George E. Lohr

This case involves tort claims brought by a mother and her son against a church and its former pastor, alleging inappropriate touching by the pastor during counseling sessions with the child. The trial court allowed the claims to go to the jury, which returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, but the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the trial court's judgment, reasoning that the First Amendment did not bar the claims because the pastor's methods were not based on religious beliefs, and the church had notice of prior complaints about the pastor's conduct.

religious libertytorts & liability

The case involved Bryan Sidney Thornton, who was charged with felony escape after fleeing from police officers attempting to arrest him on an outstanding felony warrant. The trial court dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause that Thornton was "in custody or confinement" as required by the escape statute, section 18-8-208(3), and the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that custody under the statute is established when a suspect submits to an officer's authority and direction to submit to arrest, without requiring actual physical restraint or force. The court reasoned that the officers had directed Thornton to a car for a pat-down, which he initially followed, before he broke and ran. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the escape charge.

criminal law

The case concerned whether Larimer County could adopt subdivision regulations requiring compliance with its master land use plan and deny an application for the Windemere Acres Subdivision based on inconsistencies with plan provisions on rural character, service consolidation, and intensity of development. The Board of County Commissioners denied the revised application after hearings, the district court upheld the denial, but the court of appeals reversed it as arbitrary. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded, ruling that counties may condition subdivision approval on master plan compliance when the plan provisions are incorporated into regulations, though remand was needed for adequate findings or to refine standards if they prove insufficiently specific.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Christopher Dale Dill's conviction for sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust based on an alleged 1988 incident. The defendant sought pretrial discovery of notes and reports from meetings between the child victim and a psychologist, including both an initial investigative session and later therapeutic sessions, to look for potentially exculpatory or inconsistent statements. The trial court permitted disclosure of materials from the investigative interview but denied access to the therapeutic materials on privilege grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the psychologist-client privilege protected the therapeutic notes, no waiver had occurred through use of unprivileged materials, and the defendant had not made a sufficient particularized showing to require in camera review or disclosure under due process standards.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the Colorado Department of Transportation sued a truck driver and owner to recover for damage to a highway tunnel wall caused by an oversized load, after the two-year statute of limitations for tort actions had expired following failed settlement negotiations. The trial court granted summary judgment for the state, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the state was exempt from statutes of limitation under the common-law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the doctrine is an aspect of sovereign immunity, which Colorado has abrogated, and that no adequate policy basis exists to retain nullum tempus for the state while rejecting sovereign immunity. The court remanded for further proceedings on whether the statute of limitations bars the claims.

proceduretorts & liability

In Gordon v. Benson, the plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence after their vehicles collided at a parking lot exit, presenting conflicting accounts of whether the defendant rear-ended the plaintiff's stopped car or the plaintiff backed into the defendant's stopped vehicle. The trial court declined to instruct the jury on comparative negligence, concluding the evidence showed fault on only one side, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $352,000 in damages. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to find both parties negligent and that a defendant need not admit negligence to receive a comparative negligence instruction.

torts & liability

This case concerned whether Woodmen of the World, a fraternal benefit society providing insurance benefits to members, qualifies for an exemption from Colorado sales taxes on retail purchases of tangible personal property. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' rulings that had upheld the exemption, directing entry of judgment for the Department of Revenue. The court reasoned that the sales tax act does not exempt fraternal benefit societies and that Woodmen does not meet the definition of a charitable organization under the act's exemption provisions. The court further held that the separate exemption in the fraternal benefit society statutes applies only to taxes assessed directly on a society's property or funds, not to sales taxes on its purchases.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

In Dorman v. Petrol Aspen, Inc., the plaintiff employee sued his former employer for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of good faith after being terminated following about four months on the job. The district court dismissed the complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) on the ground that the employment was at will and thus terminable at any time, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the employment offer letter was ambiguous regarding the duration of employment because it contained provisions referencing salary negotiation beyond 1991, long-range planning input, and other indicators of an expected longer-term relationship. The court reasoned that under Colorado law the ambiguity required the plaintiff to be allowed to present extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent rather than permitting dismissal at the pleading stage without such opportunity.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned a paternity and child support action brought by the Colorado Department of Social Services on behalf of minor child M.C. against S.O.V. A jury returned a verdict finding S.O.V. was not the father, but M.C. had not been joined as a party or represented by a guardian ad litem. After the verdict, a guardian was appointed and M.C. sought to intervene to challenge the result. The trial court dismissed the action on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds, but the court of appeals reversed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrines did not bar M.C.'s intervention because no final judgment had been entered when she sought to intervene in the same case and because M.C. was neither a party nor in privity with the State under the Uniform Parentage Act.

family lawprocedure

The case is a negligence lawsuit brought by skier David Graven against Vail Associates for injuries sustained when he fell down an unmarked 40-50 foot ravine or precipice while stopping on the side of a ski run. The district court and court of appeals granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the accident resulted from inherent dangers and risks of skiing under the Ski Safety Act of 1979, such as variations in terrain, slushy snow, and trees, which imposed no duty to warn and barred recovery. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded, determining that the lower courts had misinterpreted the statutory definition of inherent risks, which is limited to specifically enumerated items and does not automatically encompass the described precipice as a mere terrain variation.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a defendant who pleaded guilty to first-degree assault and sought at his sentencing hearing to suppress consideration of three prior felony convictions on grounds that they were unconstitutionally obtained. The sentencing court denied the motion under the statute of limitations in section 16-5-402 without allowing evidence of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. The court of appeals remanded to permit such evidence and, if successful, a hearing on the convictions' validity. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that a discretionary sentencing proceeding is not the proper forum for challenging prior convictions and that the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their validity during sentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the water court had subject matter jurisdiction over five claims brought by the Crystal Lakes Water and Sewer Association against lot owners in a Colorado subdivision. The Association sought declaratory judgments that the lot owners were bound by a 1978 water court decree approving augmentation plans for wells, along with enforcement of related assessments for dues, damages, and liens. The water court dismissed all claims, concluding they did not qualify as water matters under section 37-92-203(1). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first two declaratory judgment claims directly involved the scope and application of the augmentation decree and thus constituted water matters within the water court's exclusive jurisdiction, while the remaining claims were ancillary and could also be resolved there. The court remanded for further proceedings based on the decree's language binding subsequent purchasers and authorizing the Association to enforce its terms.

propertyprocedureenvironment

This case involved contingent beneficiaries suing life insurance companies for negligence after the insurers paid policy proceeds to the primary beneficiary, who was later convicted of murdering the insured, without receiving written notice of competing claims under Colorado's slayer statute, § 15-11-803. The trial court denied the insurers' motion for summary judgment, allowing a negligence claim to proceed based on suspicious circumstances surrounding the death, while the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute's notice provision in subsection (6) shielded the insurers from liability. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded, ruling that the absence of written notice does not automatically protect insurers who may have acted negligently by disbursing funds despite indications of foul play. The core reasoning centered on interpreting the slayer statute's protections as not eliminating common-law duties of reasonable care in investigating claims before payment.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Phillip McMichael's claim for underinsured motorist benefits under his employer's Aetna business auto insurance policy after being injured by an underinsured driver while working on a highway near the parked company truck. The trial court granted summary judgment to Aetna, but the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal, holding that McMichael was entitled to coverage. The court interpreted section 10-4-609 to require UM/UIM coverage for a class of individuals as broad as those covered under the policy's liability provisions. It further determined that McMichael qualified because he was using a covered vehicle as a barricade and warning device at the time of the accident.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a dispute between the City of Grand Junction and the Ute Water Conservancy District over which entity could supply domestic water to users in geographic areas where their boundaries overlapped. The District had issued a 1981 revenue bond to the federal Farmers Home Administration to finance system improvements; after an advance refunding in 1983 and the District's reacquisition of the bond in 1988, the City argued the obligation was no longer outstanding. The Mesa County District Court ruled the bond remained outstanding, granting the District protection from competition under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), and the Court of Appeals affirmed on that federal ground while vacating a ruling on a parallel state statute. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bond had not been discharged and continued to satisfy the federal statute's outstanding-debt requirement until maturity in 2021, thereby shielding the District from the City's competition in the overlap areas.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant Ronald Frye, who was charged with first-degree burglary, second-degree burglary, first-degree sexual assault, and menacing with a deadly weapon after an alleged assault on a woman in her apartment. The jury acquitted him of first-degree sexual assault but convicted him of second-degree sexual assault and menacing with a deadly weapon. The Colorado Court of Appeals had upheld the convictions, finding the verdicts consistent under prior precedent. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that consistency of verdicts is not required for convictions to be upheld on appeal. The court reasoned that only legally or logically incompatible verdicts—where the elements of one offense negate an element of another—cannot stand, whereas factual inconsistencies between verdicts are permissible if each verdict is supported by sufficient evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a promissory note executed by the Tafoyas in favor of Thurman remained enforceable after the six-year Colorado statute of limitations had expired. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment that the note was time-barred and unenforceable. The court held that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) did not toll or extend the state limitations period during the Tafoyas' separate bankruptcy proceedings, as the provision does not automatically suspend the running of the statute absent an applicable stay or state-law suspension. The court further concluded that the Tafoyas' request for lien subordination did not constitute representations sufficient to equitably estop them from raising the limitations defense.

procedureproperty

This case concerned a dispute over whether an implied easement of necessity arose in 1938 when a 194-acre parcel was conveyed, leaving a 10-acre portion north of Elk Creek without direct access except potentially over adjoining lands now owned by the Thompsons. The trial court and court of appeals found that such an easement existed across the Thompsons' property to allow access to the 10 acres. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that no implied easement of necessity was created because the 10-acre parcel had adequate access across the remainder of the 194-acre tract for the limited purposes (such as grazing and recreation) for which it was used and conveyed at the time of severance. The court emphasized that easements by necessity require strict necessity at the time of the original conveyance and that public policy against landlocking property did not apply here given the available access route.

property

This case arose from a criminal prosecution against Charles A. Crouch for alleged violations of the Colorado Securities Act and Commodity Code, following a related civil enforcement action by the state Securities Commissioner. In the civil case, Crouch was subpoenaed, deposed, and produced documents without asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, leading to a default judgment against him. When the state later filed criminal charges, the trial court suppressed the civil discovery materials under section 11-51-601(4), reasoning that they were compelled and thus immunized from use in the criminal proceeding. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the suppression order via an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 and reversed it, holding that the statute grants immunity only when a witness claims the privilege against self-incrimination and is then compelled by court order to testify or produce evidence. Because Crouch did not invoke the privilege, the prior discovery was not immunized and could be used in the criminal case.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Lyman Carroll seeking benefits under his wife's accidental death insurance policy after she died from a brain hemorrhage caused by the rupture of a preexisting aneurysm during sexual intercourse. The trial court ruled against coverage, finding the death was not caused by an accident, and the court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that the death did not result directly and independently of all other causes due to the preexisting condition. The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the policy language to require that the accident be the predominant cause but agreed that coverage was not available because the preexisting aneurysm contributed to the death. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment denying benefits.

business & regulatory