Major B. Harding

The case involved Charles Murray, who after pleading guilty to attempted capital sexual battery and serving his prison term, was detained in a treatment facility pending civil commitment as a sexually violent predator under Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act; he sought habeas corpus relief arguing that the commitment violated due process by breaching his plea agreement for probation. The Fourth District Court of Appeal dismissed the petition, concluding it lacked jurisdiction over the committing court and that the order was legal. On review for express conflict with Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center v. T.O., the Florida Supreme Court determined that the district court had misapplied the precedent on the limited scope of habeas review when lacking supervisory jurisdiction, and it addressed the proper transfer and handling of such petitions across territorial districts.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns the Florida Supreme Court's consideration of a Judicial Management Council report addressing the balance between individual privacy rights and public access to court records when those records are made available electronically, such as via the Internet. The Council was tasked with answering whether the Court should develop statewide policies on the issue, what steps would be needed to implement them, and whether a moratorium on electronic access should be imposed in the interim. After reviewing workshops, presentations from other jurisdictions, public comments, and the benefits of electronic access alongside risks to confidential or sensitive information, the Court noted that the Legislature had enacted a law creating a 21-member study committee to examine electronic access to court records and report back by January 2003. The opinion also highlighted national efforts to develop model policies and stressed that clerks must not release statutorily exempt information online.

free speechcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a defendant who filed a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct his consecutive habitual offender sentences, arguing that the underlying offenses occurred during a single criminal episode in violation of Hale v. State. The trial court denied the motion as untimely under rule 3.850, and the district court affirmed, holding that a sworn arrest report in the court file could not be used to resolve the factual question of whether the offenses arose from one episode. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, ruling that such a determination requires an evidentiary hearing and cannot be made as a matter of law from untested hearsay in a police report. The court reasoned that its precedent in Callaway limits rule 3.800 motions to pure questions of law and that rule 3.850 provides the proper mechanism with its time limits and hearing procedures. The defendant's claim was therefore time-barred.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned Mitchell Westerheide's challenge to his involuntary civil commitment under Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act as a sexually violent predator following his criminal convictions for sexual offenses against a child. The trial court rejected Westerheide's constitutional challenges, a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator based on expert testimony regarding his mental disorders and likelihood of reoffending, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the commitment while upholding the Act. On review of certified questions, the Florida Supreme Court held that the Act does not violate the ex post facto, double jeopardy, due process, or equal protection clauses of the U.S. or Florida constitutions. The court reasoned that the proceedings are civil rather than criminal in nature, aimed at treatment and public protection rather than punishment, and that the Act's requirements for clear and convincing evidence of a mental abnormality predisposing the person to reoffend provide adequate safeguards without needing less restrictive alternatives. The court also addressed related evidentiary issues but ultimately affirmed the commitment order.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved a challenge to a 2002 Florida statute requiring the Department of State to prepare and include a fiscal impact statement (limited to 50 words) on the ballot for any citizen-initiated constitutional amendment, estimating effects on state or local revenues and costs. Two political committees advocating for specific initiatives (on class size reduction and pre-K education) sought to enjoin the Secretary of State from adding these statements to the November 2002 ballot, after the Florida Supreme Court had already approved their ballot titles and summaries. The trial court granted the injunction, ruling the law facially unconstitutional under article XI, sections 3 and 5 of the Florida Constitution, and the Supreme Court affirmed after de novo review. The core reasoning was that the state constitution reserves the initiative process to the people with defined requirements and does not authorize the legislature to impose additional ballot mandates like fiscal statements, unlike certain other states' constitutions that explicitly grant such authority. The Court also noted the law would improperly alter vested rights for initiatives already approved for the ballot.

electionsprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of carjacking, robbery, and attempted false imprisonment who challenged his convictions and sentence on double jeopardy grounds and under the 1995 sentencing guidelines. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy does not prohibit convictions for both robbery and carjacking, approving the lower court's result on that issue in line with its decision in Cruller v. State. On the sentencing challenge, the court determined the defendant had standing to raise a Heggs claim because his offense occurred during the relevant window period, and it remanded for resentencing under the 1994 guidelines after finding they would produce a lower sentencing range.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the Florida Supreme Court's review of the constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, which established state legislative redistricting plans following the 2000 census. The court held that its expedited review authority under article III, section 16 of the Florida Constitution is limited to state-law challenges and does not encompass complex federal claims such as Voting Rights Act violations or political gerrymandering. It reasoned that the state constitutional process was not structured to accommodate the evidentiary and procedural demands of those federal issues, that political gerrymandering claims require an especially high showing of exclusion from the political process under Bandemer, and that Bush v. Gore does not impose a requirement for the Legislature to adopt extraconstitutional redistricting standards.

