George A. Luxford

In this case, defendant MacKall and Tánger were jointly tried and convicted of conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses from one Bullis. Tánger's separate appeal resulted in affirmance of his conviction based on the facts presented. MacKall challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict against him. The court held that the same facts established in the Tánger appeal were adequate for the jury to find that MacKall conspired with Tánger to defraud Bullis of $1500, and therefore affirmed the judgment.

criminal law

The case involved Fred S. Pillod, who was charged in two consolidated cases with taking indecent liberties with two girls aged six and seven; a jury found him guilty on both counts, leading to a penitentiary sentence that he appealed. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in deeming the young children competent to testify under Colorado statute, that evidence of their later complaints was properly admitted without details, and that the defendant received a fair trial with sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. The opinion noted that no objections were raised at trial to the children's testimony or the lack of cautionary instructions, and it rejected claims of error regarding the admission of corroborative testimony from a neighbor and the parents. The court concluded that the jury properly resolved the conflicting accounts after viewing the premises.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Otis E. Hall, a chiropractor convicted of causing a miscarriage by administering medicine and using instruments on a pregnant woman, in violation of Colorado statute. Hall appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing his proposed jury instruction requiring the fetus to be 'quick with child' (capable of movement) and by excluding testimony from his other patients about satisfactory treatment. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute criminalizes the destruction of the fetus at any stage before birth and that the given instruction properly tracked the law's language on miscarriage. It further ruled that the excluded patient testimony was irrelevant because the witnesses were not offered as character witnesses.

criminal lawabortion

The case involved Carl Tanger, who was convicted along with R.W. Mackall of conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses. Tanger had advertised a business opportunity and, together with Mackall, misrepresented the income and value of Mackall's real estate business to induce Clifford Bullis to purchase a half-interest for $1,500, when the business had in fact earned only $150 in the prior three months. The trial court overruled Tanger's motion for a directed verdict and submitted the matter to the jury, which found the defendants guilty based on evidence of their coordinated false representations about the business's profitability. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence of the conspiracy and false pretenses was sufficient for the jury's determination and that the verdict was supported by the record.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute between landlords and tenants over whether a three-year lease with an option to extend for five more years had terminated or been properly extended. The landlords sought to regain possession after the initial term, arguing that the tenants had not given notice of their intent to extend and offering only to rent on a month-to-month basis at a higher rate. The court ruled in favor of the tenants, affirming that the lease had not terminated. The core reasoning was that the lease did not require written notice for extension, and the tenants' continued possession combined with tendering the original rent amount sufficiently indicated their desire to exercise the extension option, with the typewritten extension clause prevailing over any conflicting printed provisions about month-to-month tenancy.

property

This case concerns a post-divorce dispute over the modification of alimony payments, attorney fees, and a requested lump-sum award. The plaintiff sought to increase her monthly alimony from $30 to a higher amount based on the defendant's increased income, while the defendant argued the payments were only child support and not modifiable alimony. The trial court ruled the payments constituted alimony, raised the amount to $125 per month, awarded $350 in attorney fees, and denied the lump-sum request. On appeal, the court affirmed these rulings, holding that it had continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony based on changed circumstances of the parties and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in light of the parties' incomes, the son's adulthood, and other relevant factors.

family law

This case involved a challenge to the probate of Thomas Piercen's 1938 will by several contestants after his 1945 death, raising issues of proper execution, the burden of proof, testamentary capacity, and undue influence. The trial court ruled the will was validly executed, submitted capacity and influence questions to the jury via special interrogatories, and entered judgment admitting the will to probate after the jury found the testator had sound mind and was not unduly influenced. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attestation clause provided prima facie evidence of due execution, that competent secondary evidence established the unavailable witness's signature, and that the evidence supported the jury's findings of capacity with no proof of undue influence, especially given the over six-year period before death during which the testator could have revoked the will. The court also noted the burden rested on those asserting invalidity.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over royalty payments made by a coal company to compensate for subsurface mining damage to land in Weld County, Colorado. Plaintiff Sheets had contracted in 1944 to purchase the surface rights from defendant Kirchhof, who had an earlier 1938 agreement entitling him to ongoing royalties from the coal company for removal of support. Sheets sued to establish his ownership of future royalties, and the trial court ruled in his favor after denying the defendant's motions for change of venue and dismissal. The supreme court affirmed, holding that the right to surface support is an incident of surface ownership, that damages for its removal are appurtenant to the land, and that the royalty payments constitute a covenant running with the land that passed to the buyer. The court also upheld venue in Weld County as proper for an action involving interests in local real property.

