John P. Cotter

The case involved property owners who sought injunctive relief to prevent the City of Milford from enforcing its Housing Code against sixteen vacant residential properties, after city inspectors found code violations, posted the dwellings as unfit for occupancy, and pursued arrest warrants for noncompliance. The owners argued that the local code did not apply to vacant properties, was preempted by the State Building Code, and lacked adequate standards, while the city maintained that the properties qualified as dwellings because the owners intended to renovate and occupy them. The trial court credited the owners' intent, treated the properties as dwellings, dissolved the temporary injunction, and denied permanent relief without addressing preemption. The appellate court ruled that the trial court erred by failing to decide the preemption issue, which had been squarely presented in the pleadings and arguments, because a local ordinance must yield to conflicting state law on the same subject matter.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned whether prepayments received by a computer equipment lessor in June 1975 for leases extending beyond July 1, 1975, were subject to Connecticut's new sales and use tax on leases of tangible personal property, which became effective on that date. The court held that such payments were taxable. The statute's definition of gross receipts includes payments for the term of any lease occurring on or after July 1, 1975, and the tax applies based on the period of use rather than the timing of payment receipt or lease signing. The court reasoned that the statutory language unambiguously ties the tax to the lease term after the effective date, rendering prepayment timing irrelevant.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the scope of the term 'court records' under General Statutes § 54-142a (d), which mandates erasure (including physical destruction upon request) of police, court, and prosecutorial records following a pardon. After receiving an absolute pardon, the plaintiff sued to compel the Department of Correction to destroy all prison-related records in its custody, arguing they stemmed from court documents like the mittimus. The court held that only records created or maintained by or for the court qualify as 'court records' subject to destruction, specifically including the mittimus, presentence investigation report, and sentencing transcript, but not internal prison records such as medical or administrative files. It reasoned that the statute's plain language limits 'court records' to those connected to court proceedings from commencement to termination, without extending to analogous or derivative materials held by other agencies.

criminal lawprocedure

The plaintiffs sued the Town of Westport alleging various torts arising from town officials entering their land and removing or destroying a small dam on multiple occasions, seeking damages and injunctive relief. After the trial court sustained a demurrer to the original seventeen-count complaint, the plaintiffs filed a substitute complaint that contained no new matter; the court then granted the defendant's request to revise by deleting the substitute complaint in its entirety and rendered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the demurrer ruling and the lack of further opportunity to plead, but the court held that filing the substitute complaint waived any appeal from the demurrer under established precedent and that the request to revise was properly used to eliminate a repetitive pleading. The court found error only in the form of the judgment, which should have reflected the deletion of the substitute complaint rather than a failure to plead further, and directed the trial court to render a corrected judgment for the defendant on that basis.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

The plaintiff sued the defendants for personal injuries from a fall in their parking lot on December 19, 1974, claiming she stepped into a pothole. A jury returned a general verdict for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued error in the trial court's jury charge about her use of a cane during trial, which noted a lack of medical evidence linking the cane to her injuries, and in permitting the defendants' meteorologist to testify as an expert that the ground was not frozen on the date of the fall. The court held there was no error, reasoning that because the verdict absolved the defendants of liability, any claimed error relating to damages from the cane instruction was irrelevant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying the meteorologist as an expert on ground conditions based on his experience and weather records. The court affirmed the judgment.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation's appeal from a Public Utilities Control Authority (PUCA) decision granting only a partial rate increase of about $1.78 million instead of the requested $9.6 million. The Superior Court reviewed claims that the PUCA violated administrative procedure rules by relying on an unrebutted expert report from consultant James Rothschild without allowing the company to cross-examine him, and that it made errors in calculating working capital lag, federal tax rates and savings from consolidated returns, peak demand, purchased gas costs, and interest on refunds. The court ordered the PUCA to permit cross-examination of Rothschild, redo multiple specific calculations on taxes, capital, and other items using proper methods, and rejected arguments that a later 1979 rate increase had mooted the appeal. Its reasoning centered on requirements under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act for contested cases, including the right to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and rebut extra-record evidence, as well as the substantial evidence standard for reviewing agency decisions.

