pulp and Paper Company. The receiver was later also appointed general manager of the company as a going concern and received a separate salary for that role, which the court later ordered him to partially refund. When he failed to repay the remaining amount, the plaintiff sued the surety company under the receivership bond. The court held that the surety was not liable because the bond covered only the receiver's duties, not those of the distinct general manager position, which involved separate responsibilities and compensation charged to an operating account. The judgment against the surety was reversed with directions to dismiss the action.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Horton v. McFerson, the county treasurer sued the state bank commissioner, who was liquidating the failed State Savings Bank, seeking to treat his full $39,233.90 deposit as an unsecured claim while preserving the right to apply $25,000 in pledged Liberty bonds only to any shortfall after receiving dividends on the entire amount. The trial court ruled for the commissioner, allowing the treasurer a secured claim of $25,000 and an unsecured claim for the $14,233.90 balance, with dividends computed only on the unsecured portion after the bonds were redeemed or sold. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the express trust agreement limited the bonds' security to exactly $25,000 and that a pledge for a specific debt cannot secure additional obligations absent further agreement; excess deposits remained unsecured and shared pro rata with other creditors. The court reasoned that the agreement's plain language controlled, the bonds were bank assets subject to the trust, and allowing the treasurer's proposed method would improperly diminish assets available to other depositors.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Mrs. Elizabeth Peer filing a workers' compensation claim against her employer for compensation and medical benefits after developing osteomyelitis in her wrist, which she attributed to using a metal scraper while working as a cook and dishwasher. The Industrial Commission denied the claim, finding that she did not sustain an accidental injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and that her condition, if related to employment, was more like an occupational disease. The district court affirmed this decision, and the Supreme Court upheld it on appeal. The court reasoned that the evidence did not establish that the injury was traceable to a definite accidental source arising out of her employment, as the origin of the infection was unknown and no cut or abrasion from the scraper was shown.

labor & employment

This case involved a claim by the administratrix of a deceased employee's estate against Mystic Tailoring Company for three weeks of unpaid salary at $100 per week. The company defended on the ground that the employee, who was an officer and stockholder, had voluntarily waived his salary during a business downturn, though the administratrix disputed this and the evidence conflicted solely on that point. The trial court awarded $150, but the Colorado Supreme Court held that the judgment was inconsistent with the evidence because the trial court had rejected the waiver defense while all other facts were undisputed. The court therefore modified the judgment upward to the full $300 and affirmed it as modified, remanding for entry of the corrected amount.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Hertz Drive-Ur-Self System v. Doak, Arthur Doak petitioned for a writ of mandamus to require the officers of Hertz Drive-Ur-Self System, Inc. to transfer 625 shares of the corporation's stock to him on the company books after he acquired the shares by purchase at a foreclosure sale of pledged collateral. The respondents answered by alleging fraud in the foreclosure and sale and argued that any dispute over ownership could not be resolved in mandamus proceedings. The court granted the writ and affirmed the judgment for Doak, reasoning that he had proved compliance with the statutory requirements for transfer of title by endorsed certificate, that the corporate officers' duty to record the transfer is ministerial and enforceable by mandamus, and that the respondents offered no evidence to support their fraud allegations, which therefore could not defeat the clear right to relief.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

The case involved competing claims by a bank holding a first mortgage and a national company holding a second deed of trust to a net receivership fund of $1,681.55 collected from rents of an apartment building during the redemption period after the bank's foreclosure sale. The bank had paid post-sale property taxes that accrued during that period and sought the fund on that basis, while the national company, as a judgment creditor of the insolvent mortgagors, claimed the fund instead. The trial court awarded the fund to the national company and dismissed the bank's claim. The supreme court reversed, holding that a 1929 statute required the owner to pay current taxes before penalties accrued during redemption, made the appointment of a receiver appropriate, and obligated the receiver to pay such taxes, thereby entitling the bank as certificate holder to the fund.

propertytaxesprocedure

The case involved Anine C. Stuart, who held a deed of trust on land in Jefferson County and paid what she believed were the real estate taxes to protect her lien, based on a statement from the county treasurer. The treasurer had mistakenly included amounts for the owner's delinquent personal property taxes in the figures provided, leading Stuart to overpay by nearly $200. The court ruled in favor of Stuart, ordering the county to refund the excess amount paid for the personal taxes. The reasoning was that the treasurer's sale for personal taxes could not extinguish Stuart's prior recorded lien, and her payment was not voluntary since she relied on the erroneous information without protest.

taxesproperty

In this case, White Eagle Oil Corporation sued Dougherty, a retail dealer, to recover on a promissory note given for the balance due on gasoline purchases after the seller raised prices over the buyer's objections. Dougherty counterclaimed for the difference between the original agreed price and the higher amounts charged, arguing breach of their prior agreement. The court held that Dougherty waived any such defenses by voluntarily signing the note with full knowledge of the price dispute, as the note embodied the settled balance and no fraud or mistake was shown. It applied the rule that one who gives a note for a pre-existing debt waives known defenses at the time of execution. The judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.

business & regulatory

In Lehrman Mercantile Co. v. Ireland, Ireland sued the mercantile company to recover a share of proceeds from a beet crop grown on his land, and the trial court ordered the funds paid into court with Ireland receiving his portion and the balance going to the company. After the company paid Ireland the awarded amount, it sought review by writ of error, but Ireland moved to dismiss the appeal. The court dismissed the writ, holding that it addresses only live controversies and will not review moot questions, because the payment fully satisfied the judgment whether characterized as in rem or in personam, leaving no actual dispute for decision.

procedureproperty

In this case, a prisoner convicted of a felony in juvenile court and sentenced to 30-50 years in the state penitentiary petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The district court quashed the writ for lack of jurisdiction, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed that decision. The court held that the juvenile court had exceeded its jurisdiction in handling the adult felony case, as established in prior precedent. It further ruled that the district court possessed authority under state habeas corpus statutes to review whether another court had exceeded its limits, since the juvenile court had no concurrent jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

criminal lawprocedure

In Feste v. People, the defendant was convicted under section 6793, C. L. 1921, of obstructing a constable who was executing a writ of restitution issued in an unlawful detainer action and was sentenced to 30 days in jail. Feste argued that he did not know the constable's official status, that the underlying proceedings were irregular because no prior demand for possession or rent had been shown, and that certain jury instructions were improperly refused. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the writ appeared regular on its face as issued by competent authority, that direct evidence showed Feste knew Brown was an officer and that he had incited others to interfere, and that any alleged defects in the justice court action did not excuse obstruction by a stranger to those proceedings. The court further found the evidence sufficient and that any issues with instructions or remarks by counsel had been adequately addressed by the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure