Daniel L. Herrmann

This case involved clients of a brokerage firm who alleged that the firm breached its fiduciary duties by switching their money market sweep accounts to funds managed by a new venture partner without adequately disclosing that the firm would gain a financial interest in the venture through the transfer of client assets. The Court of Chancery dismissed the state law claims, but the Delaware Supreme Court reversed that dismissal and reinstated the claims for breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure and loyalty, along with related aiding and abetting claims. The court held that the disclosures in the notification letter and prospectus were inadequate because they only implied the firm's interest rather than stating it expressly, and implications cannot substitute for clear statements of fact on a mixed question of fact and law. The court also rejected federal preemption arguments, finding no direct conflict with securities regulations that would bar the state claims.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether Delaware taxpayers who filed a joint federal return claiming the two-earner married couple deduction under I.R.C. § 221 could also claim that deduction when electing to file separate Delaware state income tax returns. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's reversal of the Tax Appeal Board, holding that the deduction is unavailable for state tax purposes in this scenario. The court reasoned that Delaware law requires married couples filing separate state returns to recompute their federal adjusted gross income as if each had filed separate federal returns, consistent with longstanding administrative practice under Tax Ruling 82-1. This approach aligns with Delaware's single tax rate schedule for all filers, which does not create the federal-style marriage penalty that § 221 was designed to address. The ruling upheld the Secretary of Finance's authority to issue the regulation as not inconsistent with state tax statutes.

taxes

The case was an appeal by Robert D. Hughes from his Superior Court conviction for first-degree murder of his wife based entirely on circumstantial evidence such as blood drops, a rope from a child's wagon, and items at the crime scene. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the trial record detailing the investigation, Hughes's statements to police, medical examiner testimony on the time and cause of death, and events during jury deliberations. The court focused on whether the trial judge sufficiently investigated potential jury prejudice after the panel was exposed over a weekend recess to a newspaper article referencing statements by witnesses and prosecutors that were not introduced at trial, despite the jury's denial of having read any news accounts and the existence of undecided jurors at separation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over real property in Wilmington that the Court of Chancery had previously placed under a constructive trust for the benefit of plaintiffs Sannini and DiMichele after finding that defendant Oleda Casscells breached a fiduciary duty by purchasing it for herself while working as a saleswoman for their real estate broker. At the second stage of the bifurcated proceeding, the court determined that the plaintiffs must reimburse the Casscells $395,000 (subject to an existing mortgage) to obtain title, but the plaintiffs neither made the payment nor posted a supersedeas bond to stay the order. When the plaintiffs failed to tender payment within the ten-day period set by the December 19, 1977 order, the constructive trust dissolved by its terms, allowing the Casscells to sell the property to a third party. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' challenge to the reimbursement amount was moot because the sale deprived the court of the ability to grant effective relief, and it affirmed the lower court's judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a service station operator, Tulowitzki, who had leased and operated an Atlantic Richfield station in Delaware since 1968 under successive one-year leases that included rights to use the company's trademarks and a renewal policy tied to fuel sales volume. As the 1976 lease expired, Atlantic presented a renewal that added a provision requiring the lessee to pay averaged monthly rent for potential vapor recovery equipment that federal EPA rules might mandate, and it refused to renew without that addendum; Tulowitzki rejected the term, Atlantic cut off fuel deliveries, and litigation followed over whether the relationship qualified as a franchise and whether the demand was unjust or unconscionable. The Court of Chancery ruled for Atlantic, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, assuming arguendo that a franchise existed under the Franchise Security Law, because the addendum did not constitute an unjust non-renewal without good cause or bad faith given the uncertain but possible regulatory requirement, the use of system-wide average costs, and the absence of any showing that the terms were unreasonably one-sided. The court also found no violation of the Retail Sales of Motor Fuel Law and rejected claims that the relationship qualified as a franchise under either the statutory definition or common-law precedents. The decision rested on the principle that superior bargaining power alone does not establish unconscionability without an absence of meaningful choice and substantively unfair terms.

business & regulatory

This case involved a personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff struck her head on a metal electrical meter box attached to a utility pole by the defendant power company, resulting in vision loss and other injuries. The plaintiff alleged negligence in the box's placement at 70 inches high next to a sidewalk in a residential area under foliage without warnings, and a jury awarded her $145,000 in damages. The defendant appealed, arguing the trial court should have directed a verdict due to insufficient proof of the standard of care (claiming expert or custom evidence was required) and contributory negligence by the plaintiff. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reasonable-person standard of care could be determined by the jury without such evidence in this common-knowledge scenario, that sufficient facts supported a negligence finding, and that contributory negligence was not established as a matter of law.