business & regulatoryproceduretaxes

The case involved the conviction of defendant John J. Johnson, Jr. for robbery in the second degree after a store clerk identified him from photographs and items including an army shirt and sunglasses were seized from his car following an arrest. The defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the out-of-court photographic identification, claiming it was unduly suggestive due to the arrangement of photos and items shown to the victim, as well as other evidentiary rulings on the car search and chain of custody. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding no error. It held that the identification was reliable under the totality of circumstances, weighing factors such as the victim's opportunity to observe the robber, her attention level, description accuracy, and certainty against any suggestiveness, per standards from Manson v. Brathwaite and Neil v. Biggers; other claims were either properly admitted or not preserved under procedural rules.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Connecticut Commissioner of Transportation was required to follow Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) procedures when setting bus fares for the state-owned Connecticut Transit Company. The City of Hartford and a resident requested a declaratory ruling that fare increases constituted regulations subject to UAPA notice, hearing, and approval requirements, and also sought promulgation of specific regulations governing such increases. The trial court held that the UAPA applied to the Commissioner's actions, that the fare schedule was a regulation, and that the matter was not a contested case; it retained jurisdiction for compliance but did not address constitutional claims or certain statutory findings. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that the Department of Transportation is not exempt from the UAPA and therefore must follow its procedures for adopting regulations, remanding the two undecided issues for further determination.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs who purchased a two-family home from the defendant and later sued for fraudulent misrepresentation after discovering that the septic system's leaching field was not on the purchased property as represented at closing, leading to backups, tenant complaints, inability to use the property as a duplex, and eventual foreclosure. The trial court found fraud and awarded damages of $15,069, including the difference between the property's actual and represented value, pumping costs, and the lost down payment. On appeal, the court upheld the finding of fraudulent misrepresentation based on the defendant's knowing false statements about the septic system that induced the purchase and caused injury, and affirmed recovery for the value difference and pumping expenses as proper benefit-of-the-bargain and consequential damages, but held that including the down payment would duplicate the value-based recovery and thus reduced the award to $9,069. The decision applied established elements of fraud requiring proof of a false statement of fact known to be untrue and made to induce reliance resulting in harm, along with limits on foreseeable damages from the misrepresentation.

propertytorts & liability

In State v. Brokaw, the defendant appealed his jury conviction for attempted assault in the first degree after firing shots at pursuing police officers during a foot chase following a confrontation in a restaurant. The defendant claimed error in the admission of certain hearsay statements by police officers regarding information about his possession of weapons and statements about not being taken by police, as well as in the jury instructions on the element of intent. The court held that the initial hearsay statement was properly admitted because it was responsive to a question posed by defense counsel on cross-examination and was offered to show the officer's state of mind, while the second repetition of the information was merely cumulative. The court further held that the jury instructions did not shift the burden of proof because they described permissive inferences rather than mandatory presumptions. Accordingly, the court found no error and affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute under the Connecticut Marketable Record Title Act over whether defendants' 1974 notice of claim preserved a claimed 25-foot easement across plaintiff's land. The plaintiff sought to invalidate the easement, arguing the notice was untimely under the Act's 40-year root-of-title rules requiring filing by July 1, 1971. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff after mistakenly concluding both parties agreed the root of title was a 1895 deed. The appellate court determined this finding was clearly erroneous, as the defendants had asserted a different root-of-title date and the precise timing of the root of title controls whether the easement survived or was extinguished absent a timely notice.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over ownership of a house originally owned by Walenty Starzee. After his first wife's death, Walenty married Clara and they orally agreed, in the presence of witnesses, that Clara would leave the property to Walenty's children upon her death; Walenty then willed the house to Clara outright. Clara later changed her will to leave the house to her niece instead. The trial court found a confidential relationship between Walenty and Clara, determined that Clara had abused it by breaking her promise, and imposed a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of Walenty's children to prevent unjust enrichment. The appellate court upheld this ruling, concluding that the evidence clearly established the agreement and supported the equitable remedy.

propertyfamily law

This case involved a divorce proceeding in which the defendant husband appealed from a judgment dissolving the marriage and dividing the parties' assets and obligations, claiming that a March 1977 agreement recited in court was binding and that the property awards improperly assigned his inherited assets to the wife. The court held that no binding agreement existed because the transcript showed the parties had not reached a final accord and the proposed settlement was contingent on financing, and it rejected the inheritance challenge by finding that General Statutes § 46b-81 expressly permits assignment of a spouse's real or personal property in dissolution actions without violating § 46b-36. The court further determined that the trial referee properly exercised discretion under §§ 46b-82 and 46b-62 in making alimony, property, and counsel-fee awards after considering the statutory factors and the parties' circumstances, including the length of the marriage and contributions to the marital home. It concluded there was no error in the judgment.

family lawproperty

In Reynolds v. Soffer, the plaintiffs, who were building homes on their land, sued to enjoin the defendants from expanding nonconforming poultry buildings on adjacent property, alleging violations of zoning regulations and a building code as well as a nuisance causing health risks, noise, odors, and reduced property value. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing inaction by town officials to the zoning board of appeals. The trial court granted the motion, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaint's allegations of special and material harm from zoning violations and nuisance permitted the plaintiffs to seek direct equitable relief in court. The court relied on precedents allowing injunctive actions without prior administrative exhaustion when the claims are distinctly equitable and the plaintiffs allege irreparable injury not adequately addressed by statutory appeals.

propertyenvironmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved defendant Henry Smith, who was convicted by a jury on two counts of violating Connecticut General Statutes § 53-21 by committing acts likely to impair the morals of a 12-year-old girl through repeated sexual touching on separate occasions in May and June 1977. On appeal, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute, claiming it was void for vagueness, violated separation of powers by delegating lawmaking to judges and juries, and permitted ex post facto application. Relying on its prior decision in State v. Pickering, the court rejected the vagueness claim, holding that the statute gives fair notice because it prohibits deliberate sexual touching of the private parts of a child under sixteen. The court ultimately found error in the trial judge's jury instructions on the reasonable doubt standard, requiring reversal without reaching all of the defendant's other constitutional arguments.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Trent, the defendant was charged with two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree, pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement recommending concurrent five-to-ten-year sentences, and later moved unsuccessfully to withdraw the pleas before sentencing. On appeal, he argued that the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of General Statutes § 53a-35 did not apply to convictions for attempted robbery and that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary due to incorrect advice about sentencing consequences. The court reviewed the unpreserved claims under the Evans exceptional-circumstances doctrine because they implicated constitutional rights. It held that the five-year mandatory minimum applies to attempted robbery in the first degree because the attempt statute classifies the offense at the same grade and degree as the completed crime and the legislature intended the minimum to attach, and it concluded that the record showed the defendant was adequately informed of the penalties, rendering the pleas valid.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute over easement rights to a small beach in Guilford, Connecticut, where the plaintiffs, successors to buyers in a 1959 subdivision, held deeds granting them the right to use the beach for bathing only, and they sought to quiet title and enjoin the defendant from opening the beach to public use. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, granting an injunction and punitive damages but denying compensatory damages due to insufficient evidence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the easements were appurtenant to the plaintiffs' properties rather than personal rights in gross, based on the language of the deeds, the value to the dominant estates, and surrounding circumstances. It further determined that the state's policy encouraging public beach access did not override the private easement rights and that the defendant's actions in widening a road and inviting the public constituted malice. The court rejected claims that the easements were limited or that the conduct was not willful.

property

This case concerned a defendant originally charged with attempted murder and attempted assault in the first degree after an incident in which he allegedly pointed and fired a revolver at a deputy sheriff serving divorce papers. After the close of the state's evidence at trial, the court permitted the state to file a second substituted information replacing the attempted murder count with a charge of threatening. The jury convicted the defendant of threatening, while the trial court granted acquittal on the assault count. On appeal, the court concluded that the mid-trial amendment was improper because it charged a different offense in violation of procedural rules, requiring reversal of the threatening conviction and entry of a judgment of acquittal on that count; the state's cross-appeal of the assault acquittal was dismissed on double jeopardy grounds precluding review.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Uniroyal, Inc. appealing the Middlebury board of tax review's refusal to reduce the assessed value of its corporate headquarters complex for the 1975-1977 grand lists, claiming the valuation was manifestly excessive and created a disproportionate tax burden relative to other town properties. A state referee acting as the Superior Court found the plaintiffs were not aggrieved and upheld the assessments. The court reasoned that Connecticut law under § 12-64 requires determining fair value as of the assessment date, applying a uniform percentage (here targeted at 65 percent), and calculating the assessment accordingly, that assessors have wide discretion in valuation, and that the plaintiffs' evidence of varying sales-to-assessment ratios did not establish discriminatory treatment or a statutory violation warranting relief, unlike cases of complete administrative breakdown in revaluation.

taxesproperty

The case involved Jose Perez's appeal from his conviction for murder after he strangled a neighbor, with the main dispute centering on whether he had the mental capacity to be found guilty. Perez claimed that due to mental disease or defect he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform it to the law, and also could not form the specific intent to kill required for murder. The three-judge trial court rejected the insanity defense and found him guilty, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Perez was criminally responsible and had the requisite intent. The court reasoned that the defense expert's testimony was not binding and could be discounted based on its limited foundation, while the state's evidence, including medical records showing no organic defect, supported the verdict. Appellate review was limited to whether any reasonable factfinder could have reached that result on the record.

criminal law