Joseph Bogdanski

This case involved a dispute over the appointment of a fire marshal in Waterbury, where state law under General Statutes § 29-45 required giving preference to members of the local fire department, but the city's civil service rules, authorized by special act, did not provide such a preference and ranked non-member Edward St. John first among applicants including plaintiff Jerry Beccia. Beccia sought declaratory and injunctive relief to block St. John's certification and have himself certified instead, while St. John separately pursued a writ of mandamus for appointment; the cases were consolidated. The trial court ruled that the city's civil service regulations controlled over § 29-45, which it found inapplicable and directory rather than mandatory, denying Beccia relief and granting the mandamus to St. John. On appeal, the court considered arguments about mootness due to the final unappealed mandamus judgment and issues of collateral estoppel, ultimately addressing whether practical relief remained available to Beccia.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over a roller-skating rink business started as a joint enterprise between Charles Karanian and Richard Maulucci, Sr., who agreed to equal ownership, equal capital contributions, and eventual incorporation; Karanian contributed his share (naming the plaintiff as beneficiary) but Maulucci did not, incorporation papers were filed listing the parties and their children as officers, yet no stock was issued or bylaws adopted, and Maulucci later barred Karanian from the premises. The plaintiff sued for an accounting, damages, and a receiver. The trial court ruled that the parties operated as a 50-50 partnership between themselves despite the corporate form. The appellate court held this was error because the filing of the certificate of incorporation with the secretary of the state created a corporation under Connecticut law, and parties who adopt the corporate form cannot be partners inter se while a corporation to outsiders; the entity was therefore a corporation whose dissolution must follow corporate statutes, and the trial court's order was modified accordingly before remand.

business & regulatory

This case involves a dispute between Connecticut Light & Power Co. and Holson Co. over the scope of a 1923 easement across land in Wilton for erecting and maintaining power lines. The power company sought injunctions to stop parking, loading, unloading, and building encroachment in the easement area, while the defendant counterclaimed to require relocation of a utility pole. The trial court denied the injunctions, found that the defendant's uses including vehicle parking did not interfere with the easement, ordered a compensatory extension of the easement border, and awarded nominal damages. On appeal, the court upheld these rulings, holding that the trial court properly determined the parties' rights under the deed's reservation clause and exercised discretion in denying equitable relief based on the facts, including long-standing non-interfering uses and lack of prior objection.

property

This case concerned two consolidated appeals by Robert Helbig from decisions of the Noank Fire District zoning commission and zoning board of appeals, which determined that his commercial boatyard use of property violated zoning regulations and rejected his claim of a valid preexisting nonconforming use under the ordinance. The Superior Court allowed Helbig to challenge the constitutionality of §13.7 of the zoning ordinance in the same proceeding, concluded that the section was invalid for lacking evidentiary standards and sufficient guidelines, and ruled the second appeal moot as a result. On review, the court addressed whether a party may attack an ordinance's constitutionality while seeking its benefits, reciting the general rule prohibiting such challenges but noting exceptions where compliance is compelled rather than voluntary, and examined whether the zoning enforcement officer acted independently of the commission in issuing violation notices.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the conviction of defendant Arthur Just on three counts of first-degree kidnapping under General Statutes § 53a-92(a)(2)(B) stemming from the March 1975 arson and explosion at the Sponge Rubber Factory plant in Shelton, Connecticut, during which three employees were seized at gunpoint, handcuffed, and driven to another location before the perpetrators fled. Just appealed the judgment, raising claims of error that included the admission into evidence of the criminal convictions of three alleged co-conspirators who testified for the state. The court reviewed the trial record detailing the planning, execution, and flight from the crime, applied precedents such as State v. Pikul on the limited admissibility of co-defendant pleas, and examined whether the convictions were introduced for permissible purposes like credibility rather than to establish the commission of the offense.

criminal law

This case involved an unmarried couple who purchased a home as tenants in common in 1974, contributed funds jointly for living expenses until their 1977 separation, and later sold the property with disputed allocation of the remaining escrow proceeds. The trial court divided ownership into three periods, treating pre-separation contributions as joint without reimbursement, post-separation mortgage payments as rent for the defendant's occupancy, and post-agreement payments as benefiting only the defendant, resulting in credits of $4,000 to the plaintiff and $14,339.12 to the defendant before splitting the balance. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed this allocation, reasoning that the parties' conduct and the unperformed 1977 agreement demonstrated differing expectations of reimbursement across the periods. The plaintiff appealed the partial credit to the defendant, while the defendant cross-appealed seeking fuller credits.

