Frank L. Hays

The case involved former partners in the Burlington Livestock Sales Company who entered into a contract for the sale of the defendant's interest in the business, which included a covenant not to compete in a livestock pavilion business within 50 miles of Burlington, Colorado, for 50 years. After the defendant allegedly breached the covenant by operating a similar business in nearby Stratton, Colorado, the plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction pending resolution of their claims for injunctive relief and damages. The trial court denied the temporary injunction due to the lack of proof of actual injury to the plaintiffs. On appeal, the court reversed, ruling that where a valid non-compete covenant accompanies the sale of an established business and its goodwill, a breach is presumed to cause irreparable damage making legal remedies inadequate, so injunctive relief is appropriate without requiring the plaintiffs to first prove specific pecuniary harm.

business & regulatory

This case involved a guest passenger suing the driver and owner of a car for injuries from an accident that occurred when the vehicle skidded off the road while traveling at high speed toward a dead-end turn on Christmas Eve 1946. The trial court dismissed the suit as a matter of law, finding the defendants had acted with willful and wanton negligence but that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for failing to protest the speed or warn of the upcoming turn. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, ruling that the state's guest statute limits liability to willful and wanton disregard of the passenger's rights and that contributory negligence is not available as a defense under that standard. The court held that whether the driver's conduct met the willful-and-wanton threshold was a factual question that must be submitted to a jury under proper instructions.

torts & liability

This case is a workers' compensation proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act in which claimant Mike Fontana sought benefits after falling from a building under construction on the property of Neely-Towner Motor Company in 1950. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation, which the trial court sustained, and the company sought review arguing that Fontana was an independent contractor rather than an employee or, alternatively, a casual employee exempt from coverage. The court examined evidence that the company hired Fontana on an hourly basis, supplied all materials, retained control over the work including deviations from plans, and paid a helper, and it concluded based on statutory language and prior precedents that he was an employee engaged in the usual course of the employer's business. The judgment affirming the award was therefore upheld.

labor & employment

The case concerned John J. Berger, Jr., who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death; after his conviction was affirmed, his attorney filed a motion in the trial court asserting that Berger had become insane while awaiting execution and seeking a judicial determination of his sanity, either by the court or a commission, along with a stay of execution under Colorado statutes. The trial court appointed two psychiatrists who examined Berger and reported him to be sane; after reviewing their reports and consulting the prison warden, the court found Berger sane and accountable to the law. Berger then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for original jurisdiction to require a jury trial on the sanity issue. The court held that the statutory procedure did not mandate a jury trial for post-conviction, post-sentence claims of insanity and that the trial court's determination based on the expert reports was adequate.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved original disbarment proceedings in the Colorado Supreme Court against attorney E. Clifford Heald, who had been convicted in federal court on charges of making false statements to a governmental lending agency and conspiracy related to a real estate transaction involving a veteran's GI loan. The matter was referred to a referee, who found after review that Heald had been fairly tried and convicted on sufficient evidence and that the offenses involved moral turpitude. The court examined the underlying facts, including the use of dual contracts showing different sale prices and misrepresentations to the loan association, and determined these established moral turpitude. The court adopted the referee's findings and suspended Heald from practicing law in Colorado for six months.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the collection of income tax deficiencies assessed by the Colorado director of revenue against the estate of Minnie K. Liebhardt for 1945 and 1946. After serving notices of deficiency and a final determination on the estate administrator, the director issued a distraint warrant that was filed as a court judgment when the administrator failed to request a hearing, post bond, or appeal within the statutory timelines. The administrator later moved to set aside the judgment on technical grounds, but the trial court denied the motion. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the taxpayer had not exhausted the plain statutory remedies, rendering the tax final and unreviewable, and that the collection method satisfied due process requirements.

taxesprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing the City and County of Denver for damages from a collision between their automobile and a city truck. The trial court dismissed the actions, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the notices served on the mayor were fatally defective under the Denver city charter. Section 158 of the charter requires written notice within sixty days stating fully when, where, and how the injuries occurred and their extent as a mandatory condition precedent to suit, with no authority for waiver. The provided notice omitted these required details, and the court ruled that substantial compliance cannot be found where there is a total failure to include any of the specified elements. A second action based on the same facts was also dismissed for similar deficiencies in the pleadings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Clark v. Clark, the plaintiff brought an action for divorce and other relief against the defendant, and the parties stipulated that the trial court would first decide whether a valid common-law marriage existed between them. The trial court ruled the marriage invalid on the ground that the relationship began while both parties had living spouses from whom they were not divorced. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that a valid common-law marriage existed because, after the impediments were removed by the parties' respective divorces in 1945 and 1947, they continued to cohabit, hold themselves out as husband and wife, and were reputed as such by others for two years. The court relied on its earlier decision in Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Reed to conclude that such conduct after removal of the initial legal barriers established the marriage's validity.

family law

The case involved a dispute over a 1940 contract in which the New Mexico Potash & Chemical Co. hired attorney Don B. Oliver to negotiate direct royalty payments and mutual releases from related companies in exchange for a 16 2/3 percent share of those royalties. Oliver performed the agreed services, securing the necessary promises and releases, after which the company initially paid his share but later stopped. The trial court entered judgment for Oliver, finding full performance, good faith, and no fraud, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the managing stockholders' committee had authority to bind the corporation, the contract was valid and performed, and the company ratified the agreement by accepting its benefits. The court applied principles that managing officers may employ counsel and that a corporation cannot retain benefits while repudiating an agent's unauthorized act.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a claim by the State of Colorado for unpaid income taxes from 1941 and 1942 against the insolvent estate of Guy C. Lyman, which was filed after the six-month creditor claim deadline under probate statutes had expired. The administratrix had submitted the returns late without payment, and the lower courts allowed the claim as preferred despite the timing. The court decided that state income tax claims against estates are not subject to the non-claim filing deadlines or classifications that apply to ordinary creditor claims. The core reasoning was that the income tax statutes establish separate procedures for determining liability and collecting taxes from estates, reflecting legislative intent that such claims are not barred by probate non-claim provisions, as supported by case law from other jurisdictions; the court also addressed procedural posture to affirm the judgment.

taxesprocedure

The case involved an applicant who sought a retail liquor store license from Denver's manager of safety and excise under Colorado's liquor code; after a hearing that included petitions, remonstrances, and testimony from witnesses on both sides, the manager denied the application. The applicant then brought a Rule 106 proceeding in district court, which reviewed the record, found the denial arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the license issued. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute gives local licensing authorities broad discretion to determine neighborhood requirements and resident desires based on all competent evidence, that remonstrances need not be verified, and that courts must uphold the authority's decision if supported by evidence rather than substitute their own judgment. The Court relied on prior precedent emphasizing deference to the licensing body over the trial court's assessment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Plaintiffs sued to enjoin defendants from building two single-family homes on a lot 96 feet wide, alleging violation of a zoning resolution requiring 100 feet minimum width for such development and claiming the Board of Adjustment's variance was invalid. The trial court granted the injunction, but the supreme court reversed, holding that the proper remedy was review under Rule 106 for whether the board exceeded its jurisdiction or abused discretion rather than an independent injunction action. The board had authority under the enabling statute and zoning resolution to grant variances for exceptional lot conditions causing undue hardship, and after hearings it found the lot's shape and area justified relief without substantial detriment to others or the zoning plan. Because plaintiffs had already pursued and lost before the board, the court remanded with directions to dismiss the suit.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved interpreting a clause in Harriet F. Dunklee's will that directed a trustee to pay the income of the estate to Dr. George K. Dunklee for life and authorized use of principal "as may be necessary" to provide for his necessities of life. The trustee sought to make monthly payments from principal regardless of the beneficiary's actual need, a position upheld by the trial court after excluding evidence of the beneficiary's other substantial income and assets. The court reversed, holding that invasion of principal was permitted only upon a showing of necessity after considering the beneficiary's other income and assets, which the offered evidence indicated were substantial, and that the will language granted the trustee discretion rather than imposing a mandatory duty.

