William D. Neighbors

In Bales v. People, the defendant was convicted of felony menacing and sought to prevent the prosecution from using a prior conviction for first-degree sexual assault to impeach him if he testified, arguing that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court and court of appeals denied the motion in limine and held that the prior conviction was final and could not be collaterally attacked in this proceeding. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prior conviction satisfied constitutional standards before allowing its use for impeachment. The court reasoned that refusing such a hearing impermissibly burdened the defendant's constitutional right to testify in his own defense, relying on its recent decision in Apodaca v. People. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including the hearing and a potential new trial if the prior conviction is found invalid.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from an incident in which plaintiff Mahinder Uberoi, seeking university records under the Colorado Open Records Act, had a confrontation with a university employee that led to his arrest by campus police; he then sued the University of Colorado and several employees for slander, assault, battery, false arrest, negligence, conspiracy, and violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court dismissed all claims, citing the plaintiff's failure to provide the notice required by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act for tort claims, the inapplicability of § 1983 to states or the university, and the eleventh amendment. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the common-law tort claims on immunity grounds but reversed the dismissal of certain § 1983 claims. It held that the eleventh amendment did not apply, that the university qualifies as a "person" under § 1983, and that the complaint adequately alleged deprivations of constitutional rights. The court therefore remanded those claims for further proceedings.

civil rightstorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved charges against three defendants for possessing and manufacturing methamphetamine after police entered their home without a warrant during a landlord-tenant dispute, observed drug-related items, and later obtained a search warrant based on those observations. The district court suppressed the physical evidence seized under the warrant, and the People appealed under C.A.R. 4.1, arguing that the defendants' suppression motions were facially insufficient and that the court had improperly shifted the burden of proof. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the suppression order, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the legality of the officers' initial warrantless entry into the home and that the motions adequately raised the issue of an unlawful search and seizure under state and federal constitutions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether Colorado courts retained jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to modify visitation rights after a 1974 divorce decree, where the mother and child had relocated to Michigan in 1975 and the father later sought enlarged visitation in Colorado. The trial court and court of appeals held that Colorado had subject matter jurisdiction because it was the child's home state at the time the original dissolution proceeding began. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, ruling that jurisdiction for a modification proceeding must be assessed based on the circumstances at the time the modification motion was filed, not the original action, and that Colorado lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJA's home state or significant connection provisions given the child's long-term residence in Michigan.

family law

In Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., a car rental customer paid an extra daily fee to select the physical damage waiver option in a standard rental agreement but later crashed the vehicle while intoxicated; the rental company sued to recover the car's value and related damages, arguing that the waiver was voided by the contract's prohibition on driving under the influence. The trial court ruled for the customer, the court of appeals held the waiver was not insurance and was properly voided, and the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the waiver's scope was limited in an unconscionable manner. The core reasoning rested on contract principles: the agreement was a standardized form with small print on the reverse side that the customer had no meaningful opportunity to review before signing, the company charged an additional fee for the waiver while burying key exclusions, and enforcing the limitation would frustrate the customer's reasonable expectations in the transaction.

