This case concerns a dispute over riparian rights to a 6.34-acre parcel of marshland and tidal flats on the Mianus River in Greenwich, Connecticut. In 1937, the railroad and Greenway agreed to a 'Line of Ultimate Filling' dividing their properties and limiting riparian claims beyond it, though the agreement was unrecorded at the time. In 1951, the railroad conveyed the parcel to McNeil by quitclaim deed whose boundaries precisely matched that line, with no mention of riparian rights, and McNeil later transferred it to Mianus Realty; Harrison later contracted to buy it for marina development. The court held that Mianus and its successors acquired no riparian rights beyond the deed's described boundaries. The decision rested on the deed's and map's precise courses, distances, and alignment with the 1937 line, which demonstrated the grantor's intent to convey only the specified uplands without attached riparian rights.
The case concerned whether a planning commission's approval of a subdivision plan was valid despite a zoning change that increased minimum lot sizes from one to two acres after the initial application but before final approval. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision that had set aside the approval, holding that the statute protects the subdivision from intervening zoning changes. The core reasoning was that under the local regulations, the application for tentative approval of a preliminary plan constituted the required "application" for subdivision approval under General Statutes § 8-28a, with protection relating back upon final approval, as supported by the statute's text and legislative history.
The case involved a property owner's application to the Stratford board of zoning appeals for approval of a gasoline station location under General Statutes § 14-321. The board initially denied the application after a hearing focused on traffic concerns, but later granted a second, formally new application after the owner had appealed the denial and then withdrawn that appeal, with no showing of changed conditions. Neighboring property owners appealed the approval to the Court of Common Pleas, which sustained the appeal. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a zoning board cannot reverse its own prior decision absent a change in conditions or intervening considerations materially affecting the merits, as the second proceeding did not qualify as a mere rehearing and lacked any such justification. The court emphasized the need for finality in zoning decisions to avoid uncertainty.
In this quo warranto action, the trial court ousted the defendant from the office of selectman of Enfield after he, a registered Democrat, won a special election to fill a vacancy created by the resignation of the board's sole Republican member, leaving the three-member board without minority-party representation. The defendant argued that the statutory restriction in § 669d—no more than a bare majority of the board may belong to the same political party—applied only to regular town elections and not to special elections filling vacancies. The court rejected that claim, holding that the restriction applies to boards of selectmen however constituted, whether by regular or special election, because the clear legislative intent since 1945 has been to ensure minority representation on such boards at all times.
This case arose from a fatal 1954 car collision at an intersection in Lebanon, Connecticut, between a vehicle driven by defendant Baldwin (in which the decedent Betty Baldwin was a passenger) and a state police car driven by defendant Harvey while responding to an emergency call; the plaintiff, as administratrix, sued Baldwin, Harvey, and the state for wrongful death damages under a statute allowing claims against the state. The jury awarded $75,000 against all defendants, and the trial court denied motions to set aside the verdict. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's jury instructions on proximate cause using the substantial-factor test were adequate for this concurrent-negligence scenario without any superseding cause, that exclusion of certain out-of-court statements to show witness bias was within the trial court's discretion, and that the damages award was not excessive given the decedent's injuries, pain, and circumstances.
This case involved a part-time employee injured while trimming trees for a town tree warden on a single day under a separate contract. The plaintiff had previously agreed to compensation based on the day's actual pay but later sought to reopen the award, arguing it should instead reflect the higher prevailing weekly wage for full-time tree workers in the area. The compensation commissioner granted the modification using the full-time rate, but the Superior Court reversed, holding that the statute required using the prevailing wage for similar part-time, one-day employment. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that when prior employment totals less than two weeks, compensation is based solely on the prevailing wage in the same type of employment, and precedent establishes that the nature of the employment (part-time and irregular) rather than the work itself controls the calculation.