Hilbert Schauer

The case involved a dispute over the appointment of a receiver and distribution of net profits from operating a 13-unit motel in Colorado Springs after Phillips defaulted on a deed of trust securing a promissory note held by the Websters. The trial court appointed Florence Webster as receiver under the deed of trust terms and state statute due to defaults in payments and maintenance, approved her final report after the foreclosure sale, and ordered distribution of remaining funds including payments for receiver fees, taxes, and the balance to Phillips. The appellate court affirmed, holding that statutory and contractual grounds supported the receivership given the property's condition and defaults, but once the Websters bid the full debt amount at the public trustee sale and received the deed, their rights to the profits ended and the net balance belonged to Phillips as record owner. The court directed specific distributions from the registry funds totaling $6,976.99, with $2,290.57 to Phillips after approved deductions.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by a head waitress injured when she slipped on ice outside her apartment while traveling there for a private work-related conference with her manager after her usual quitting time. The Industrial Commission denied the claim under the general rule that injuries sustained going to or from work are not compensable, but the district court reversed and reinstated an award recommended by the referee. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the injury was compensable because the claimant was acting under the employer's express or implied direction as part of her supervisory duties, creating an exception to the going-and-coming rule where the employment created the necessity for the travel. The court rejected arguments about jurisdiction and fact-finding deference, noting the facts were undisputed and the conference was within the course of employment. The judgment directed the Commission to enter a consistent award.

labor & employment

The case involved claims by the parents of a newborn child born with permanent brain damage allegedly due to lack of oxygen immediately after birth at a county hospital in Colorado. The plaintiffs asserted multiple claims sounding in both tort (negligence) and contract against the attending physician, the county, the hospital, its board of trustees, and the administrator. The trial court dismissed all claims against the county, hospital, trustees, and related defendants on grounds including sovereign immunity, while allowing the case to proceed only against the doctor and administrator. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed those dismissals, holding that the amended complaint stated viable causes of action if supported by proof, that the trial court had prematurely addressed sovereign immunity and governmental capacity issues without evidence, and that contract-based claims might not be subject to immunity defenses.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case is a quiet title action concerning ownership of a placer mining claim in Gilpin County, Colorado, including surface rights, mineral rights, water rights, and road access. Plaintiff Gilpin Investment Co. claimed a six-acre tract based on a chain of title starting with a 1921 deed that reserved mineral rights to the grantor, followed by tax deeds conveying only 'surface ground.' Defendant Sleeping Giant Co. claimed the full claim, including minerals, through a 1961 deed tracing back to the original owner. The court held that the plaintiff owns only the surface of its six-acre tract (subject to road reservations and non-conflicting mining access), while the defendant owns the minerals and the remainder of the claim. The reasoning was that tax deeds convey only the interest assessed and held by the delinquent taxpayer, which excluded the previously reserved minerals, and the plaintiff had no color of title to the minerals under the statute of limitations.

propertytaxes

The case involved a public utility seeking to construct a transmission line across property in El Paso County after the county commissioners denied a building permit; the utility attempted to override the denial under a state statute, prompting the county to obtain a temporary restraining order from the district court halting construction. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court's temporary restraining order was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 65 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, as established in prior precedent. The Court further ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, which instead fell exclusively under the authority of the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to the state constitution and statutes governing utility services, extensions, and facilities. As a result, the Court directed the district court to vacate the restraining order and dismiss the underlying action without prejudice.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved a lawsuit by a father, both as guardian for his four-and-a-half-year-old son injured in a pedestrian-vehicle accident and in his personal capacity for medical expenses. The plaintiff alleged negligence by the defendant driver, who struck the child while driving at moderate speed on a highway at night; the defendant raised defenses including contributory negligence and unavoidable accident. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of evidence, finding no prima facie case of negligence. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the undisputed evidence showed the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances and that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving actionable negligence.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved former Denver police officers who had made mandatory contributions to the city's Police Pension and Relief Fund but left service before qualifying for any pension benefits under the city charter. They sued to recover their contributions plus interest, arguing the payments were contractual consideration for future pensions that never materialized and that the lack of a refund provision created an improper forfeiture. The trial court ruled against them, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the charter provisions requiring contributions were silent on refunds, the fund was a public trust that could not be disbursed absent explicit authorization, and the officers had no contractual or other right to repayment. The court rejected claims based on rescission or salary protections under Article XX of the Colorado Constitution, noting the contributions were a condition of employment for which no repayment was provided.