business & regulatory

The case involved the prosecution's appeal from a district court's dismissal of criminal charges against defendant Joseph J. Beyette for violating Colorado's statutory speedy trial requirements under section 18-1-405. After a mistrial, the People pursued an original proceeding that led to reinstatement of two counts, with the trial reset for March 1983; the defendant moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, and the court granted the motion. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the six-month speedy trial period was tolled during the interlocutory appeal but did not begin anew upon remand. The court reasoned that the statute excludes only the delay caused by such appeals and does not provide for resetting the clock, so the remaining time had expired by the new trial date. As a result, all charges were properly dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the murder conviction of Paul Briggs, which was reversed by the court of appeals on grounds that certain witness testimony and physical evidence must be suppressed as fruits of the defendant's involuntary statements to police. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed whether a witness's immunized testimony automatically dissipates the taint of illegality under the attenuation doctrine and whether the inevitable discovery exception applied. The court rejected a per se rule that immunized testimony is insufficient to purge the taint and instead directed the trial court to apply standards evaluating significant intervening events. It agreed that the inevitable discovery issue had not been preserved for appeal and remanded the case for further findings on attenuation while affirming the reversal in part.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Roy E. Secrest, arrested in Colorado, challenging his extradition to Louisiana where he had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana but failed to appear for sentencing. Secrest filed a habeas corpus petition arguing lack of jurisdiction, insufficient proof of identity, and defective extradition documents missing the state seal. The district court discharged the writ and ordered extradition, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, finding the appeal timely under appellate rules for mailed notices, that witnesses, photographs, and fingerprints established a prima facie case of identity which went unrebutted, and that the governor's warrant was properly sealed even if supporting documents were not.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved David Quintana's conviction under Colorado's felon-in-possession statute (section 18-12-108) for carrying firearms, which was predicated on his 1971 guilty plea to second-degree burglary. Quintana moved to dismiss, arguing that the prior conviction was invalid because the plea violated Crim.P. 11 and his constitutional rights by failing to inform him of the elements of the offense. The district court found the plea invalid but ruled it could still serve as the predicate felony, relying on federal precedent, and a jury convicted him. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that an unconstitutional prior conviction obtained through an invalid plea cannot form the basis for a conviction under the state statute, distinguishing it from federal law and allowing collateral attack on the predicate offense.

criminal lawguns

In Estep v. Hardeman, the petitioner, convicted in 1975 of first-degree murder and other crimes, sought post-conviction relief under Crim.P. 35 based on a third party's confession to the murder, supported by another witness's expected testimony. After the trial judge commented on the credibility of the petitioner's witnesses and denied a motion for a special prosecutor, the petitioner moved to disqualify the judge for bias under Crim.P. 21(b) and related statutes; the judge ruled the motion untimely and legally insufficient. The Colorado Supreme Court made absolute a rule to show cause, holding that the judge must be disqualified because the statement created an appearance of prejudice regarding witness credibility before any testimony was heard, which the court must accept as true for purposes of the motion, and the filing was timely given the circumstances. The decision rests on principles requiring judges to avoid even the appearance of partiality to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Robert Zaragoza's appeal of a district court order upholding the revocation of his driver's license by the Colorado Department of Revenue under a 1981 statute that required revocation for a driver with two alcohol-related driving convictions within five years. The court affirmed the revocation, holding that the statute applied because only the second or triggering conviction needed to occur after the law's effective date. It rejected arguments based on the statute's plain language and the Colorado Constitution's ban on retrospective legislation, reasoning that the revocation was triggered solely by the post-enactment conviction and served the non-punitive purpose of protecting public safety on highways rather than impairing vested rights or imposing new disabilities for past conduct.

criminal law

In Blades v. DaFoe, the plaintiffs sued multiple physicians for medical malpractice, alleging negligence, assault and battery, and lack of informed consent related to surgery performed on one plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendants six peremptory challenges in violation of C.R.C.P. 47(h), denied the plaintiffs' challenge for cause to a juror who stated the plaintiffs faced an "uphill battle," and instructed the jury on informed consent, resulting in a defense verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the jury selection errors were reversible and required a new trial, reasoning that peremptory challenges are a valuable right essential to securing an impartial jury and that granting excess challenges combined with denying a for-cause challenge abridged the plaintiffs' rights under the civil rules. The court declined to review the jury instruction issue because the abbreviated record on appeal provided an insufficient factual basis.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned two court-appointed attorneys who sought payment of fees exceeding the maximum guidelines for representing an indigent defendant charged with first-degree murder in Larimer County District Court; the trial judge awarded substantially less than requested after the charges were dismissed, and the attorneys appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal while discharging its rule to show cause but remanding for further proceedings. The court held that an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, rather than a direct appeal, is the appropriate vehicle to review such fee orders because they do not constitute a final judgment in the underlying criminal case. It further reasoned that appointed counsel are aggrieved parties with standing to challenge fee awards and that trial courts must exercise discretion in authorizing payments above the maximum based on specific unusual circumstances rather than automatically approving time records.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an attorney discipline proceeding against Denis John Blanck for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility in handling a debt collection matter for Commercial Credit Corporation. The respondent failed to communicate with his client for nearly a year, did not return the promissory note as requested, and did not cooperate promptly with the Grievance Committee's investigation, including providing false information about collections. The Supreme Court Grievance Committee found these actions violated DR6-101(A)(3), DR9-102(B)(4), and C.R.C.P. 241.6(7), and recommended a 30-day suspension along with costs, which the court approved based on substantial evidence supporting the findings and the respondent's prior admonitions for similar conduct.