torts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted of theft and conspiracy who appealed on the grounds that delays from his June 1974 arrest to his September 1975 trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The court examined the timeline, including a nolle prosequi due to a missing witness and subsequent re-indictment, while applying the balancing test from Barker v. Wingo that considers delay length, reasons for delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and any prejudice. It found that the defendant had asserted his right in December 1974, the State acted diligently regarding the witness, and there was no resulting prejudice, partly because some delays stemmed from the defendant's other pending cases. The court concluded that no speedy trial violation occurred and affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Delaware Real Estate Commission had authority to issue a public formal reprimand to a licensed real estate broker for newspaper advertising deemed improper. The Superior Court ruled that the Commission lacked such power, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the governing statute (24 Del.C. §§ 2901 et seq.) grants the Commission only the disciplinary options of suspending or revoking licenses under §§ 2912 and 2913, with no express or implied authority for public censure. The Commission’s alternative claim that the reprimand was a valid exercise of its rulemaking power under § 2905(1) was rejected because the action was not framed as establishing or enforcing a rule but instead amounted to ad hoc, retroactive discipline that lacked due process. The Court adopted principles from case law requiring general prospective rules rather than case-by-case adjudication for administrative agencies.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a real estate salesman suing an incorporated commercial real estate firm and its parent corporation to recover a disputed $9,000 sales commission. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff had waived any claim to the commission via a 1971 memorandum dividing future commissions and had not protested the treatment of the amount as an overpayment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, ruling that the record showed sufficient disputes of material fact on the issue of the plaintiff's intent to waive the claim, making summary judgment inappropriate and requiring jury determination. The court further noted that unresolved questions remained regarding whether the amount was a mistaken overpayment or earned commission and the potential applicability of Delaware wage statutes to any waiver.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves two consolidated workers' compensation claims under Delaware law where employees sought compensation for permanent scars from work-related injuries, arguing the scars were visible and offensive when clothed normally. The Industrial Accident Board awarded compensation to one claimant but denied it to the other, with the Superior Court reversing the award and affirming the denial based on prior precedent limiting "clothed normally" to daily routine attire excluding recreational clothing. The Delaware Supreme Court overruled that precedent, interpreting "clothed normally" to include clothing worn during any regular activities such as recreational ones, and remanded both cases for further proceedings consistent with this broader interpretation.

labor & employment

In Brown v. State, the defendant appealed his convictions for rape, robbery, and possession of a deadly weapon, challenging the admission of expert hair-identification testimony and the victim's and another witness's in-court identifications on grounds that they were tainted by multiple suggestive pre-trial confrontations. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the hair evidence was properly admitted with its weight left to the factfinder and that the in-court identifications were admissible because they had independent origins from the witnesses' observations during the crime. The court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test, noting the victim's half-hour unobstructed view in adequate light and accurate prior description, which showed no substantial likelihood of misidentification despite the questionable procedures. It similarly found the second witness's brief but clear daylight view sufficient to support his identification. The decision rested on precedents like Stovall v. Denno, Simmons v. United States, and United States v. Wade regarding due process in identifications.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a garnishment action by John Julian Construction Co. to recover a judgment debt owed by Monarch Builders, Inc., from Albert Marta and Frank Acierno as garnishees, based on claims that the garnishees assumed the debt, were alter egos of the corporation, or received fraudulent transfers. The court affirmed the denial of the garnishees' motion for summary judgment, holding that an assumption of the debt could create a garnishable obligation and that jurisdictional objections were waived by participation in the proceedings. It also affirmed the denial of Julian's motion for summary judgment due to remaining disputed issues of material fact regarding the assumption of the debt. The court further ruled that theories of piercing the corporate veil and fraudulent conveyances, along with related dissolution claims under Delaware corporate statutes, were not properly pursued in a garnishment action and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved Harry A. Mayer's conviction in Superior Court for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, following a search of his home under a warrant; he was acquitted on a related firearm charge. Mayer appealed, arguing that the affidavit supporting the warrant lacked probable cause due to insufficient proof of the informant's reliability and staleness of the information, and that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the firearm charge from the drug charge. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the affidavit established the informant's reliability through prior successful drug introductions and detailed observations, and that the combination of recent and ongoing information about marijuana at the residence supported probable cause at the time of the search. It further ruled that the charges arose from the same transaction, making joinder proper under Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) without undue prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved appeals by Alan Kent Kreisher from Superior Court convictions for possession of marijuana and hashish under 16 Del.C. § 4722, after he pleaded guilty to the marijuana charge and was convicted by a jury on the hashish charge. Kreisher challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment and an abuse of discretion, and raised constitutional claims that the statute violated rights to privacy and equal protection, exceeded the state's police power, and treated marijuana differently from other substances without rational basis; he also argued entrapment and inconsistent verdicts on the hashish count. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, ruling that no constitutional right of privacy encompasses marijuana possession, the law is a valid exercise of police power, equal protection claims failed due to a rational basis for different treatment, and the jury instructions and verdicts on entrapment were consistent and supported by the evidence.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Gaster v. Wilmington Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., a plumbing materials supplier sought a mechanic's lien against an apartment building after a subcontractor failed to pay for approximately $8,122.75 in delivered items, including water closets and faucets, during construction where the property owners served as general contractors. The trial court granted the lien with a priority date of March 18, 1969, without requiring proof that the materials were incorporated into the building, and also entered a personal judgment against the subcontractor. On appeal, the court affirmed, interpreting 25 Del.C. § 2702(a) to permit liens for materials furnished "for or at such structure" by a subcontractor regardless of later incorporation, and concluding that lien waivers were for the benefit of lenders and title insurers rather than releases of the supplier's claim. The court further held that a prior judicial concession regarding the lien date was not binding in the second trial and that the lien could include charges for tools and expendable materials.

