The case involved a land development company seeking to discharge a sewer assessment lien placed by the town on two unsold lots in a recorded subdivision, along with related injunctive relief. The trial court ruled for the town, finding the lien valid, and the appellate court affirmed. The court determined that the plaintiff had impliedly dedicated the relevant street portion to public use by recording the subdivision map, referring to the proposed streets in deeds, and other conduct, and that the town accepted the dedication through its formal resolution and construction of sewers using public funds, which supported the assessment under principles of equitable estoppel.
The case concerned property owners near Manresa Island in Norwalk who challenged the Connecticut Light & Power Company's application to build a steam electric generating plant on the island, which was zoned for residential use. The Norwalk zoning commission approved the location under General Statutes § 5646, and after de novo hearings the public utilities commission affirmed that order, applying standards that weighed public convenience and necessity against zoning considerations, public health and welfare, and property values. The Superior Court dismissed the owners' appeal, and the Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the commissions had properly balanced the statutory factors without needing to exhaustively exclude all alternative sites and that § 5646 was constitutional because it supplied adequate legislative standards to guide the agencies.
This case involved an appeal from the Windsor town plan and zoning commission's decision to grant a change in the comprehensive plan and rezone fourteen acres from agriculture to business 2 for a shopping center, shortly after unanimously denying a similar application. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs' appeal, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs were aggrieved as property owners affected by the plan change and that the commission had acted illegally or arbitrarily. The core reasoning was that no new evidence addressed prior concerns about flooding or the adequacy of existing business zones, the second application differed only in terminology without regulatory basis, and private meetings between commissioners and applicants undermined the process.
The case involved the State Bar Association suing two banks, alleging they were unlawfully practicing law through trust department activities such as advertising estate planning services, providing general information on tax and trust laws, reviewing wills and trust agreements, preparing and filing probate documents like petitions and accounts, and appearing in probate court proceedings. The trial court ruled largely in favor of the banks, and on appeal the court held that activities like distributing general information, reviewing documents while urging consultation with attorneys, and handling routine tax returns and filings did not amount to the unauthorized practice of law under the relevant statutes. The court found error in part of the judgments, however, noting that involvement in complex legal issues commonly understood as the practice of law would violate the statutes, and remanded for modified judgments.
In Hennessey v. Hennessey, the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages after falling on a wet, waxed floor in the back hall of his home, where she had been staying as a social guest. The trial court treated her as a licensee and the jury returned a verdict in her favor, which the defendant appealed on grounds that the evidence was insufficient and the jury instructions were erroneous. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence, though circumstantial, permitted the jury to find that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition, that he failed to exercise reasonable care by requesting the plaintiff to close the door into that area or by warning her of the hazard, and that this failure proximately caused her fall. The court further concluded that the jury instructions adequately stated the duty owed to a licensee under the circumstances and that contributory negligence was not established as a matter of law.
The case involved a zoning commission's decision to rezone most of a 50-acre property from an R-20 district (half-acre minimum lots) to an R-40 district (one-acre minimum lots) as part of a town-wide pattern. The trial court reversed the commission's action after finding its stated reasons invalid and discriminatory, and the commission appealed solely on the ground that the court improperly admitted new evidence not presented at the original hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a 1955 statutory amendment allowed the trial court to admit additional relevant evidence when the commission's record lacked a stenographic or complete mechanical recording of the proceedings. The court reasoned that the statute's purpose was to enable full judicial review of incomplete administrative records, and the evidence here related to facts already referenced in the hearing.