The case involved APAC-Atlantic suing Travelers Indemnity Company for breach of contract, claiming Travelers failed to defend and indemnify APAC in a wrongful death lawsuit arising from a highway construction project where APAC was the general contractor and PSI was a subcontractor insured by Travelers. The court granted summary judgment to Travelers. The reasoning was that the insurance policy only provided coverage to APAC as an additional insured for liability arising out of PSI's work, but the underlying complaint did not allege any claims against PSI or liability stemming from PSI's actions.
The case involved a dispute over whether the Paughs' Westfield umbrella insurance policy provided $1 million in uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for injuries Scott Paugh sustained in a 2002 motor vehicle accident. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the coverage issue, with undisputed facts showing that Westfield's agent required the Paughs to sign a rejection form to obtain the policy and that no optional UM/UIM coverage was offered during the application process despite West Virginia Code § 33-6-31's requirements and Westfield's prior representations. The court denied Westfield's motion and granted the Paughs' motion, holding that Westfield failed to make an effective statutory offer of coverage and that coverage therefore applied by operation of law.
The case involved Clarence and Sherri Pennington suing the Berkeley County Planning Commission and individual members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that denial of final plat approval for their commercial development (including a liquor store and video lottery machines) violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, purportedly due to public opposition rather than the stated regulatory reasons. Plaintiffs had successfully challenged the initial denial in state court via writ of certiorari, resulting in an order for preliminary approval that was not appealed. The federal district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint, ruling that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal jurisdiction over claims tied to the state court outcome, individual defendants were protected by qualified immunity, and no valid due process claim was stated because any delay did not implicate a protected property interest in the manner alleged. The court denied plaintiffs' motion to strike the dismissal motion, finding it procedurally proper under Rule 12(b).
This case involved environmental groups suing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and West Virginia transportation officials to block a Section 404 Clean Water Act permit for a new four-lane highway project, including a bridge over the Shenandoah River, after the Federal Highway Administration had already approved the project following an environmental impact statement. The plaintiffs claimed the Corps violated NEPA and the CWA by improperly relying on the prior federal review, failing to assess the full project scope or changed circumstances, and issuing its environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact without public notice. The court granted summary judgment to the agencies, ruling that the Corps' actions complied with both statutes because it had coordinated as a cooperating agency, followed its own NEPA regulations, and was not required to duplicate the FHWA's review or provide extra public comment periods.
In Duwel v. Charles Town General Hospital, a surgeon sued his former hospital employers alleging that misinformation about the availability of a leave of absence led him to involuntarily surrender his medical staff privileges, violating his common-law due process rights, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, and hospital bylaws; he sought damages, a declaratory judgment on immunity, removal of a report to the National Practitioner’s Data Bank, and reinstatement of privileges. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the evidence showed Duwel voluntarily tendered his privileges to avoid a credential committee vote and investigation, that facing an unpleasant choice between resignation and investigation does not render the resignation involuntary under precedent, and that the plaintiff’s affidavit—essentially restating his pleadings—failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
This case involved environmental groups challenging the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' decision to adopt a Federal Highway Administration environmental impact statement for a proposed 4.6-mile highway project in West Virginia without preparing its own analysis, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, NEPA, and the APA. The court granted the defendants' motion in limine, barring relitigation of issues regarding alternatives to the highway and indirect environmental impacts under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because those matters had already been fully litigated and decided in a prior related case against the FHWA. The court also granted the motion to dismiss the APA count, holding that the APA does not create an independent substantive cause of action but serves only as a procedural vehicle for claims under other statutes. The remaining claims regarding the Corps' adoption of the prior EIS were allowed to proceed.