electionscivil rightsfederal power

The case concerned whether an unmasked accomplice who drove the getaway vehicle could have his convictions for robbery and attempted carjacking reclassified to a higher degree under Florida's mask statute, section 775.0845, which enhances offenses committed while wearing a hood or mask. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative and quashed the district court's decision affirming the enhanced convictions. The court held that the statute requires proof that the defendant personally concealed his identity with a mask and rejected any theory of vicarious or constructive liability based on the masked conduct of codefendants. The court also rejected the defendant's separate claim that double jeopardy barred convictions for both robbery and attempted carjacking.

criminal law

In Cruller v. State, the defendant was convicted of both robbery without a firearm (for taking the victim's wallet) and carjacking without a firearm (for taking the victim's motor vehicle) based on a single incident in which he and an accomplice used force to obtain the items. The Florida Supreme Court held that the dual convictions and punishments did not violate double jeopardy. The court reasoned that the legislature intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes, as shown by the distinct statutory definitions, the structure of the carjacking statute, and its legislative history, which treat robbery of personal effects and carjacking of a vehicle as separate offenses even when arising from one episode.

criminal law

In Wingfield v. State, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of burglary, aggravated battery on law enforcement officers, and other offenses arising from his flight from police in a borrowed truck, during which he rammed the vehicle into a police cruiser and then entered a nearby apartment. The Florida Supreme Court accepted review based on certified conflict with a prior district court decision regarding whether the ramming of an occupied vehicle can constitute a battery. The court remanded the case to the Second District Court of Appeal for reconsideration of the aggravated battery convictions, directing application of its recent holding in Clark v. State that the sufficiency of evidence for such a conviction depends on whether the specific circumstances show a sufficiently close connection between the vehicle and its occupants.

criminal law

The case concerned James E. Brake, Jr., who was charged under Florida Statute section 787.025 with luring a child under 12 into a dwelling for other than a lawful purpose after having a prior conviction for a similar offense in Texas; the facts showed Brake approached a 10-year-old girl, gave her a toy, took her to his home on his bicycle without parental consent, and engaged in brief physical contact. The trial court denied Brake's motion to dismiss, but the district court of appeal held the statute unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "other than a lawful purpose" was undefined and the statutory affirmative defenses could not cure the defect. On review, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Brake lacked standing to mount a facial vagueness challenge since his conduct was clearly proscribed by the statute's plain terms, construed the statute to prohibit luring for an illegal purpose, rejected the district court's analysis of the prima facie evidence provision as an unconstitutional presumption, and upheld the statute's constitutionality as so limited. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded to permit Brake to withdraw his nolo contendere plea.

criminal law

In Pullen v. State, Gloria Pullen appealed a Division of Administrative Hearings order authorizing her continued involuntary civil commitment under Florida's Baker Act after her appointed public defender filed an Anders brief stating no reversible error existed. The First District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Anders procedures do not apply to Baker Act proceedings because they are civil rather than criminal and the right to counsel arises under the due process clause. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that Anders is grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases and is therefore inapplicable to civil commitments, while adopting an alternative procedure modeled on termination of parental rights cases: counsel may move to withdraw after a conscientious record review, the appellant receives an opportunity to file a pro se brief, and failure to prosecute results in dismissal. The Court emphasized that states may use procedures ensuring appeals are resolved based on their merits without mandating the exact Anders framework.