procedure

The case involved criminal charges against the defendant for second-degree forgery and offering a false instrument for recording, based on allegations that she forged signatures and a "paid in full" notation on a promissory note from her parents and then recorded the altered document. The prosecution appealed the trial court's suppression of certain statements the defendant made to police on November 19, 1982, and May 5, 1983. The court reversed suppression of the November 19 telephone statements, reasoning that they occurred during a non-custodial conversation so Miranda warnings were not required. The court affirmed suppression of the May 5 statement that the defendant could only print, as it was involuntary under the totality of circumstances including custody pursuant to a nontestimonial identification order, lack of Miranda warnings, ignored requests for counsel, and a threat of immediate jailing.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 in which petitioners sought to disqualify Judge Dressel from presiding over consolidated lawsuits arising from the 1982 Lawn Lake Dam collapse and resulting flood damage to properties in Estes Park. Multiple suits were filed against the dam owners, the town, and the State of Colorado; the cases were consolidated and assigned to Judge Dressel by the chief justice. After the judge communicated ex parte with some counsel about reassigning issues involving the State due to an appearance of impropriety and then ruled on other claims, petitioners moved to disqualify him entirely. The Colorado Supreme Court made the rule absolute, holding that the judge lacked authority under C.R.C.P. 42.1 to reassign part of the case and that his actions required disqualification from all matters under C.R.C.P. 97 to avoid any appearance of impropriety.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney Harry L. Simon for professional misconduct while handling a client's application for a liquor license. Simon neglected the matter for months, obtained a fictitious license through a state employee, misrepresented the status to clients and partners, and was later convicted of cocaine possession and possession of a forged instrument, though he completed probation, treatment, and rehabilitation. The court accepted a stipulation for discipline but imposed a public censure rather than suspension, citing the elapsed time and successful rehabilitation, while noting the violations of multiple rules including criminal conduct, misrepresentation, neglect of legal matters, and conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law. The censure remains on file for potential future consideration.

criminal lawprocedure

The consolidated cases involved challenges to Colorado's obscenity statutes by adult businesses and individuals facing civil injunctions or criminal charges for promoting obscene materials and devices. The Colorado Supreme Court held that several provisions were unconstitutional: the undefined term "accredited" was vague, the definition of "patently offensive" was overbroad under community decency standards, a statutory presumption of knowledge violated due process, and the ban on "obscene devices" burdened privacy rights. It rejected other constitutional attacks, found the invalid parts severable, and upheld the remainder of the Act under the First Amendment, Colorado Constitution, and due process clauses.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rights

This case concerned the constitutionality of Colorado's 'Sexually Explicit Materials Harmful to Children' Act, which restricted the public display of certain materials and provided exemptions for accredited institutions. Bookstores and publishers challenged the display and exemption provisions as violating free speech, due process, and equal protection rights, while the state defended the law as a means to protect minors. The trial court ruled the display provision overbroad because it chilled adults' access to protected materials and the exemption unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory, but found the invalid parts severable. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of both provisions due to their infringement on First Amendment rights and equal protection guarantees but reversed on severability, holding the entire Act unconstitutional because the flawed sections could not be excised without undermining the law's core structure.

free speechcriminal lawcivil rights

This case is a lawyer disciplinary proceeding against Douglas Nutt for conduct while representing the Schawo family in estate planning and financing matters tied to potential oil and gas mineral rights. The court found that Nutt violated Disciplinary Rule 5-104(A) by failing to disclose his and his mother-in-law's role as lenders in a $70,000 loan to the clients along with a related $5,000 fee, and violated Disciplinary Rule 2-106 by charging a clearly excessive fee through overbilling and a contingent fee agreement tied solely to future royalties rather than services performed. The Hearing Committee recommended public censure while the Hearing Panel recommended a three-month suspension, but the court imposed a six-month suspension, citing Nutt's prior discipline for a similar excessive-fee violation and determining that the pattern of conduct required that sanction.

procedure