property

The case involved a dispute over a commercial lease for a store building in Denver, which included an option to renew for another five years if the tenants provided written notice by a set deadline. The tenants failed to give written notice but claimed that a conversation with the landlord company's vice president waived the requirement. The landlord sued for possession in a forcible entry and detainer action; the justice court ruled for the landlord, but the county court entered judgment for the tenants after a jury trial. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted because the vice president lacked authority under the corporate bylaws to waive the written notice provision, and the company president was available to handle such matters.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case was a suit to quiet title to 600 acres of land in Pueblo County, Colorado. The plaintiffs claimed ownership through a 1940 warranty deed from the original owner, Evelyn Cables, to their assignor, the Hatchett Cattle Company. The defendants claimed title based on a 1940 contract of sale signed by an agent and later recorded, followed by a 1944 warranty deed from Cables. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the agent lacked authority to bind Cables to the sale contract without her approval, rendering the contract ineffective, and that Cables had already conveyed the property to the plaintiffs before attempting to deed it to the defendants.

property

This case involved a beneficiary under a will who sought to compel the trustee to pay him his share of the trust estate in cash rather than purchasing an annuity policy as the will expressly directed. The trial court granted summary judgment for the trustee, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the testator's intent, clearly expressed in the will, must be given effect under Colorado law unless it violates public policy or statute. It rejected the beneficiary's argument based on the English rule followed in Massachusetts and New York, instead aligning with decisions from other states that prioritize the testator's intent over allowing the beneficiary to demand cash. The court noted the will's explicit restrictions against lump-sum payments during the annuitant's life and found no basis to disregard those terms.

property

In Sandoval v. People, Pete Sandoval was convicted of first-degree murder after shooting Tito Sandoval outside a Colorado tavern in 1946 following an argument involving verbal insults and drinking. Sandoval appealed, claiming insufficient evidence for a first-degree murder conviction, reliance on perjured testimony, and errors in the trial court's refusal of his proposed jury instructions on self-defense and character. The court affirmed the life sentence, holding that the evidence—including Sandoval arming himself beforehand and firing multiple shots—supported inferences of premeditation and deliberation under established precedent, that claims of perjured testimony lacked merit, and that the given instructions adequately covered self-defense and other issues without needing the tendered ones. The decision emphasized that conflicting witness accounts and the absence of a weapon on the victim did not undermine the jury's verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

In Parsons v. Shackleford, former minors sued their ex-guardian for alleged improper administration of their estates that caused them losses, seeking a judgment against him years after the fact. The guardianship ended with court approval of final reports and discharge of the guardian in 1928 and 1930, but the petition was not filed until 1939. The court determined the suit was barred by the five-year statute of limitations applicable to trusts and by laches, as all transactions were matters of public record available to the petitioners and the trial court found no fraud or concealment. Judgment was entered for the guardian, and the appellate court affirmed.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a tenant who sued her landlady for damages after slipping and falling on an icy private sidewalk leading to an apartment building, resulting in a broken hip; the tenant alleged negligence in allowing ice to accumulate due to a missing downspout. A contractor who had performed work on the building, including removing the downspout, was added as a third-party defendant but was dismissed by the trial court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. The jury returned a verdict for the tenant against the landlady, and the landlady appealed, challenging the dismissal of the contractor, the denial of her motions for directed verdict, and a jury instruction on landlord duties. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the contractor had no ongoing contractual liability or privity with the tenant after his work was completed and paid for, that factual disputes about the sidewalk condition and negligence precluded a directed verdict, and that the instruction correctly stated the non-delegable duty of a landlord in possession and control to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for tenants.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case concerned a damages claim by the plaintiff against multiple defendants, including the First National Bank of Trinidad, for alleged wrongful acts in handling a 1942 shipment of goat cheese from Colorado to New York. The bank moved to dismiss the amended complaint on grounds that it failed to state a sufficient cause of action, and the trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff chose to stand on the ruling and sought review by writ of error. The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed the writ because no final judgment had been entered in the trial court, which is a prerequisite for appellate review under Rule 111(a)(1) and prior case law, though the dismissal was without prejudice to further proceedings below.