propertyfamily law

In State v. Shaw, the defendant was convicted of first-degree assault after shooting his roommate during a dispute in their shared home, leading to claims of self-defense. On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the defendant challenged the trial court's jury instructions on self-defense, which omitted specific language about no duty to retreat in one's dwelling and the use of greater force in the heat of passion; the admission of his prior manslaughter conviction solely for impeachment purposes; and the denial of motions to strike an eyewitness's testimony and for a mistrial. The court held that the given instructions adequately conveyed the relevant self-defense principles under state statutes, including retreat considerations when both parties reside in the dwelling, and that the prior conviction was properly limited to credibility assessment without details of the underlying facts. It further found no error in the handling of the witness testimony issues under applicable procedural rules. The judgment was affirmed with no errors identified in the trial proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between neighboring landowners over the location of their common boundary, which both parties agreed was the center line of a brook. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had altered the brook's course during development, encroaching on their property by two-tenths of an acre, while the defendant maintained the brook had not moved. In an action to quiet title, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the court upheld the admission of survey maps prepared by a deceased surveyor under a hearsay exception for boundary declarations, finding the conditions met including the surveyor's lack of interest to misrepresent, and determined that the evidence sufficiently supported the plaintiffs' title by record.

property

This case involves a medical malpractice claim by plaintiff Cross against two physicians, alleging that their negligent prescription and administration of the drug Atabrine from 1965 to 1970 caused her blindness. Following a jury verdict in favor of defendants Huttenlocher and Eiege, the plaintiff appealed on grounds including jury instructions on the standard of care, proximate cause, and the admissibility of certain evidence and learned treatises. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish the applicable standard of care through expert testimony for the general pediatrician, that the trial court's instructions on causation and burden of proof were legally correct and sufficient, and that evidentiary rulings excluding or admitting materials were proper or not preserved for review. Claims regarding failure to warn or test the drug were either unsupported or waived. The decision rested on established principles requiring expert proof of both the standard of care and its breach in malpractice actions.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

This case is a divorce action in which the wife sought dissolution of marriage along with custody of the minor children, child support, alimony, and property division, while the husband counterclaimed for custody and other relief, citing adultery. The trial court awarded custody and the family home to the husband after finding both parents fit but concluding the father, with help from his parents, could better provide stability, partly due to credibility concerns with the wife's testimony; the wife was ordered to transfer her interest in the home for lump-sum alimony of $52,000. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, emphasizing the trial court's broad discretion in family matters under statutes like §§ 46b-56, 46b-81, and 46b-82, its superior position to assess facts and credibility, and the lack of demonstrated abuse of discretion in weighing the children's best interests and financial circumstances.

family lawproperty

The case involved a post-divorce dispute over modifying visitation rights for a child whose mother had relocated with her to Tennessee, along with related child support payments ordered by a Connecticut court in the original 1976 dissolution judgment. The plaintiff father sought to alter visitation, and the trial court modified the order while directing that support payments be withheld until the mother complied with the new visitation terms. The defendant mother appealed, arguing lack of jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The court analyzed the UCCJA's requirements for custody determinations, which encompass visitation but exclude support, focusing on whether Connecticut remained the child's home state or had significant connections after the move. It concluded that jurisdiction to modify visitation was lacking due to the child's absence and stronger ties elsewhere, while support modifications could be addressed separately.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a jury conviction of the defendant for first-degree robbery under General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(3) after he and another individual took property from a victim at knifepoint in an apartment. On appeal, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of third-degree larceny and by giving misleading or confusing instructions on aiding and abetting under § 53a-8. The court examined whether the four-prong test from State v. Whistnant for lesser included offense instructions was satisfied and reviewed the original and supplemental charges on accomplice liability given in response to jury questions, citing prior cases to assess whether criminal intent was properly addressed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a personal injury claim by a plaintiff who fell in the corridor of an apartment/office building owned by the defendants, alleging that negligence in maintaining a slippery floor caused her injuries on December 29, 1972. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in the plaintiff's favor. The defendants appealed the denial of their motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish causation or a defective condition and relied too heavily on subjective descriptions. The court affirmed the verdict, holding that the evidence, including testimony about the floor's slipperiness and the plaintiff's fall, was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendants were liable without requiring speculation.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a trial court decree dissolving a 34-year marriage, which ordered the defendant husband to pay the plaintiff wife $17,000 in lump sum alimony, $600 in counsel fees, and to transfer various jointly owned assets including real property, an automobile, and other items. The defendant argued that the awards constituted an improper assignment of his estate under the relevant statutes and exceeded the value of his assets. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, holding that lump sum alimony is permissible under General Statutes § 46b-82 and may exceed the paying spouse's estate when supported by the statutory factors. The decision rested on evidence of the marriage's length, the cause of its breakdown due to the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's limited income and poor health, the defendant's earnings and pension contributions, and his prior transfers of substantial assets without consideration.

