Anthony E. Grillo

This case involved fifty-five tenants suing landlords who owned older apartment buildings in New Britain for collecting rents without obtaining required certificates of occupancy after vacancies, despite numerous housing and health code violations that rendered the units uninhabitable. The court held that the landlords violated General Statutes §§ 47a-5 and 47a-57 by renting without certificates and that this conduct, along with the collection of $58,695 in rents, constituted unfair or deceptive acts under CUTPA. The trial court awarded the tenants damages equal to the rents collected (with a limited setoff for reasonable use and occupancy value on three units), enjoined further rent collection or evictions without certificates, and appointed a receiver of rents. The core reasoning was that the statutes impose a duty on landlords to secure certificates before habitation and bar recovery of rents without them, making the landlords' actions unfair practices under CUTPA for which actual damages could be recovered.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved an insurance agency suing to recover unpaid premiums from a marina after issuing policies in 1977, where the plaintiff alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by defendant E. Stuart Mitchell and the Mitchell Company based on a worthless check that led the agency to release prejudgment attachments on boats. The trial court found in favor of the defendants, ruling that the plaintiff failed to prove fraud. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence did not show the check was issued for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to drop its lawsuit and release the attachments, as required for an actionable misrepresentation. The court noted no evidence that the check's delivery was conditional on releasing the attachments or that Mitchell intended to cause that action.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over a promissory note for the purchase of school stock, where the defendants defaulted and the parties disagreed about enforcing an arbitration clause in an addendum signed only by the defendants. The plaintiff sought a court order to compel arbitration under state statutes, and after arbitration proceeded and resulted in an award against the defendants, the trial court confirmed it. The appellate court upheld the award, ruling that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable despite the plaintiff's lack of signature because the statute requires only a written agreement and the defendants had signed it, initiated arbitration, and participated in the proceedings. The court further held that the defendants were estopped from challenging the agreement after accepting its benefits and that the award conformed to the submission without evidence of arbitrator bias or other statutory grounds for vacating it.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a former husband's 1981 motion to modify or terminate a $25 weekly alimony award ordered in a 1974 divorce decree that also transferred the family home, car, and business interest to the former wife. The trial court denied the motion, finding no substantial change in circumstances, and the appellate court affirmed. The plaintiff argued that a 1975 financial affidavit showing his net weekly income at $139.38 (versus $98 in 1974) should be given collateral estoppel effect and demonstrated a change justifying relief, but the court held the 1975 figure was not before the original referee, was never litigated due to the dismissed appeal, and could not support modification. The court further noted that the former wife's improved finances, including proceeds from the cottage and business draws, were foreseeable at dissolution and did not meet the statutory threshold under General Statutes § 46b-86(a) for altering the award.

family law

The plaintiff sued the defendant for personal injuries from a car collision at a T-intersection, alleging negligent turning and encroachment into his lane; the defendants denied negligence and asserted contributory negligence as a special defense. After a jury returned a general verdict for the defendants, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, leading to this appeal on claims of error in the jury charge on proximate causation (including the substantial-factor test and comparative negligence), admission of expert testimony via hypothetical, and denial of the motion. The appellate court examined the evidence of speeds, positions, and witness accounts, along with the trial court's instructions referencing statutory duties like driving in the right lane, and concluded that the charge properly framed the issues without reversible error.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Walsh v. Walsh, the parties' 1979 marriage dissolution decree incorporated a stipulation under which the wife paid the husband monthly while they shared an apartment to support their adult children's college expenses, with the husband covering most other costs, and the judgment explicitly noted it was without prejudice to reopening. In 1981 the wife moved to modify the judgment, and the trial court ordered the husband to pay her weekly alimony of $92.50 after the parties began living separately. On appeal the husband argued that no alimony had been awarded originally, that res judicata barred modification, and that the court failed to follow statutory criteria or hear sufficient evidence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the temporary, conditional nature of the original orders and the without-prejudice language preserved jurisdiction to modify, that changed circumstances justified alimony, and that the parties had acquiesced in the procedure used.