procedure

This case arose from a 1943 car collision at the intersection of Sixth Avenue and Sheridan Boulevard in Colorado, in which Otis Amos and his passengers were injured when their vehicle was struck by a car driven by Vern Davis, an employee of Remington Arms Company who was transporting a coworker to a house fire. Amos sued Davis and the Arms Company for damages, alleging negligence due to excessive speed, but the trial court directed verdicts in favor of the defendants on the ground that the accident resulted from the concurrent negligence of both drivers. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence of Davis's speed (estimated at 60-100 mph in a 25-60 mph zone) and the parties' right-of-way obligations under state traffic statutes raised factual questions of negligence, proximate cause, and contributory negligence that must be resolved by a jury rather than by directed verdict. The court emphasized that drivers may assume others are obeying speed limits and that right-of-way rules do not apply when one driver's unlawful conduct prevents the other from yielding.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case is a will contest in which Robert Jones, the adopted son of the deceased, petitioned to set aside the probate of his adoptive father's will after initially consenting to it, but later signed a stipulation with the widow and executrix Icel May Jones to dismiss the petition with prejudice. Jones's attorneys nonetheless sought a writ of error and supersedeas in the supreme court to continue the appeal. The court held that the attorneys lacked authority to pursue the appeal after their client had stipulated to dismissal, as a party retains the right to control and settle litigation without attorney consent or approval. The application for supersedeas was denied and the writ of error dismissed on that basis.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a claim by the owners of a shipment of ginger root for damage caused by freezing during an interstate trucking delivery from Tampa, Florida, to Denver, Colorado, in January 1945. The plaintiffs sued the carrier after the goods arrived frozen and partially worthless, and the trial court granted them summary judgment. The appellate court reversed, holding that a common carrier is not liable for damage to goods resulting from their inherent nature when the carrier was not negligent and the shipment complied with applicable tariffs and Interstate Commerce Commission regulations that did not require heater service. The decision relied on precedent establishing that carriers are exempt from liability for such losses absent fault or misconduct.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a perjury charge against Charles H. Anderson stemming from his testimony in a civil proceeding about the distribution of proceeds from the sale of his farm. After the prosecution presented its evidence, including testimony from Anderson's son denying receipt of the money and a deposition from his daughter stating she knew nothing about the transaction, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and dismissed the case. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the evidence failed to meet the required standard for perjury convictions, which demands either two witnesses or one witness plus independent corroborating circumstances of equal weight. The daughter's testimony was deemed insufficient corroboration because she lacked knowledge of the events in question.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a divorce proceeding in which the wife sought and obtained an interlocutory decree followed by a final decree that incorporated an order dividing the parties' property. Over a year after the final decree, the defendant moved to reopen the case to modify the property settlement, but the trial court denied the motion on the ground that it lacked continuing jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that courts have no ongoing authority to alter property divisions in divorce decrees, in contrast to alimony provisions. The court reasoned that once a property settlement is approved and made part of the final judgment—whether by agreement or court determination—it becomes binding like a contract, and modification is barred absent timely post-judgment motions or appeals under the applicable rules and statutes.

family lawpropertyprocedure