Rivers H. Buford

The case involved Edmun Realty Corporation seeking to re-establish a lost promissory note and mortgage through proceedings that required constructive service by publication on named defendants Belle Weiner and Samuel Weiner, as well as all other interested persons. The trial court dismissed the bill of complaint, finding the published notice insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the unnamed defendants. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the notice failed to include a brief statement of the substance of the petition as mandated by Florida statute section 71.07. The court emphasized that statutes authorizing substituted service must be strictly followed to acquire jurisdiction. The notice only described the relief sought without summarizing the petition's substance, rendering the service defective.

propertyprocedure

In Williams v. Mayo, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus after conviction in a criminal case. The Florida Supreme Court determined that the facts were identical to those in the prior case of Scott v. Mayo. Relying on that precedent and citing Florida Statutes sections 924.34 and 775.09, the court declined to discharge the petitioner from custody. Instead, it remanded the matter to the Criminal Court of Record of Duval County for entry of judgment and sentence on a lesser included offense within the charged information.

criminal law

The case involved two consolidated appeals by farmers who borrowed from the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation in 1943 under special war crop advance contracts to finance bean production; the contracts provided that the agency would cancel any unpaid balance if the borrowers met five conditions regarding use of funds, insurance, husbandry, and application of crop proceeds, with certification by designated county boards. The trial court entered judgments against the borrowers after they repaid all crop proceeds but were denied the required certificates. The dissenting opinion concluded that the judgments should be reversed because the borrowers' uncontradicted evidence of full compliance with the contract conditions was sufficient to establish that the certifying agents acted arbitrarily and capriciously in refusing the certificates, making formal certification unnecessary and entitling the borrowers to cancellation of the remaining balances under the contract terms.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case Laster v. State concerned the appellant's conviction for manslaughter based on claims of unlawful and culpable negligence while driving an automobile that struck and killed a young girl. The facts showed the appellant was driving lawfully on a paved highway when the child, who had exited another vehicle with her parents to gather flowers, suddenly ran across the road directly in front of his oncoming car. The court examined the evidence and determined it did not establish unlawful driving or culpable negligence under the standards from prior decisions such as Cannon v. State. As a result, the judgment of conviction was reversed.

criminal law

The case concerned a dispute over ownership of a savings share account deposit at Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association, opened in 1941 under a certificate and membership application naming John Novark (now deceased) and Alice Naphtali as joint holders with right of survivorship. The trial court decreed the account to be the sole property of Naphtali and ordered the association to pay the balance to her. The appellate court reversed, holding that the contract language was insufficient to create either a present gift inter vivos or a survivorship estate because Novark had never surrendered dominion over the certificate or deposits. The decision relied on precedent from Webster v. St. Petersburg Federal Savings and Loan Association.

property

The case Paris v. Barfield concerned an appeal alleging errors related to the selection of jurors for trial. The dissenting opinion concluded that the appellants failed to demonstrate harmful error in the jury selection process. This was because the record did not show that the appellants had challenged or expressed a desire to challenge any of the individuals tendered as jurors.

procedure