labor & employment

This case involves a dispute over whether a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to quash service of process could be reviewed by writ of error. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the writ, contending that such an order was not a final judgment under Rule 111(a) and that the proper remedy was instead a writ of prohibition under Rule 116. The court reviewed precedents including Kellner v. District Court and Treadwell v. District Court, which treated jurisdictional challenges as matters of great public importance suitable for prohibition, and concluded that writ of error was not available. It dismissed the writ of error and held that prior language in Wells Aircraft Parts Company v. Allan J. Kayser Company allowing appeal of such orders was no longer applicable.

procedure

The case concerned a professional engineer who sought a declaratory judgment invalidating a Denver ordinance requiring that drawings and specifications for certain buildings bear the seals of both a licensed architect and a registered engineer. The plaintiff argued that the requirement improperly limited engineers' rights under state law and violated state and federal constitutions. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding no justiciable controversy, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that declaratory relief is unavailable for hypothetical or academic questions, as the plaintiff had neither applied for a permit nor had any submission rejected, leaving only the possibility of future injury. The judgment was therefore affirmed because no actual legal controversy existed for adjudication.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Leslie Dennison, who was charged with first-degree murder, pleaded not guilty, and was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, resulting in a sentence of 20 to 40 years in prison. On appeal, Dennison argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the trial court erred by not directing an acquittal or withdrawing the murder charges from the jury. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the record contained abundant evidence supporting a guilty verdict on either first- or second-degree murder and that the jury instructions properly covered the defense theories and applicable law. The opinion noted that the trial was fair and that no prejudicial error occurred.

criminal law

This case arose from an automobile collision on the Boulder-Denver turnpike in which the defendant, after experiencing a flat tire, backed her vehicle approximately 100 yards in the westbound lane and was struck from behind by the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff sued for damages alleging negligence by the defendant, while the defendant counterclaimed asserting negligence by the plaintiff, with both sides also raising contributory negligence defenses. A jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff on his complaint and against the defendant on her counterclaim, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the evidence did not establish the defendant's negligence as a matter of law due to the disabled-vehicle exception in the stopping statute, that questions of negligence and contributory negligence were properly submitted to the jury, and that the challenged jury instructions were supported by the record.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a divorced couple's ongoing disputes over alimony and child support payments for their two minor children, stemming from a 1951 divorce decree. The ex-wife petitioned the trial court in 1959 and again later for increased payments, while the ex-husband sought to end alimony obligations; the trial court eliminated further alimony, adjusted child support amounts, and addressed education costs, dispensing with new trial motions. On appeal via writ of error, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the decree, holding that the ex-wife's remarriage (even if later annulled) extinguished her alimony rights under applicable law, that the trial court had properly evaluated the parties' financial circumstances and the children's best interests without abuse of discretion, and that prior stipulations and orders governed property and support matters. The court noted the father's willingness to fund higher education in-state as consistent with the decree's protections for all involved.