procedurecivil rights

This case involved a legal malpractice claim by Fremont Indemnity Company against its former law firm, Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason & Spring, P.A., for allegedly negligent handling of the defense in underlying litigation against Fremont's insured, including failure to communicate settlement offers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of when the two-year statute of limitations began to run on the malpractice claims. The court held that the limitations period commenced at the conclusion of the underlying litigation, when it reached final judgment. The reasoning followed the precedent in Silvestrone v. Edell, under which the statute of limitations for malpractice arising from errors or omissions in the course of litigation does not begin to run until the litigation concludes by final judgment.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether Florida's speedy trial rule under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 allows the state to file an information after the 175-day speedy trial period has expired following an arrest, without any prior state action such as a nolle prosequi. The defendant was arrested in October 1999, the state filed charges 206 days later in May 2000, and she moved for discharge on speedy trial grounds. Following its prior decisions in State v. Agee and Genden v. Fuller, the Florida Supreme Court held that the speedy trial period continues to run from arrest and cannot be tolled by the state's delay in filing formal charges, so the defendant was entitled to discharge. The court reasoned that permitting the state to file after expiration would undermine the rule's protections by allowing prosecutors to delay while developing their case. The decision answered a certified question from the district court of appeal in the negative, applying Genden even where the state took no pre-expiration action.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the accrual date for the statute of limitations in a negligence claim by an insured against his insurance agent for failing to secure coverage on stored sports card inventory. After coverage was denied by the insurer and Blumberg sued the insurer for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, he later filed a separate negligence action against the agent; the agent raised the statute of limitations as a defense. The Florida Supreme Court approved the Fourth District's ruling that the limitations period began to run when Blumberg filed suit against the insurer, because that filing demonstrated his awareness of potential harm from the agent's alleged negligence. The decision resolved a conflict with prior precedent on when damages are sufficiently certain to start the limitations clock in malpractice or negligence actions tied to underlying disputes.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was a class action challenging Florida Medicaid rules that excluded coverage for medically necessary abortions except when the pregnancy endangered the mother's life or resulted from rape or incest. Petitioners, including Medicaid-eligible pregnant women and abortion providers, argued that the restrictions violated the state constitutional right to privacy under Article I, Section 23. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question from the district court in the negative, holding that the rules did not violate the privacy clause. The court's reasoning relied on the federal Medicaid framework, the Hyde Amendment's funding limits, and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. McRae, which upheld similar federal restrictions against equal protection and privacy challenges.

abortionhealthcarecivil rights

The case involved an appeal from a circuit court judgment validating sewer revenue bonds issued by the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority to finance wastewater system projects in the Florida Keys, prompted by environmental concerns and a county comprehensive plan. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the validation. The court reasoned that proceedings under chapter 75, Florida Statutes, are limited in scope to whether the issuing body has the power to act and whether it exercised that power lawfully, excluding collateral challenges such as the validity or enforceability of the related mandatory connection ordinance.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a legal malpractice claim by clients against their attorneys for allegedly failing to include required disclosures in stock purchase agreements under Florida securities law, which led to third-party litigation, a settlement, and damages for the clients. The trial court granted summary judgment to the attorneys on statute of limitations grounds, but the district court reversed, holding that the limitations period in transactional malpractice cases begins when the related third-party litigation concludes. The Florida Supreme Court approved the district court's decision and receded from its prior ruling in Edwards v. Ford to the extent it conflicted, reasoning that a malpractice cause of action accrues when the client incurs damages at the end of the underlying proceedings, consistent with its recent decision in Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co. The court emphasized that this approach avoids inconsistent positions by clients and prevents premature or speculative suits.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved an inmate, Steve Pearson, who sought to enforce a plea agreement making his habitual offender sentence coterminous with a prior sentence, which the Department of Corrections refused to implement due to a statutory requirement that prisoners serve at least 85% of their sentence. The circuit court denied mandamus relief, but the First District Court of Appeal granted it, holding that the statute only limits the DOC's gain-time authority and that refusing to follow the court's sentence violates separation of powers. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the DOC must execute the sentence as imposed by the judiciary.

criminal law

In State v. Maynard, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether police had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk based on a tip from a woman who identified herself as the suspect's mother and reported that he was carrying a concealed machine gun in a backpack. The trial court had denied the defendant's motion to suppress the firearm found during the stop, but the Second District reversed, classifying the caller as an anonymous informant whose tip alone was insufficient. The Supreme Court quashed that decision, holding that the caller qualified as a citizen informant because she disclosed her relationship to the suspect, provided an address, demonstrated a basis of knowledge, and showed no motive other than concern for safety, making the tip reliable enough by itself to justify the stop. The court therefore approved the conflicting decision in Foy v. State and ruled the evidence admissible. The topics selected are criminal law, procedure, and guns.

criminal lawprocedureguns