The case involved the Connecticut Light and Power Company suing defendant Joseph J. Kluczinsky for interfering with its easement rights to construct a power line on his property, seeking an injunction and damages for construction delays and security costs; the defendant counterclaimed for damages to his land. After a jury trial where the defendant represented himself and lost, he appealed claiming various errors, including issues not objected to at trial. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that pro se litigants must properly raise objections during trial for appellate review, and no exceptional circumstances existed to excuse the failure to preserve claims, such as a deprivation of constitutional rights. The defendant's difficulties stemmed from his own conduct rather than lack of opportunity to obtain counsel or present his case.
The case involved plaintiffs Alice and Richmond Perley who issued a $22,000 check payable to Robert and Geraldine Burney to fund a land purchase; Geraldine Burney forged Robert's endorsement, deposited the check, and the drawee bank debited the Perleys' account after the payor bank processed it. The Perleys sued the drawee bank to recover the funds after discovering the forgery, and the bank impleaded the payor bank. The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding they intended both payees to have an interest in the check and were not negligent, so the forged endorsement rendered the payment improper under UCC rules requiring valid endorsements from all payees for negotiation. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the banks' defenses under the nominal payee rule and negligence claims were unsupported by the findings, and the conclusions on intent and lack of negligence were consistent with the facts.
The case involved a plaintiff who was injured in a 1961 automobile accident and sought damages for his personal injuries plus indemnification for settlements paid to passengers, based on strict products liability claims against General Motors as the manufacturer of his 1959 Corvette. The plaintiff alleged a manufacturing defect in the limited slip differential and failure to warn about needed modifications. Suit was filed in 1964, with a strict liability count added in 1972, but the trial court set aside jury verdicts for the plaintiff, holding the claims barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and granting judgment notwithstanding the verdicts for the defendant. The core issue on appeal was whether the three-year limitation period under General Statutes § 52-577 for tort actions began running from the date of the product's manufacture and sale or from the accident or discovery of the injury, with the court analyzing that the statute's language ties accrual to the act or omission complained of.
The plaintiff, Crescent Beach Association, a specially chartered municipal corporation, sued the Town of East Lyme under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-119, seeking a determination that its beachfront property was exempt from property taxes on the 1971–1973 grand lists because it was owned by a municipality and used for a public purpose under § 12-81(4). Both parties moved for summary judgment, stipulating that the only issue was a question of law. The trial court granted the town’s motion, holding the property taxable. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that although the beach appeared open to the public, recorded easements granted to prior lot owners created private rights that could be impaired by unrestricted public use; therefore the land was not devoted exclusively to a public purpose. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s procedural claim that it was entitled to a post-judgment hearing.
This case concerned a bank's lawsuit to recover an overdraft in a joint checking account caused by an employee's forgeries of the customer's signature on checks and a letter redirecting bank statements. The defendants raised a special defense claiming the bank negligently honored the forged items. The court affirmed judgment for the bank, ruling that the defendants' prolonged failure to examine statements, reconcile the account, or notify the bank of issues substantially contributed to the unauthorized signatures under General Statutes § 42a-3-406. This negligence precluded the defendants from asserting the forgeries against the bank, which paid the items in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, as the defendants did not prove lack of ordinary care by the bank under § 42a-4-406(3).