Harry Lee Anstead

In Calabro v. State, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a case where the defendant, during his arraignment for second-degree murder, made statements expressing a desire to avoid trial through a plea agreement and admitting guilt. The trial court excluded both statements as inadmissible offers to plead guilty under section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(h), but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed as to the second statement, deeming it an unsolicited unilateral utterance. The Supreme Court quashed the appellate decision, holding that the statements were made in connection with plea negotiations and thus inadmissible. The core reasoning was that excluding such statements promotes the policy of encouraging plea discussions without fear of their use at trial, consistent with the evidence code and procedural rules.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a criminal defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after his attorney failed to timely file a motion to disqualify the trial judge based on comments made during a hearing on counsel's motion to withdraw, which the defendant interpreted as showing the judge had predetermined a life sentence. The Florida Supreme Court addressed a certified conflict among district courts of appeal regarding the proper standard for assessing prejudice in such claims. The court held that the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington governs these ineffective assistance claims rather than an alternative approach, and it quashed the First District's decision that had applied a different standard. Applying Strickland to the record, the court examined whether counsel's deficient performance undermined confidence in the outcome due to any actual judicial bias.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a negligence lawsuit brought by the estate of a driver killed in a car accident at a T-intersection, alleging that overgrown foliage on adjacent residential property owned by Williams obstructed the driver's view and contributed to the collision. The Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question by holding that private residential property owners owe no common-law duty to motorists on abutting public roads to maintain foliage located wholly within the bounds of their property. Applying the foreseeable zone of risk analysis from McCain v. Florida Power Corp., the court reasoned that Florida tort law has traditionally limited landowners' duties to those who enter the property and does not extend to internal foliage that does not intrude into the public right-of-way, though a duty does exist if foliage extends outward to interfere with roadway safety. The decision reversed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's contrary ruling and reinstated summary judgment for the property owner.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved homeowners whose house was destroyed by fire, a covered peril, and who received the face value of their policy under Florida's Valued Policy Law but disputed whether they could recover under a supplemental ordinance or law endorsement without proving they had actually incurred extra expenses for compliance with building codes. The Florida Supreme Court approved the Third District Court of Appeal's decision holding that the insureds were required to demonstrate an actual loss before payment under the supplemental coverage. The court reasoned that while the Valued Policy Law fixes the measure of damages for the primary dwelling coverage in total-loss situations, it does not override or alter the unambiguous terms of the policy's additional endorsements that condition payment on proof of incurred costs. It therefore disapproved conflicting language from a prior Fourth District decision on this supplemental-coverage issue.

property

This case involved a challenge to a Florida statute that created a temporary exemption from the certificate-of-need requirement for establishing an adult open-heart surgery program in a new hospital under specific conditions, including relocation from an existing hospital with such a program and use of a closed-staff model. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the lower courts' rulings that the statute was unconstitutional as a special law enacted without following the requirements for special laws. The court reasoned that the statute's criteria were so narrowly tailored that no hospital other than St. Vincent's could realistically qualify for the exemption before its expiration on January 1, 2008, making it apply only to one entity in practice.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit in which the plaintiffs alleged that a hospital negligently credentialed a physician who performed procedures resulting in injury, and sought discovery of the list of privileges granted to that physician through the hospital's credentialing process. The trial court and district court ordered production of the list over the hospital's objections based on peer review confidentiality statutes. The Florida Supreme Court approved the result, holding that a claimant is entitled to discovery of the privileges granted to a physician but not to the actual records of the credentials committee involved in determining those privileges. The court reasoned that the statutes protect investigations, proceedings, and records of peer review committees, but the final list of granted privileges constitutes a non-protected outcome or hospital record rather than confidential committee materials.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a class action lawsuit by Florida property owners against a law firm representing mortgage lenders, alleging that the firm violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act by sending reinstatement letters that claimed excessive costs for title searches and other services during foreclosure proceedings. The trial court certified a class limited to borrowers whose properties were not ultimately foreclosed, but the First District Court of Appeal addressed whether the litigation privilege barred the statutory claims. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict with another district court decision by holding that the litigation privilege applies to all causes of action, whether statutory or common law. However, the Court concluded that the privilege did not bar the claims here because the reinstatement letters were nonadversarial presuit communications between private parties rather than acts necessarily preliminary to judicial proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