family law

This case involved a mortgage foreclosure on a restaurant property in West Haven, Connecticut, after the borrowers defaulted on a $1.1 million promissory note secured by the real estate and its fixtures. Following a strict foreclosure judgment that vested title in the bank, the trial court held a hearing on the bank's motion for a deficiency judgment and valued the property at $960,000 as of the date title passed, using an income approach based on estimated net rental value per square foot capitalized at 10.5 percent, after deducting accrued taxes. Subtracting this value from the mortgage debt of approximately $1.23 million produced a deficiency judgment of $294,079.82. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly relied on the income valuation method and figures from the prior foreclosure judgment without error in its calculations or procedure.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a town's acquisition of a sewer line right of way through condemnation proceedings on property owned by John Steinmann. After negotiations failed, the town filed a condemnation petition in September 1969, which John received, and recorded a lis pendens; shortly afterward, John transferred part of the property to his son David for no monetary consideration. The trial court ruled that the town's easement was superior to the defendants' ownership interests. The appellate court affirmed, finding that John had actual notice of the proceedings based on his involvement in negotiations, receipt of detailed petitions, and understanding of the easement location, binding him to the judgment. For David, the court held that the lis pendens provided constructive notice and that equitable principles applied due to the timing and nature of the transfer, making his interest subordinate to the town's right of way.

propertyprocedure

In Cirrito v. Turner Construction Co., an employee of a plastering subcontractor was injured while leaving the construction site at the end of the day, carrying tools down exterior stairs built by the general contractor. After settling the underlying personal injury claims, the general contractor sought indemnification from the subcontractor under a broad contractual clause covering injuries arising out of the execution of the work. The trial court denied recovery, finding the connection between the injury and the subcontractor's plastering work too tenuous. The appellate court reversed, holding that the injury occurred in sufficient connection with the work to trigger the indemnity obligation, drawing on principles from workers' compensation cases involving travel to and from the job site.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a habeas corpus petition by Charles Crawford challenging his 1974 murder conviction on the ground that the trial court's jury instructions on intent created an unconstitutional conclusive or burden-shifting presumption under the later-decided Sandstrom v. Montana rule. The court first addressed retroactivity, holding that the Sandstrom principle must be applied retroactively because it protects the integrity of the fact-finding process in criminal trials. Turning to the merits, the court examined the full jury charge and concluded that, when read as a whole, the instructions did not permit a reasonable juror to interpret them as shifting the burden of proof or creating a conclusive presumption on the element of intent; instead, they correctly emphasized the state's burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. The petition was therefore denied.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Harris, the defendant was charged with three counts of first-degree robbery under General Statutes § 53a-134(a)(4) for allegedly displaying or threatening the use of a firearm during incidents near the New Haven Correctional Center. After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged, and he appealed, claiming error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on robbery in the second degree as a lesser included offense based on evidence that the weapon was a toy gun. The defendant presented an alibi defense denying involvement while also introducing testimony from others suggesting accomplices used a toy pistol, which could serve as an affirmative defense under the statute reducing the charge. The court examined the four conditions from State v. Whistnant for lesser-included-offense instructions, noting the state's argument that the evidence was inconsistent with an affirmative defense because it did not concede participation in the crime. The appellate court analyzed whether the proof on the differentiating element was sufficiently in dispute to warrant the requested charge.

criminal law

This case is an appeal from a Connecticut trial court's modification of a child support order originally issued as part of a 1974 New York divorce decree. The plaintiff sought an increase from $500 to $900 per month based on changed financial circumstances, and the trial court granted the modification along with awards of attorney's fees. The appellate court rejected the defendant's claims that a prior 1978 Connecticut order barred the modification, that New York substantive law was misapplied, that evidence was insufficient, and that the plaintiff's income or defendant's expenses were improperly considered. It held that the 1978 order was not a final judgment on the merits and that the trial court correctly applied New York law under General Statutes § 46b-71 while following Connecticut procedural rules for evidence and fees.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a real estate broker suing a developer for breach of a brokerage contract and commissions related to the purchase and subsequent sales of the Choate property, after the broker obtained an ex parte prejudgment attachment that the defendant sought to dissolve. The court affirmed the dissolution of the attachment, holding that the plaintiff failed to show probable cause because multiple writings did not collectively satisfy General Statutes § 20-325a(b). The core reasoning was that the documents contained inconsistent commission rates and lacked sufficient connection or relationship to form a single enforceable contract meeting the statute's requirements for writing, parties' details, date, conditions, and signatures; parol evidence was properly excluded as it could not resolve the inconsistencies or create a new agreement.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In this negligence case, a real estate developer sued an electric utility company for negligently installing underground utilities pursuant to an easement in a residential subdivision, which allegedly caused extra road restoration costs and a nine-month delay in development. The trial court found the defendant negligent and awarded damages for road repairs as well as interest payments on the plaintiff's improvement loan during the delay period. On appeal, the court upheld the exclusion of the plaintiff's president's statements made during settlement negotiations, as they were not clearly factual admissions separate from compromise discussions. The appellate court also determined there was insufficient evidence linking the defendant's conduct to a nine-month delay or establishing the amount of any lost profits, leading it to reverse the interest award while affirming the road construction damages and remanding for judgment accordingly.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory