The case involved adult children suing the executor of their father's estate and other beneficiaries to enforce an alleged oral trust agreement between their deceased parents regarding the distribution of family farmland and property in Colorado. The plaintiffs claimed their parents had agreed that each would hold certain parcels for life with remainders to specific children, but the defendants denied the agreement and raised defenses including the statute of frauds. The trial court found that no such agreement had been made and dismissed the consolidated actions. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence presented, consisting largely of oral statements, was insufficient to meet the required standard of clear and convincing proof to establish the trust against the terms of the father's will and existing deeds.
The case involved Sam Waite and Enid Waite, who were convicted on three counts of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, keeping it for sale, and selling it. On appeal, the defendants challenged the trial court's rulings on juror qualifications, the denial of a motion to dismiss charges against Enid Waite, alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments, and claimed jury misconduct during deliberations. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the relevant statute disqualified only jurors who had actually sat in trials within the prior year, that conflicting evidence on the wife's involvement properly went to the jury, that no error was preserved regarding the prosecutor's statements, and that jurors could not impeach their own verdict through affidavits or testimony. The judgment was therefore upheld with no errors found in the record.
This case involved a dispute over whether an insurance policy on a barn and related structures remained in effect when a fire destroyed the property on October 21, 1926. The insured sued the Hartford Fire Insurance Company to recover under the policy, while the insurer argued that it had validly canceled the policy by mailing a registered letter with the unearned premium to the address listed in the policy. The court examined the policy language allowing cancellation by mail and the company's own letter stating that cancellation would be effective upon receipt of notice. It concluded that the notice was not received by the insured until after the fire, so the cancellation did not take effect in time, and the policy remained in force. The trial court's judgment in favor of the insured was affirmed.
The case involved a mandamus action by the widow and son of a Denver police patrolman who died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound, seeking to have them enrolled as beneficiaries of the city's police department relief fund. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the officer remained a member of the department at the time of his death even though he was off duty, that the ordinance authorizing benefits substantially complied with the city charter, and that the evidence plus the presumption against suicide supported the finding that the death was not the result of the officer's immoral conduct. The court declined to address the ordinance's constitutionality because it was not properly raised.
The case involved a contract dispute in which a contractor sued the City of Alamosa for the $2,000 contract price after drilling an artesian well, following the city's refusal to pay based on the engineer's rejection of the work as noncompliant with specifications for depth, casing, and sealing. The trial court, sitting without a jury, entered judgment for the contractor. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the general finding for the plaintiff was presumed to include all facts necessary to support the judgment, including that the contractor had complied with the contract or that the city's engineer had accepted the completed work at 816 feet as full performance, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain that finding.
The case concerned a dispute over a contract for the sale of real estate in Denver. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Nellie Barr breached a second written contract (Exhibit B) after they surrendered their interest in a prior contract (Exhibit A) and made various payments and improvements. The trial court ruled that Exhibit B was void under the statute of frauds because the agent lacked written authority but instructed the jury that plaintiffs could recover damages based on an alleged parol promise if they had relied on it by surrendering the first property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint was based solely on the written contract, that the jury instructions were erroneous because any recovery should have been based on the written contract with evidence of part performance and ratification by the defendant, and that a new trial was required to determine damages consistent with those principles.