In V.K.E. v. State, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether mandatory surcharges under adult criminal statutes sections 938.08 and 938.085, for domestic violence costs and the rape crisis fund, could be imposed on a juvenile who pled nolo contendere to simple battery in delinquency proceedings. The court answered no to the certified question and quashed the district court's affirmance of the trial court's imposition of the surcharges. The core reasoning was that the Legislature created a separate rehabilitative juvenile justice system distinct from the punitive adult criminal system, has expressly applied certain criminal costs to juveniles in other instances but not these, and has generally directed that court fees and costs should not be imposed in juvenile proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether an insurance policy financed through a premium finance agreement had been canceled before an injury occurred on the insured property, turning on the interpretation of Florida's premium finance cancellation statute. Scottsdale Insurance had issued a policy to the Cuban Club with a mortgagee notice requirement; after the insured defaulted on payments, the finance company canceled the policy effective January 9, 2001, but the mortgagee received notice later. The Millers, who obtained a judgment against the Cuban Club and were assigned its policy rights, sued Scottsdale claiming coverage because the policy remained in force until notice to the mortgagee. The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question by holding that section 627.848 provides for a single cancellation date for the contract as a whole, applying the statute's plain and unambiguous language that mandates uniform procedures without separate effective dates for different parties.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether Florida's 1994 Money Transmitters' Code (chapter 560) authorized deferred presentment transactions, in which a customer receives cash in exchange for a postdated check plus a fee, with the provider agreeing to hold the check for a period. The Florida Supreme Court held that such transactions constitute short-term loans not covered by the Code and are therefore subject to the state's usury laws. The Court reached this conclusion by examining the statutory definitions of check cashing and money transmission, which it found limited to immediate exchanges of currency for payment instruments rather than advances with deferred presentment and fees; it also noted the absence of any legislative approval for these practices until later amendments. The decision approved the Fourth District's ruling and rejected the Fifth District's contrary view in a conflicting case.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a construction contract dispute in which Caldwell Construction sued Colby Materials for alleged double payment, and Colby responded with motions to strike and dismiss prepared pro se by its non-attorney owner rather than licensed counsel. The trial court struck the motions, entered a default, and issued a final judgment; the Fifth District affirmed, treating the unauthorized filings as a nullity that justified the default. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fifth District's decision and remanded, holding that filings by unauthorized agents are amendable defects rather than nullities. The court reasoned that parties should receive a reasonable opportunity to obtain proper counsel before sanctions are imposed, consistent with its prior ruling in Torrey that prioritizes resolution on the merits and liberal amendment of pleadings.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Stephen Scipio's appeal of his first-degree murder conviction, based on a claim that the prosecution committed a discovery violation by failing to notify the defense that a key defense witness had recanted his deposition testimony after being approached by the prosecutor. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision and remanded for a new trial, holding that the State had not demonstrated the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that the undisclosed change in testimony—regarding whether a gun was present at the crime scene—materially prejudiced the defense by undermining its strategy of suggesting another perpetrator, and it clarified that its prior harmless-error analysis in State v. Schopp applies to such discovery violations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a claimant denied unemployment benefits by the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission must continue filing weekly claims during an appeal of that denial in order to receive benefits if the appeal succeeds. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed a Second District decision that sided with the Commission, which conflicted with a Third District ruling in Dines. The Court quashed the Second District decision and approved Dines, holding that claimants are not required to file ongoing weekly claims after an adverse eligibility ruling. The core reasoning was that such filings would constitute a useless act given the Commission's rejection of eligibility, and the appellate mandate directing payment of benefits must be followed without additional procedural hurdles.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit filed in 2001 alleging negligence during a child's birth, which the trial court dismissed in 2002 for failure to prosecute under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e) after periods of inactivity in the record, including motions to appear pro hac vice. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal and certified a question about whether trial court orders resolving good-faith motions qualify as record activity. The Florida Supreme Court answered that such orders entered and filed to resolve properly filed motions should be treated as record activity precluding dismissal, quashing the district court's decision. The Court reasoned from the text and history of rule 1.420(e), emphasizing that activity must appear on the face of the record and that prior passive-activity distinctions were no longer required after Metropolitan Dade County v. Hall.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether the State could benefit from an automatic stay under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2) when appealing a trial court's dismissal of a petition to civilly commit Frank Mitchell as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act (part V of chapter 394, Florida Statutes). The trial court had dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because Mitchell's current incarceration was not for a sexual offense, though probable cause had been found earlier. The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that the State was entitled to the automatic stay because the commitment proceedings are civil in nature and the rule applies to civil appeals by public parties. The core reasoning was that the civil classification of the proceedings under the statute and case law, combined with the rule's text applying to public entities without distinguishing case types, supported the stay, while noting that the respondent could still move to dissolve or modify it based on the circumstances and liberty interests involved.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wright v. State, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court's failure in 1979 to provide written reasons for retaining jurisdiction over the first third of a defendant's armed robbery sentences, as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes, rendered the sentences illegal and thus subject to challenge decades later under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The petitioner had filed a 2002 motion claiming the omission made his sentences illegal, after the trial court had already granted relief on a separate claim about retaining jurisdiction over multiple sentences. The Court approved the Second District Court of Appeal's holding that such a procedural violation does not qualify as an illegal sentence under the rule, which is limited to sentences no judge could lawfully impose, such as those exceeding statutory maximums or imposed without authority. The reasoning drew an analogy to the Court's prior decision in Davis v. State, where failure to provide written departure reasons was deemed not correctable at any time via 3.800(a) but only on direct appeal, and distinguished it from fundamental defects allowing indefinite postconviction relief.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the constitutionality of Florida Statute section 193.016, which directs property appraisers to consider a prior year's reduced assessment by a value adjustment board when valuing tangible personal property for tax purposes, and to justify any upward adjustment with new facts. Taxpayers challenged the law as violating article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution by interfering with appraisers' discretion to determine just value and by creating a favored class of property. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling of unconstitutionality, holding that the statute imposes only a procedural requirement to consider prior determinations without mandating a specific valuation outcome or establishing an invalid classification. The Court reasoned that the law preserves appraisers' authority to reach just value under uniform standards and does not arbitrarily favor certain taxpayers over others.

taxesproperty

The case involved three defendants arrested for drug sales who entered agreements with law enforcement to provide substantial assistance in exchange for delayed formal charges and court proceedings, without signing speedy trial waivers. Trial courts granted their motions for discharge under Florida's speedy trial rule after charges were filed beyond the 175-day limit, but the First District reversed, finding the delays attributable to the defendants' cooperation. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the First District's decision and approved the conflicting Williams ruling, holding that an agreement to cooperate with police, standing alone, does not waive the right to a speedy trial or prevent the rule's time from running. The court reasoned that defendants are not deemed unavailable for trial absent scheduled proceedings or explicit waiver, and the rule's protections apply whether defendants are in custody or at liberty, preventing the state from avoiding its requirements through unarrests or cooperation deals.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether Florida Statute section 627.7405, which requires insurers of commercial motor vehicles to reimburse insurers of private passenger vehicles for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits paid after an accident involving the commercial vehicle, violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions by creating an arbitrary classification without regard to fault. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a decision from the Second District Court of Appeal that had affirmed a trial court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm, which had paid PIP benefits and sought reimbursement from Amerisure. The court applied the rational basis test, noting that the parties conceded the statute served a legitimate governmental purpose of regulating insurance rates, and held that the classification between commercial and private vehicles was rationally related to that purpose by reallocating some insurance risk. Accordingly, the court approved the Second District's decision upholding the statute's constitutionality, along with similar rulings from other districts, and disapproved a conflicting Third District decision that had found no rational basis for the law.

business & regulatorycivil rights

The case involved a class action lawsuit by borrowers against Buckeye Check Cashing alleging that its deferred deposit agreements were illegal usurious loans under Florida statutes, with the contracts containing arbitration clauses governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The trial court denied Buckeye's motion to compel arbitration, a decision reversed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal but then reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court due to conflict with Fifth District precedent. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District's ruling and held that an arbitration provision in a contract claimed to be void ab initio under state law cannot be separately enforced by an arbitrator while the underlying contract's legality remains pending before a trial court. The core reasoning relied on state cases such as FastFunding and Party Yards, which distinguish challenges to a contract's validity from issues of contract formation or fraud in inducement addressed in Prima Paint, concluding that Florida courts must first resolve whether the contract is illegal before any arbitration can proceed.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power