Joseph S. Longo

The case involved an association of mobile home owners and two residents suing a mobile home park owner to challenge certain lease provisions as violating state statutes and regulations, seeking declaratory judgment that the provisions were invalid and leases void, plus an injunction against the owner's representations and threats of eviction. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the real estate commission, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the commission had authority to issue declaratory rulings on the validity of lease terms under relevant statutes, that this remedy was adequate given the commission's enforcement powers, and that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to support injunctive relief bypassing administrative procedures, such as an actual threat of eviction.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether the Winchester board of selectmen could levy a uniform property tax mill rate across the entire town or was required by the town charter to apportion expenses for sewers, street lighting, sidewalks, curbs, crosswalks, police, and fire protection solely or differentially to the city of Winsted tax district. After trial, the Superior Court issued a permanent injunction requiring apportionment of street lighting, sewer, curbs, sidewalks, and crosswalks expenses to the city only but declined to mandate differential treatment for police and fire expenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's factual findings with one minor addition, rejected challenges to the evidence and the finding, and affirmed the judgment interpreting the charter to require apportionment only for the enumerated items while allowing uniform taxation for police and fire. The court emphasized that its decision rested on the plain language of the 1915 charter provision and the parties' historical practice rather than constitutional or home-rule issues.

taxesprocedure

The case concerned rate-increase applications filed in 1977 by HELCO and CL&P with the PUCA under General Statutes § 16-19(a), which requires companies to seek amendments to their existing rates. Intervening parties argued the applications were invalid because prior rates from 1974 and 1976 decisions were under appeal, had been declared invalid by a trial court, and thus no existing rates were in place when the 1977 filings occurred. The PUCA interpreted existing rates to mean the rates actually being charged at the time of filing and declined to dismiss the applications; the Court of Common Pleas upheld this view but remanded other substantive issues, leading to appeals. The court reasoned that the legislature intended the PUCA to retain plenary authority over rates at all times and that pending litigation did not strip the agency of jurisdiction to consider new applications.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Miranda, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree manslaughter after he admitted shooting the victim but claimed self-defense, arguing the victim had attacked him with a knife. The sole issue on appeal was the trial court's exclusion of the victim's prior convictions for violent crimes (including assault and carrying a dangerous weapon), which the defendant sought to introduce to show the victim was the aggressor, even though the defendant had no prior knowledge of those convictions. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that in homicide cases where self-defense is raised, evidence of the victim's violent character—shown via specific convictions for violent acts—is admissible to prove the victim was the aggressor regardless of the defendant's knowledge of that character or the convictions. The court adopted the majority rule, reasoning that such evidence goes to an objective question of what the victim likely did rather than the defendant's subjective state of mind, and that the prosecution retains the right to rebut with similar evidence while the trial court exercises discretion over probative value and remoteness.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the apportionment of $43,000 in eminent domain damages between landlords and their tenant after the state took access rights to a leased parking lot parcel without acquiring any land, reducing the property's fair market value from $258,000 to $215,000. The trial court referee awarded the landlords $2,000 (including fees) for their fee and reversionary interest and the tenant $37,048.34 for damages to its leasehold interest, calculated from the annual difference between economic rent and contract rent before and after the taking, multiplied over the remaining lease term including a renewal option and discounted to present value. The landlords appealed, arguing the tenant suffered no compensable loss, but the court affirmed the award, finding the leasehold had independent value that was diminished by the taking while the landlords' rental income remained unchanged. The decision relied on standard valuation methods for partial takings affecting leaseholds under Connecticut law.

propertyprocedure