property

In Rash v. State, defendants convicted by a jury of marijuana possession under 16 Del.C. § 4722 sought to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence, but the State moved to dismiss on grounds that the Superior Court's disposition under the conditional discharge statute, 16 Del.C. § 4764, was not a final judgment. The Delaware Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that a § 4764 disposition—which defers entry of judgment, places the defendant on probation with consent, and dismisses proceedings upon successful completion—is not appealable. The court reasoned that the Delaware Constitution limits criminal appeals to final judgments, precluding interlocutory review, and that the statute's mechanism merely postpones rather than waives appeal rights, which become available if probation is violated and judgment is later entered. The court also provided guidelines to ensure no judgment or sentencing occurs until the statutory process concludes.

criminal lawprocedure

In Freeman v. State, appellants Willard Freeman and John Martin appealed their convictions for possession of a narcotic drug with intent to sell and conspiracy, challenging the legality of the search and seizure of their vehicle. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the police lacked probable cause to stop and search the car based on observations of brief, non-transactional interactions in a high-drug area, which amounted only to suspicion rather than sufficient facts to believe a crime had occurred. Consequently, the evidence obtained was inadmissible, and the convictions were reversed. The court emphasized that warrantless searches require probable cause, which was absent here despite the automobile exception considerations.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involves Elpidio Ortiz's appeal of the denial of unemployment benefits after his discharge for repeated tardiness and absences. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's affirmance of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's denial, holding that the employer lacked just cause for termination under the circumstances. The court reasoned that the employer had condoned the claimant's poor attendance record for six months while providing accommodations for his wife's illness, making an explicit warning necessary before ending that tolerance and discharging him without notice. The ruling is confined to these exceptional facts and does not require warnings in every absenteeism case.

labor & employment

In Smith v. State, the defendant appealed his rape conviction, raising three issues: denial of pretrial discovery of a police memorandum paraphrasing statements the defendant made to his father, the trial judge's failure to specifically admonish the jury about avoiding news reports of the trial, and the use of a witness's prior out-of-court statement as substantive evidence. The court held that the memorandum was not discoverable under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 because it reflected an officer's recollection of a third party's account, consistent with precedent in Ray v. State. It further ruled that the lack of a daily media admonition was not reversible error given the jury handbook instructions and that any exposure was properly handled by dismissing the affected juror, while providing non-mandatory guidelines for future cases on jury management and media exposure. On the third issue, the court applied a statute allowing prior inconsistent or consistent statements of a testifying witness to be used as affirmative evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hill v. State, two defendants convicted of kidnapping and rape appealed their convictions, claiming that their joint representation by the same public defenders violated their Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest, and that the admission of each defendant's out-of-court statements for impeachment purposes violated the Confrontation Clause under Bruton v. United States because the co-defendant was unavailable for cross-examination. The court held that joint representation of co-defendants does not per se constitute ineffective assistance absent a demonstrated conflict or prejudice, and that the Confrontation Clause was not violated because both defendants testified at trial with consistent, exculpatory accounts of events (claiming consent) that did not accuse each other. The court further reasoned that counsel had represented to the trial judge before trial that no conflict existed, and that effective examination occurred through shared counsel, but it remanded the case for a determination of the trustworthiness and voluntariness of the statements used for impeachment. The topics are criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure