James B. Carey

The case involved a personal injury suit by Joseph Dillon against General Motors and a car dealer for negligence and breach of warranty after he was injured in an accident allegedly caused by a defective steering column in his new Pontiac Firebird. A jury awarded Dillon $65,000, and the defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the case to reach the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and in denying their motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court affirmed the verdict, reasoning that res ipsa loquitur applied because Dillon showed something went wrong with the steering mechanism without identifying a specific defect, and the defendants' expert testimony about the column's design and post-accident condition did not constitute undisputed physical facts that conclusively rebutted any inference of negligence or malfunction. The court noted that the expert had not inspected the full vehicle and that the evidence left room for the jury to find a possible steering defect.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an appeal from the Superior Court's reversal of a zoning variance granted by the Wilmington Board of Adjustment, allowing property owners to build a 142-space parking facility on portions of land zoned R-1 residential to support two apartment towers planned for adjacent property zoned R-5-B. The Board had approved the variance based on exceptional conditions and hardship, but the Superior Court found insufficient evidence and reversed it. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that under precedent from Searles v. Darling, a variance requires hardship inherent in the specific property for which it is sought, not hardship arising from the intended use of neighboring property. The court reasoned that the appellants' need for parking stemmed from their apartment development plans rather than conditions unique to the R-1 lots, making the variance improper without legislative change to the zoning ordinance.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved credit card holders who sued three Delaware banks in the Court of Chancery, alleging they were charged interest exceeding the legal limit under 6 Del.C. § 2304(b) and seeking recovery of triple the excess interest or $500 per borrower. The banks moved to dismiss for lack of equity jurisdiction, arguing an adequate remedy existed at law in Superior Court. The Court of Chancery initially retained the case to consider whether a class action under Chancery Rule 23 could prevent a multiplicity of suits, but the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Rule is only procedural and does not expand equity jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Delaware strictly maintains the law-equity distinction, that common legal questions can be resolved through a few Superior Court actions establishing precedent, and that no imminent multiplicity of suits was shown.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved an appeal from the Court of Chancery's ruling that Delaware Trust Company did not breach its fiduciary duties as trustee under William DuPont Sr.'s will by participating in the 1928 Hopeton exchange. The transaction transferred voting shares of Delaware Trust stock held in the residuary trust to a new holding company controlled by the life tenants (the testator's children), in exchange for non-voting shares, while the trustee retained beneficial ownership. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the exchange improperly separated voting control from the trust's economic interests in a manner that favored the life tenants over the remaindermen (grandchildren) without adequate protection for the latter. The court reasoned that the trustee had a duty under the will and fiduciary principles to safeguard the remaindermen's interests impartially, and the facts raised a triable issue as to whether that duty was fulfilled. The matter was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of affirmative defenses.

propertyfamily law

This case was a derivative stockholders’ action in which a shareholder of Iroquois Industries challenged a transaction negotiated by the company’s president with Scotten, Dillon Company on grounds that the president had an undisclosed personal financial interest. The lower court awarded the plaintiff counsel fees after finding a triable issue of fraud under 8 Del.C. § 152 and a reasonable hope of success, even though the deal had been canceled. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the $25,000 fee award, holding that the record supported the allowance of fees and that the amount was reasonable under the circumstances.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from settlement agreements in which Noah Dietrich promised Howard Hughes and Hughes Tool Company not to disclose confidential information or publish any biographical writings about them; after Dietrich wrote a book titled Howard, The Amazing Mr. Hughes that was published by Fawcett Publications, Hughes Tool Company and Rosemont Enterprises sued in Delaware Chancery Court for breach of contract and inducement of breach, seeking damages plus a mandatory injunction requiring surrender of the manuscript and assignment of the copyright. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaints for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that equity jurisdiction was proper because the requested relief included assignment of copyright—an incorporeal right distinct from the physical manuscript that cannot be obtained through legal actions such as replevin or detinue—and that only a court of equity could grant complete relief through a mandatory injunction compelling transfer of that unique interest.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

This case concerns a stepfather who sought reimbursement in Superior Court from the natural father for money spent supporting the father's minor children after their mother's remarriage. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint because it did not allege that the plaintiff had first attempted to obtain support under 13 Del.C. §§ 502 and 702. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that those statutes do not furnish an adequate remedy for recovering past expenditures and that the stepfather is entitled to proceed to trial. The court further noted that the father's defenses—volunteer status, estoppel, and waiver—depend on factual development at trial and had not yet been addressed below.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over farm equipment purchased by debtor Warren Callaway, with Maryland National Bank holding a perfected purchase money security interest via a financing statement describing 'equipment of all kinds' and Porter-Way Harvester Manufacturing Company later perfecting its own interest on the same collateral. After Porter-Way obtained a judgment and conducted an execution sale of the equipment, the Bank petitioned to set aside the sale, arguing its lien continued. The Superior Court denied the petition, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the financing statement satisfied 5A Del.C. § 9-402(1) because Delaware's UCC uses a notice filing system where describing the type of collateral as 'equipment' is sufficient under §§ 9-402 and 9-110. It further ruled that under longstanding Delaware case law and UCC § 9-311, an execution sale extinguishes prior security interests, leaving the senior lienholder with priority claim to the sale proceeds rather than the goods themselves.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved a lawsuit by homeowners against a gas utility, the City of Wilmington, and a paving contractor for damages from a gas explosion in their home, allegedly caused by a break in a gas main near where the City and contractor had performed street repaving work months earlier. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding insufficient evidence of negligence or proximate cause, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. The core reasoning was that the record showed only a possibility—not a probability—that the repaving caused the pipe break, as expert testimony indicated the fracture could equally have resulted from frost, ground stress, or traffic shock, rendering any finding of causation speculative and insufficient to create a triable issue. The court clarified the summary judgment burden but held that the moving parties had met their initial burden and plaintiffs failed to rebut it with evidence of causation. It also noted an improper ex parte consultation by the trial judge but deemed it immaterial to the outcome.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a customer injured in a supermarket by a grocery cart being used by a wholesaler's employee to make a delivery. The plaintiff sought to apply strict liability for an allegedly inherently dangerous activity, but the trial court struck that count and permitted an amendment to an admission regarding control of the cart; the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that supermarket carts are not ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous under established tort standards, so liability turns on ordinary negligence principles rather than strict liability. The court also upheld the amendment to the admission as a proper exercise of discretion with no prejudice shown. The jury's verdict necessarily resolved the negligence issues in favor of the defendants.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case was an appeal by the plaintiffs from a summary judgment entered against them by the Court of Chancery in a dispute involving the estate of Alexia duPont Ortiz deBie. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. It did so on the basis that the Vice-Chancellor's opinion in the lower court proceeding had correctly analyzed and resolved the issues presented. No additional reasoning was provided by the Supreme Court.

propertyprocedure

In this case, a committee of preferred stockholders sought an allowance from corporate funds to compensate their attorney for services rendered during a receivership of the defendant corporation, including efforts to contest federal bankruptcy proceedings and to help formulate a reorganization plan. The Chancellor denied the request, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that denial. The court held that the Chancellor has wide discretion in such matters and found no abuse of that discretion or misapprehension of law, noting that the attorney's work did not clearly amount to preservation of corporate assets for the benefit of all shareholders and that the successful termination of the receivership resulted from fortuitous increases in asset value rather than the proposed plan. The court emphasized that allowances from corporate funds are granted only with restraint and only when special circumstances justify shifting the cost to the corporation.

business & regulatoryprocedure