propertyfamily law

The case involved Royal Stender's petition to probate an alleged lost will of his deceased sister, opposed by the estate administrator on grounds including lack of testamentary capacity and revocation of the will. After a jury found the testator lacked sound mind and had revoked the will, the district court denied probate. On appeal, the sole issue was whether the administrator's cross-examination of Stender regarding pre-death conversations and transactions waived the statutory bar on interested parties testifying about dealings with a decedent when an administrator is a party. The court held that such cross-examination removed the statutory inhibition, rendering the proponent competent to testify for all purposes under established precedent, and therefore reversed the judgment denying probate with directions for further proceedings.

propertyprocedure

This case involves an original proceeding in prohibition seeking to halt a condemnation action brought by the Housing Authority of Denver against the Old Timers Baseball Association and others to acquire unplatted land for a housing project. The petitioners argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the Housing Authority had failed to make a good-faith effort to negotiate and agree on compensation prior to filing the condemnation suit, as required by statute. The court reviewed the record, including evidence of discussions, an offer of $15,100, and the petitioners' admission that they could not agree on compensation and considered the property not for sale at that price. It concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction and had not abused its discretion, as the statutory negotiation requirement had been satisfied. The order to show cause was vacated and the writ discharged.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with taking immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties with a 12-year-old girl by photographing her in lewd poses after providing alcohol, without any physical contact or sexual advances. The trial court convicted him under a Colorado statute making it a felony for a person over 14 to take such liberties with a child under 16, and he appealed arguing that an assault was required for conviction. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute defines multiple offenses and that the third one—taking immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties with the child—does not require proof of assault, as consent is irrelevant and the law aims to protect minors from moral corruption. Prior cases interpreting the statute supported that the element of assault applies only to the first enumerated offense.

criminal law

The case involved Sherberg suing the bank for damages after it used funds from a loan he obtained (intended to complete construction of his home via a deposit into the contractor's account) to offset a personal debt owed by the contractor individually. The trial court dismissed the action, but the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, holding that a bank which knowingly accepts a deposit for a specific purpose cannot divert it to its own benefit. The core reasoning relied on precedents establishing that such knowledge creates an obligation not to apply the funds contrary to the known purpose, even absent direct privity of contract between the depositor and the bank.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a challenge to an initiated constitutional amendment petition in Colorado, raising two issues: whether a 1945 statute requiring signatures from at least 15% of legal voters was constitutional given the state constitution's 8% threshold, and whether the petition had been circulated within the legally required timeframe after titles and submission clauses were set. The court reviewed the constitutional provisions reserving initiative power to the people, emphasizing that such provisions are self-executing and should be liberally construed to facilitate rather than restrict the right. It determined that the statutory 15% requirement and related procedural rules did not impermissibly limit the reserved rights, and that the titles were fixed on January 31, 1950, making the circulation timely under the statute. The judgment upholding the petition was affirmed.

electionsprocedure

This case concerned the assessment of ad valorem taxes on a wholesaler's inventory of distilled spirits, specifically whether amounts paid for federal and state excise taxes must be included in the valuation of the stock under Colorado statutes requiring assessment based on the average money invested in merchandise. The trial court ruled that the excise taxes should be excluded from the valuation, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed that judgment. The court held that the taxes form part of the cost of the merchandise because the spirits cannot legally be possessed or sold without payment and attachment of stamps evidencing the taxes, which enhances the value of the inventory. It concluded that such payments therefore qualify as money invested in merchandise within the meaning of the taxing formula, drawing on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that taxes paid and passed on are part of the price received for the goods.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In this replevin action, plaintiff Jorgensen sought to recover possession of his 1946 automobile that had been seized by the sheriff of Arapahoe County under an execution to satisfy a judgment against Fleenor’s, Inc., an auto dealer where the car had been left for minor repairs and potential sale. The trial court ruled against Jorgensen, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, directing judgment in his favor. The court reasoned that Jorgensen at all times retained the certificate of title, never transferred ownership or authority to sell to the dealer, and the sheriff had actual notice from the dealer that the vehicle belonged to Jorgensen rather than relying solely on circumstantial evidence of possession. The decision emphasized that state motor vehicle title statutes protect owners by making title evidence controlling and preclude estoppel claims when positive title information is available and disregarded.

propertyprocedure