family lawproperty

In this case, plaintiff Samuel Bierman sought site plan approval from the Westport Planning and Zoning Commission to convert an abandoned gas station into an office building, but the commission denied the application on eight grounds. Bierman appealed to the Superior Court under General Statutes § 8-8, which sustained the appeal, ruled that zoning regulations §§ 43-2 and 44-2 were unconstitutionally vague on their face and constituted an improper delegation of legislative power, and granted affirmative relief without remanding to the commission. The commission appealed, claiming error in allowing a facial challenge to the regulations during a site plan appeal, in the constitutional findings, and in the failure to remand. The Supreme Court examined the trial court's memorandum of decision and determined that the lower court had in fact invalidated the regulations per se rather than as applied, while noting the general rule that a party seeking benefits under a zoning ordinance cannot challenge its constitutionality in the same proceeding. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a defendant charged with sexual assault in the second degree, risk of injury to a minor, attempt to promote prostitution, and permitting prostitution, who sought dismissal of the charges on speedy trial grounds after the state entered a nolle prosequi just as trial was about to begin. The trial court accepted the nolle over the defendant's objection based on the state's representation that a material witness had died and the complaining witness had become disabled, and denied the motion to dismiss. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the state's representation satisfied the statutory exception under General Statutes § 54-56b allowing a nolle despite objection when a witness is disabled and further investigation is needed. The court reasoned that the nolle did not violate speedy trial rights under the state and federal constitutions because Connecticut law limits reprosecution to thirteen months and requires erasure of records thereafter, distinguishing it from cases like Klopfer v. North Carolina where indefinite exposure existed. The court found no error in the trial court's acceptance of the nolle or denial of dismissal.

criminal lawprocedure

In Venuti v. Venuti, the plaintiff wife and defendant husband sought dissolution of their twenty-year marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, and the defendant appealed the trial court's financial orders awarding the wife alimony of $300 per week, $7,500 in counsel fees, the family home, and other assets. The defendant argued that the awards were improper because the wife had committed adultery and because they were disproportionate to the parties' finances and earning capacities. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that post-1973 statutory changes abolished the prior rule barring alimony to an adulterous spouse and made the causes of the dissolution only one discretionary factor for the court to weigh. The trial court had found that any adultery by the wife was not a cause of the marriage's breakdown, and the financial awards were supported by evidence of the parties' earning capacities, assets, and other statutory criteria without an abuse of discretion.

family lawprocedure

In Powers v. Ulichny, the defendant sought and obtained a building permit to add a second story to his restaurant, which would extend into the approach zone of a municipal airport owned by Bridgeport but located in Stratford; the state aeronautics commissioner objected on air safety grounds and, after construction began, secured a temporary injunction before seeking a permanent one under aeronautics statutes and regulations. The trial court granted the permanent injunction, finding irreparable injury and no unconstitutional taking. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief because no airport zoning ordinances had been adopted by the municipality or commissioner as authorized by General Statutes §§15-88 through 15-97, the relied-upon regulation (§15-41-31(d)) did not restrict adjacent landowners, and the statutes governing airport hazards (§§15-73, 13b-43, 13b-44) require acquisition of property interests rather than an injunction to clear airspace. The court also noted that administrative exhaustion was not required given the nature of the issues but emphasized that the statutory scheme provided no direct authority for the requested injunction.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Johnson, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted murder, second-degree kidnapping, first-degree robbery, and first-degree sexual assault arising from the abduction and assault of a female victim by five men. On appeal, the defendant claimed error in the trial court's jury instructions on intent, its failure to instruct that any abduction was merely incidental to other crimes, and the denial of his right to self-representation. The court held that the intent instruction improperly created a conclusive presumption violating due process under Sandstrom v. Montana for the specific-intent crimes of attempted murder and robbery, requiring reversal and a new trial on those counts only, but found the instruction harmless as to the other counts; it rejected the remaining claims, concluding the defendant had forfeited self-representation through his own disruptive conduct and that no other instructional error occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Connecticut taxpayers who received income from shares in The Reserve Fund, a regulated investment company under federal tax rules, and disputed whether that income should be classified as dividends or interest for purposes of the state's capital gains and dividends tax. The Tax Commissioner determined the income was dividends and assessed additional tax, which the taxpayers challenged through administrative proceedings and appeal. The court held that the income constituted dividends under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-505, adopting the federal tax classification for such distributions from regulated investment companies. It reasoned that the Connecticut legislature intended to incorporate the federal income tax scheme for defining and taxing dividends, including the conduit treatment under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code that treats qualifying distributions as dividends to shareholders.

taxes