family law

The case involved petitioner Espinoza's challenge to the revocation of his parole and subsequent return to custody in the Colorado State Penitentiary following a burglary conviction and concurrent federal sentence. After the governor commuted his minimum sentence, the parole board granted him parole to a federal detainer; upon release from federal custody he was returned to Colorado under parole conditions, which he violated by purchasing a firearm, leaving the state without permission, and failing to report, leading to revocation. Espinoza filed multiple habeas corpus petitions arguing that the commutation and related actions released him from state jurisdiction, but the district court denied relief after a hearing on the merits. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commutation only reduced the minimum term without discharging the prisoner, parole constituted a change in custody rather than release, and Espinoza remained subject to the parole board's authority until expiration of his maximum sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing a truck driver and his employer for damages from injuries sustained when the truck allegedly became entangled in and pulled down scaffolding on which the plaintiff was working as a stone mason. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged several procedural and evidentiary rulings, including the allowance of leading questions during cross-examination of an adverse witness by his own counsel, the scope of that cross-examination, and the admission of rebuttal testimony about the positioning of ropes the day before the accident. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the rules of civil procedure expressly permitted the cross-examination at issue, the trial court had discretion over the scope, and the rebuttal evidence was properly admitted to contradict the plaintiff's own testimony about safety practices and rope handling.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved two defendants convicted of narcotics possession (and one also of conspiracy) after police searched their premises pursuant to a warrant issued by a justice of the peace. The defendants appealed, arguing that the supporting affidavit was insufficient under prior precedent and that evidence from the search should have been excluded, but the only issue they had raised below was that the warrant itself was invalid on its face due to blank spaces for the return and inventory recipients. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendants failed to preserve the affidavit issue through a contemporaneous objection or by including it with particularity in their motion for a new trial, as required by Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and longstanding precedent. Any deficiencies in the warrant were deemed ministerial rather than substantive, caused no prejudice, and were not properly before the appellate court for review.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between a stock purchaser and a brokerage firm over the alleged failure to execute a stop-loss order on shares of Record Vending Machines Corporation stock. The plaintiff claimed a breach of fiduciary or agency duty by the broker. After a bench trial, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's case, finding insufficient evidence of any legal obligation or fiduciary relationship. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings were supported by the record and that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving the existence of a duty.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Ruark v. People, the defendant was tried and convicted in Adams County District Court on counts of aggravated robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and escape after conviction, stemming from events that began with his escape from a sheriff's bus following a prior robbery conviction and continued with an assault on a guard and the taking of a car at gunpoint. The central issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by denying a pretrial motion to sever the escape count from the others. The Colorado Supreme Court majority held that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing severance, reasoning that proof of the prior conviction was an essential element of the escape charge but was otherwise inadmissible and highly prejudicial to the remaining counts, as the defendant did not testify and open the door to credibility impeachment. The court therefore reversed the convictions on the first three counts.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a real estate purchase agreement for a home in Rye, Colorado, between buyer Cooley and broker Christmas acting for the sellers. Cooley paid a $2,000 down payment under terms requiring the broker to obtain a conventional loan for the balance at specified rates, with the contract becoming null and void and the deposit returned if financing could not be secured. When the broker failed to obtain such a loan and instead proposed an alternative arrangement that Cooley rejected, she sued for return of the deposit, which the broker refused. The trial court ruled in Cooley's favor, awarding her the $2,000 plus interest, finding the agreement unambiguous and the broker noncompliant with its terms. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the contract language was plain and must be enforced as written, and that evidence of subsequent dealings was properly excluded because affirmative defenses like waiver or novation had not been pleaded.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a defendant charged with incest for allegedly having sexual relations with his 17-year-old daughter. After a jury trial resulting in a guilty verdict, the defendant was sentenced to three to five years in prison, and he appealed on grounds including the sufficiency of the evidence, the voluntariness of his confession, hearsay testimony, and the denial of post-trial motions including one styled as coram nobis based on the daughter's later recantation. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the confession was voluntary after the defendant was advised of his rights, the evidence supported the verdict as a matter for the jury, and the coram nobis motion was untimely because the trial court lost jurisdiction after the term in which judgment was entered. The court found no reversible error or abuse of discretion in the trial proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a Denver City Council ordinance rezoning property from R-2 to R-4. After proper notice and a public hearing, the council defeated the bill by a 6-3 vote following protests by nearby owners; at a later regular meeting without new notice or hearing, it reconsidered and passed the measure 7-1, then overrode the mayor’s veto. Property owners sued to enjoin enforcement, alleging violations of city charter and ordinance procedures as well as state and federal due-process protections. The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that once the bill was defeated the council exhausted its authority under the original notice and could not validly reconsider or enact it without fresh public notice and hearing as required by the charter and ordinances.

propertyprocedure